Chapter 2 | Literature review

2 LITERATURE REVIEW & BACKGROUND
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2.2.5 Malay supremacy

According to Heng, there are three core ethnic identifiers of “Malayness” – bahasa, agama, raja (language, religion, and royalty) – that was constantly used by the Malay leaders to reflect the hegemonic status of the Malay in Malaysian polity.[1]

Shamsul said these ethnic identifiers concurred with the three key attributes identified by the Malay nationalist movement in the 1900s.[2] These Malay nationalists also felt that Malay should be the sole official and national language in an independent Malaya.

The Malay nationalists which consist of three factions – the “administocrats”, the Malay Left, and the Islamic leaders – differed in regards of the role of the royalty and Islam.

In the early stage of independence, the British choose to back the Malay ‘administocrats’, which the British see as in the best position to maintain British interests in the independent Malaya.

Thus, royalty and Islam were thrust to the fore – together with the Malay language – as the main ethnic identifiers of the Malays in Malaysia.

Heng pointed out that the main priority of the Malay nationalists after WWII was to ensure their political hegemony in the independent Malaya. In another word, the Malay put politics before economy.

Malay political hegemony in Malaysia was largely attributed to the British’s ‘blessing’, unlike the official narrative put forward by the ruling elites in Malaysia today. According the Heng, the British acknowledged the Malay political and cultural dominance in the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948 and later entrenched it in the 1957 Constitution.[3]

Besides having the blessing from the British, UMNO also had it easy with its Alliance partner. MCA in negotiating the independence Constitution with UMNO conceded to the Malay special positions, Malay language as the sole national language, and the lack of official status for Mandarin.[4] In another word, MCA had recognised the Malay hegemonic position in politics from the birth of Malaysia. Heng pointed out that MCA had little choice because the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948 had already discriminated against Chinese interests. In addition to that, the British is supporting UMNO in their position in Malay political leadership.

The British did not encourage the Chinese to sought equal citizenship. As a response to the MCA-negotiated deal with UMNO, the Council of Registered Chinese Guilds and Association led by Chinese-educated merchant Lau Pak Khuan were formed to push for equal citizenship and official-language status for Mandarin. According to Heng (1998:59), this movement was rebuffed by the British, thus leaving the Chinese with the MCA-brokered deal.

Heng also pointed out that the independence in 1957 actually bought less freedom for the Chinese as “it ends the autonomy they had enjoyed in running their community affairs”. The independence actually put the Chinese under the direct rule of the Malay political elites, as the Chinese were unable to secure favourable deals with their Malay political partner.

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2.3 Political landscape

2.3.1 Melaka and Malay Dominance
Melaka before it was invaded by the Portuguese in 1511 A.D. was the major entreport in Asia. Today, it is only a reminder of the once great Malay Muslim Empire that is still a source of pride among the Malays in Malaysia.

It was in the 15th century when trade was among the major income to the Melaka sultanate particularly and to the people of Southeast Asia generally. The Southeast Asia region is also often referred to as the Nusantara Archipelago. Natives in this archipelago shared the same cultural roots.

It was believed that the Malays migrated from the southern part of China and settled in this region before the Chinese and Indian immigrants. It is important to note that the Malays were immigrant themselves. However, the Malays in Malaysia claimed special positions and the status of being natives to the land. This shall be the source of contention for many years after the special privileges were formally enshrined into the 1957 Merdeka Constitution, the supreme law in Malaysia.

When the Melaka sultanate was mention in any setting within the Malay community, a sense of pride and shame teased their hearts. Pride because it reminds them those glory days when Melaka was the centre of trade in Asia and what Malays community is capable of. Shame because it reminds them the catastrophe for being complacent of their achievements and how they were tricked into discriminating treaties and agreements by the foreign powers that finally resulted them being left behind by other immigrant races like the Chinese and the Indians. As pointed out by Von Vorys, “traditional Malay society was especially vulnerable to external predatory initiatives” (1976:36).

The Malays have to be subjected to the rule of foreign western powers until the World War II that saw the participation of the Japanese army for the Pacific theater. For over 400 years, the Malays only managed to see in awe what the western powers were capable of, especially in exploiting their beloved lands. The Malays were also constantly being made to believe that they would never be capable to run the country. The term ‘lazy natives’ were always used to describe the Malays. This ‘lazy native’s myth’ was also the justification used by the British to pursued aggressive immigration policies in bringing in foreign labours from China and India. The British argue that these influxes of foreign communities were crucial to support the labours demands for the economy of Malaya then.

If this past account gave the impression that the British actively sidelined the entire Malay community, it is only half of the story. During the British colonial time, they had actively engaged the elites in the Malay community, and to protect their interests by promoting their positions in the community.

According to Haque (2003:247), the British had “arranged English education and training for the sons of aristocratic Malays to join certain positions in the Malayan Civil Service (MCS). Haque also noted that the Malay Administrative Service (MAS) were created for these privileged Malays, but actively leave out the ordinary Malays (Means 1986:97 as cited in Haque 2003).

Thus, we could only speculate the reason the ruling elites in Malaysia arguing for the preferential treatments for the Malays. According to Haque, the proportion of Malays and non-Malays entering the MCS was required to be 4:1, to “ensure that they were not marginalised by non-Malays” (2003:247).

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2.3.2 The Japanese Invasion
As discussed above, for over 400 hundreds years, the Malays were made to believe that they are not capable of running the country and the western races was invincible. The swift success of the Japanese army invasion over the large part of Asia generally, and especially their two weeks campaign in Peninsula Malaysia demolished this myth once and for all. Previously, even the lower administration clerks job were sourced directly by the British from India.

When the Japanese defeated the British in Peninsula Malaysia, they established the Japanese Emperor administration to replace it. As a strategy to influence the Malays to support the Japanese invasion, some administration posts were passed to the Malays. This is to minimize local insurgence by the Malays community. Malays were also recruited into the police force. The Japanese used this strategy to pit the Malays against the Chinese in Malaya. Oversea Chinese donated large sum of money to support China during the Japanese campaign back in 1938. As revenge, the Japanese targeted the Chinese in their ‘purifying’ campaign of the Malaya. Thus, the Malay police force was used to hunt down the Chinese. This strategy leaves a sore point between the Chinese and the Malays in the post-WW2 period in Malaysia.

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2.3.3 The Malayan Union
The Malayan Union proposed by the returning British after the WW2 was perhaps the best chance for the immigrant communities especially the Chinese and Indians to fight for equal citizenship. However, the political consciousness of these two communities was largely aligned to their home countries – China and India.

The period after WW2 was a period of uncertainty, with the status of Malaya as a country unclear. Hence, the Chinese saw it fit to keep their Chinese citizenship than to give it up and fight for Malayan citizenship which is uncertain of coming in the first place.

Therefore, when the Malayan Union proposed of equal citizenship to everyone in Malaya, the Malays through their vernacular newspapers were strongly opposed to the idea while the Chinese only gave it a cold response. Chinese papers gave scant coverage to this aspect of the Malayan Union. The Majority of the Chinese still felt that their homeland was China and Malaya was only a temporary place. (Fujio 2003:98).

The rally by the Utusan, an influential Malay paper saw the rise of Malay political consciousness, led by a Malay leader Onn Jaafar from Johor. The Malays saw the need to come together to defend their rights in Malaya and thus, United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) was formed in 1948 with this purpose in mind.

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2.3.4 The Alliance and the Merdeka social contract
It can be said that the first generation of the leaders forming the core of the Alliance shared some of the similar characteristics. Tunku Abdul Rahman of UMNO, Tun Tan Cheng Lock of Malaysia Chinese Association (MCA) and Tun Sambathan of Malaysia Indian Congress (MIC) all were convinced that the “single most critical fact with which a viable political system would have to come to grips was the dominance of profound communal cleavages” (Von Vorys 1976:13). This communal cleavage is one single factor that “radically distinguished it from its Western counterparts”.

The Alliance leaders recognised the grip of communal cleavages in human personality that they are convinced that “the only reasonable course to follow was to recognise communal groups as essential, legitimate components of the political system (Von Vorys 1976:14). Hence, the Alliance was formed with individual political parties intact to represent their respective communities.

The early Alliance leaders also were able to mobilise popular support because they were “themselves primarily communal leaders”.

Von Vorys (1976) also pointed out that these leaders shared certain beliefs like: a preference for democratic politics in resolving political conflicts and in providing legitimacy for the political system, and seeing the use of violence as a bad form and poor judgment, and coercion as only the last resort of public policy. They were also educated in English school.

Due to this sociopolitical background, “Malaysian (Malayan) leaders set out to establish a viable, democratic system not based on a national community, but on the cooperation of discrete communal groups” (Von Vorys 1976:14).

Von Vorys listed out the four features of this political arrangement.

First, the relationship of citizens within the same group would continue to be managed through a semi-autonomous communal hierarchy.

Second, the relationships of citizen across communal boundaries or to the government would be regulated through terms agreed to by an inter-communal Directorate at the highest level.

Third, the terms of inter-communal relations would be promulgated in a constitutional contract, and then implemented and when necessary augmented by policies secretly negotiated.

Fourth, the members of the Directorate would have to possess dual qualification. They would have to be the leaders of the political organisation of their community most capable of mobilizing mass support behind the government in democratically conducted elections.

They would also have to be men who would maintain the confidence of their colleagues by keeping negotiations within the Directorate secret and by refraining from ever mobilizing their external communal mass-support to bring pressure on the secret negotiations (1976:14-15).

Under the 1957 Merdeka Constitution, the Malays were given ‘special privileges’ status, not the ‘special rights’ as often heard these days. These ‘special privileges’ were enshrined in Article 153 of the Constitution as an exchange to the extension of political rights to the non-Malays then.

This bargaining is commonly known as the social contract between the Malays and the non-Malays in Malaysia. It is considered the cornerstone to the formation of Malaysia and the very concept where modern Malaysian society is built upon.

The members of the Alliance also pledged to “establish a type of national school that will be acceptable to the people of Malaya.”[5]

In the Report of the Education Committee 1956, better known as the Razak Report, the direction of this ‘national school’ was envisioned to share common syllabuses for all school throughout the country and for the Malay and English to be made compulsory subjects in all primary and secondary schools.

The exclusion of Chinese or Tamil language as a compulsory subject do not received strong objections from the leaders of the Malayan (later Malaysian) Chinese Association and the response from the Chinese press were restrained and hopeful.[6]

The Chinese and Indian leaders were probably overcome by the euphoria of the prospect of gaining independence for Malaya.

However, the Malays intellectuals were not satisfied with the Razak Report. Outside the UMNO, various Malay Teachers’ Associations, the Malay Language Society of the University, and PENA the national writers association united under the leadership of the National Language Action Front (NLAF) to voice their dissatisfaction. This protest simply means that UMNO was losing grip of the Malay intellectuals. The loudest criticism was voiced when NLAF accused Tunku Abdul Rahman of betraying the Malays.

For the Chinese community, the political party representing them – the MCA – only played marginal roles on most Chinese daily lives. Chinese communities also treat their chambers of commerce and their clan associations with great respect and importance.

Thus, when the Alliance and later the Barisan Nasional coalition government, managed to co-opt the largely Malay and Indians communities into the mainstream political ideology, the Chinese had different channels to vent their dissatisfactions and to seek help. This is one of the reasons for a large number of Chinese to have their own psyche and do not share the national sentiments.

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2.3.5 The May 13 racial riot and the NEP
Among the darkest history of Malaysia are the May 13 racial riots in 1969. The official explanation of the cause of the riot was the economic imbalance among the different races in Malaysia. After the riot, Malaysia was declared under the state of Emergency. Operation of the country was transferred from the Cabinet to the newly formed National Action Council (NAC).

As Milne noted that the riot “showed that consensus was low and that primordial loyalties were high.”[7]

The 1969 riot in Malaysia is often seen as a landmark event that shapes the future of Malaysia. If the Article 153 in the Constitutions institutionalised communalism, then the New Economic Policy (NEP) put forward by the National Operation Council (NOC) certainly operationalised it. Almost every single policy implemented in Malaysia after that is somehow influenced by the NEP.

Economically, the skewed distribution of wealth among different ethnic groups ‘forced the Malaysian government to fundamentally rethink its economic policy’ (Andaya & Andaya 2001:302). In 1970, 75 per cent of households living under poverty lines were Malays.[8]

However, it would be inaccurate to assume that the Chinese controls all the wealth in Malaysia. Chinese economic role might be bigger that the Malays, but this is still inferior compared to foreign capital. According to Heng, the diverse and widespread economic role of the Chinese might gave the impression that they controlled the economy of Malaysia at that period.[9]

Politically, after the poor showing of UMNO in the 1969 general elections, UMNO had to heed the pressure from the Malay community in order to stay relevant. The Tunku, at that time, was unwilling to advance Malay welfare at the expense of holding back Chinese business interests. There was general perception that the prime minister who is also the president of UMNO was too compromising to the non-Malays. Some of UMNO leader like the Minister of Agriculture, Abdul Asis Ishak had called for the advancement of Malay economic interests, even at the expense of the Chinese.[10]

Tunku Abdul Rahman stepped down soon after that and the second prime minister Tunku Abdul Razak in 1970 introduced NEP as a sweeping policy with two objectives: the eradication of poverty regardless of race and the restructuring of society so that the identification of race with economic function would be eliminated.

In pursuing these two objectives, the implementation seems to focus on the eradication of poverty along communal lines. History will be twisted to provide justification to this one-sided policy. The official narrative will point to the colonial policies which put the Bumiputra at a disadvantage position. Even though there is an official recognition[11] that poverty exist in all communities, the focus is usually on the Bumiputra because of Malay special rights and that they are discriminated during the colonial era.

In achieving the second objective, government introduced the Industrial Co-ordination Act 1975 which “required the private sectors to employ 30 per cent Malays at every level or risk revocation of their licenses” (Andaya & Andaya 2001:314).

The NEP officially ended in 1990 with the introduction of National Development Policy (NDP). Despite the aggressive interventionist steps taken by the government, ‘ethnic and economic disparities were still very much part of Malaysian life’ (Andaya & Andaya 2001:318). This gave the Malay nationalists reason to call for the maintenance of the Malay special rights and created an atmosphere of fear and siege that help to define the political roles for UMNO.

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NAC finally launched the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971 with the purpose to correct the economic imbalance among the different races in Malaysia. The main objectives of the NEP were:
a. To reduce and eradicate poverty by increasing employment opportunities to every Malaysian regardless of ethnic background.
b. To restructure the society and to eventually eradicate the identification of ethnic groups according their occupation.

Implicitly, the NEP aimed to reduce poverty among the Malays. In order to achieve this objective, government pursued aggressive positive affirmative actions aimed at the Malays. Malays were given subsidies, preferential treatment in granting licenses and franchises, quotas in government jobs and university places. For example, 64 percent of local universities places were reserved for the Malays. This number was in recent years reduced slowly.

Often, the NEP will be abused for political mileage. Malays will be constantly reminded to support the existing government in order for them to continually enjoy the special privileges. The NEP also created a new class of Malays that benefited from the government-sponsored oversea tertiary educations and government contracts. This eventually split the Malays into groups that support the present government because they benefited from it and those who prefer reforms because they see the special privileges as a political blackmail.

In the 1999 general elections, the Malays are clearly divided into the urban middle class UMNO supporters on one side and the largely rural lower class PAS supporters. Of course, the division is not that clear cut. There are also urban Malay middle class, who themselves benefited from the NEP, who join their rural brethrens to push for reforms.

In 1991, the NEP was replaced by the National Development Policy (NDP). NEP failed to achieve some of the objectives outlined. The ownership of share capital in limited companies by the Bumiputeras (read: Malays) did not hit 30 percent as targeted by NEP.

Andaya and Andaya (2001) noted that the NEP would ‘have been difficult to implement had it not been for UMNO’s power in the governing coalition’. After the Parliament resumed in February 1971, amendments were passed in Dewan Rakyat which enables the government to implement these policies. Steps were also taken to remove the public discussion of ‘sensitive issues’ like the power and status of the Malay rulers, Malay special privileges, Malay as national language and the status of Islam as the official religion.

This reality is in stark contrast to the official rhetoric of equal partnership and power-sharing of the governing coalition. Up to 1969, UMNO still treat its two weaker partners with respect. However, with UMNO losing its credibility after the elections, it had no choice but to maintain its own relevance to the Malay community. The poor elections result of its Chinese partner, MCA also greatly weakens its bargaining power with UMNO (Andaya & Andaya 2001:325).

The massive social restructuring of the NEP also saw the restructuring of the politics in Malaysia. The Alliance was expanded to include the PAS and was known as Barisan Nasional (National Front) from then on.

Since then, the Barisan Nasional has been able to win more than two-third of the seats in Parliament due to the clever combinations of persuasive and coercive tactics. This enable the BN to amend the Constitutions ‘at will to suit its purpose’ (Andaya & Andaya 2001:327).

UMNO is also never shy in letting the coalition partners to know who the actual boss is and who could have the final say. Dr Mahathir, well-known for his tactics in consolidating powers to the executive, stated that ‘UMNO is the backbone, the very bulwark of the Barisan Nasional.’[12]

The position of UMNO within the ruling coalition and the government is so strong that any threats to the party are usually internal power struggle rather than external threats.

In recent history, two particular events had shaped the position of UMNO within the society and resulted in UMNO reasserting its position as the defender of Malay special rights. In these two occasions, it’s the non-Malay who suffered as they are used as a bogeyman in UMNO communal rhetoric.

The Operasi Lallang in 1987 was the response of UMNO to the perceived threats to the party internally and externally. The challenge to UMNO leadership of Dr Mahathir by Tengku Razaleigh, together with the dissatisfaction of the Chinese community caused by the appointment of non-Chinese speaking Chinese to head Chinese schools gave UMNO the opportunity to clamp down on its enemies, both internal and external.

In this episode, language and education were the main cause of the Chinese dissatisfaction.

The 1998 episode was the accumulation of political crisis as a result of Asian economic crisis ravaging through Asia in 1997. The ambitious Anwar Ibrahim, inspired by the reformasi movement in Indonesia attempted to challenge Dr Mahathir to the premiership. The initial differences in handling the economic crisis later spilled to the political arena, climaxed with the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim from the post of deputy prime minister and deputy president of UMNO. He was later charged in court for sodomy and corruption. This episode caused a massive swing of Malay supports to the Opposition, especially with the forming of Parti Keadilan Nasional by Anwar’s wife.

UMNO had to reassert its position as the defender of the Malay special rights. The clever dissemination of message by the mainstream papers enables UMNO to tell the Malays a different picture while paint a different picture to the non-Malays. To the Malays, Anwar was painted as the cause of disunity in the community. This, UMNO argued, will result the Malay community being weak and unable to defend its interests. On the other hand, PAS was portrayed as an extremist Islamic party to the non-Malay, especially the Chinese. The political collaboration of DAP and PAS in Barisan Alternatif caused the former to lost their traditional supporters.

Some Malaysian observers argued that the 1998 episode is the start to more principle-based politics, departing from the usual communal politics. This thesis argues that, even under such conducive environment, clever dissemination of messages by the ruling coalitions and their control over the mass media enables them to ethnicised even universal issues. The Suqiu episode is one clear example.

Communal issues will always remain relevant in Malaysia as long as the present political structure is maintain, and this writer believe that political elites in Malaysia will strive hard to maintain such structure.


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2.3.6 1997 economic crisis and the 1998 political crisis
Anwar Ibrahim, the former deputy prime minister was sacked from his post on 2 Sept 1998. This was the clearest sign of difference between the top two men in the government, something which they both had publicly denied before that.

After the 1988 UMNO political crisis, Dr Mahathir had managed to purged his party from rival fractions by registering UMNO as a new party, excluding those he seen as his political rivals. Thus, through out the 90s, he manages to consolidate power to himself and to put anyone up or down at his will. Anwar Ibrahim, a student leader back in the 70s is among a few who earned Dr Mahathir’s trust. Anwar meteoric rise to the top was envy to a large numbers of UMNO members.

The bath devaluation in July 1997 sparked a massive economic crisis that hits most of the Asian countries. Dr Mahathir with his usual rhetoric snubbed the International Monetary Fund advise for tighter fiscal policy. On the other hand, Anwar Ibrahim was widely seen as favourable of the tighter fiscal policy. Dr Mahathir announced increase in government spending to facilitate economic growth. This goes against Anwar Ibrahim who was then the Finance Minister as well. These economic differences were downplayed by both men as the usual difference but with the similar goal in mind.

During the 1998 UMNO general assembly, Zahid Hamidi, a protégée of Anwar Ibrahim moved a motion during the debate of the presidential speech. Zahid brought up the cronyism and corruption issue during his speech. This was seen as an indirect attack to Dr Mahathir. Cronyism and corruption was seen as the reason for the weak Asian economic fundamentals including Malaysia.

It was also these two issues that brought down the former Indonesian president Suharto. Dr Mahathir pulls another rabbit out his political hat by releasing list of names of Bumiputera that had benefited from the government’s share allocation schemes. These names includes non other that Anwar Ibrahim’s father. That was the clearest sign of Anwar’s challenging Dr Mahathir leadership. Many observers felt that the days of Anwar were numbered. However the swiftness of Anwar’s removal and the subsequent events caught everyone by surprise.

The sacking of Anwar Ibrahim on 2 Sept 1998 ends the dynamic partnership of Mahathir and Anwar in running the country and marked the beginning of Malay splits.

As expected, Anwar did not go quietly. He rallied his supporters for massive demonstrations in the capital city and hold rallies around the country to gather supports. Malays who were left out from the economic growth felt that it is time to push for reforms and PAS was fast in throwing support behind the man they once criticised as the traitor to the Islamic religion.

The political stakes during the 1999 general election were high. There was a general consensus that changes with the existing sociopolitical conditions were possible. It was also in the spirit of reforms that Chinese associations introduced the 17-point election appeals.

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2.3.7 The split of the Malays and Chinese voters as kingmaker
The gentlemen’s agreement to discuss anything sensitive within the Alliance was tested several times throughout the history of Malaysia. The last one was during the 1999 general elections. It was a few months prior to the general elections that 11 Chinese association came together to form The Malaysian Chinese Organisation Election Appeals Committee, or in short Suqiu. Suqiu came out with a 17-point appeal and “call upon all political parties an candidates in the coming general elections to declare their support and endorsement” (Suqiu 2002:11). This was seen by the BN as a pressure by the Chinese community from outside the Alliance to bow to their demands and the failure of the MCA to co-opt and check on this dissident voices.

After the sacking of the former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim, the Malay community was split and thus, supports from other communities were even more crucial to ensure that BN stays in power. Thus, the BN government do not take this 17-point appeal kindly and seen it as a blackmail by the Chinese community on the BN government. As the Chinese consist of 26 percent of the population, any swing by the Chinese electorates will ensure victory to any candidates the Chinese choose to support.

Weiss (2000:413) noted that the Malay vote was clearly split between UMNO and PAS.

The Chinese were with the BN since the 1995 general elections. The BA coalition with PAS and Keadilan closely identify with the reformasi movement do not appeal to some Malays and especially the non-Malays. As noted by Weiss (2000:421), some Malaysian voters “expressed dissatisfaction with or distrust Anwar, seeing him as just another opportunistic BN politician”.

For the non-Malays, Anwar Ibrahim was known for its “pro-Malay, pro-Islam policies of the 1980s and 1990s that have disgruntled non-Malays; hence, his multiracial rhetoric rang a bit hollow to some”.[13]

Thus, in the elections, the choice was clear. It was between the BN’s politics of development and stability and BA’s politics of justice and good governance.

However, even when BA tried to move beyond ethnic politics, its own campaigns and conducts during the run up to the elections were playing into BN’s hand. Weiss (2000:425) noted that since its formation, Keadilan “has grown more Islamic in image”.

However hard the BA tried to move beyond ethnic politics, they know very well that ethnic issues certainly appeal to Malaysians. PAS government in Kelantan – in a move seen as trying to appeal to the Chinese voters – lifted the ban on pig farming.

Even though this move was commendable, Chinese voters never distinguish PAS Islamic politics with UMNO Malay nationalist politics. Even in the early years of Malaysia, during the debate of national language after the Razak Report was published in 1956, PAS “have often being critical of the government for what is felt to be the inexcusable gradualism in making Malay the sole official language, and foolish tolerance towards the persistence of other language”.[14]

The elections results for Keadilan candidates could be interpreted as voters identifying Keadilan as a Malay-based party, as all its successful candidates were Muslim Malays.[15]

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2.4 Suqiu
Suqiu is the common names for The Malaysian Chinese Organisation Election Appeals Committee. Suqiu according the Wong Chin Huat writing in Suqiu Document is literally a voters’ manifesto. By the eve of the 1999 general elections, this document was endorsed by 2095 organisations nationwide (Suqiu 2002:13). These organisations were mainly Chinese organisations because it is a Chinese community’s initiative. However, Wong pointed out that “its spirit and substances are definitely not Chinese but Malaysian oriented”.

Plenty of the 17 points raise by Suqiu were universal in nature. For example, Point 14 urged the government to restore confidence in the police force. Suqiu reiterated their stand again on 17 October 2000 by issuing a press statement which urged the government to review the “salary scheme of Malaysian police, to build a clean and professional Police Force, and the regain public confidence” (Suqiu 2002:114). It is therefore not wrong to say that government do agree and share the same sentiments as that of Suqiu. The 5th Prime Minister of Malaysia Abdullah Ahmad Badawi on 29 December 2003 announced that Malaysian government will set up a Royal Commission to “study and recommend steps to enhance the capability of the Royal Malaysia Police (PDRM) (Bernama 29 Dec 2003).

According the Bernama news report, Abdullah said the proposed commission would modernise all operational and work aspects of the police, taking into account policing techniques and human rights issues, including women's rights.

Looking back, Suqiu is not something new from the Chinese community but a “continuation of its previous calls for an inclusive Malaya/Malaysia”. In the 80s, there were also two similar documents – Memorandum of National Culture (1983) and the Joint Declarations of Chinese Organisations (1986).

Back in June 1999, with elections expected to be held anytime, the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall (SCAH) took the initiative to organise dialogue between the Chinese community leaders and the representatives of both the ruling and oppositions parties.

On 16 August 1999, the SCAH together with 10 other Chinese organisations launched the final version if the Suqiu appeal in Malay, English and Chinese.

One interesting episode within the Suqiu was the proposal by the Federation of Chinese Associations Malaysia (FCAM) to include an ethnic Chinese second PM and an ethnic Chinese Finance Minister as part of the final appeals. Even though Suqiu rejected outright this suggestion from FCAM, it was eventually accused by the mass media of playing up racial sentiments.

The main theme for the 17 points were promote national unity, advance democracy, uphold human rights and justice, curb corruption, fair and equitable economic policy, review the privatisation policy, enlightened, liberal and progressive education policy, let multiethnic cultures flourish, protect the Malaysian environment, develop and modernize new villages, housing for all, protect women’s rights, fair media, restore confidence in the police force, upgrade social services, respect the rights of workers, and provide for our indigenous people.


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2.4.1 History of Chinese pressure

Even in the days leading to the independence of Malaya, Chinese education groups were vocal in voicing their protests in what they seen as steps by the government to sidelined Chinese education and Chinese language values. The Chinese Guilds and Associations response to the release of the Razak Report in 1956 by demanding that Chinese language be accepted as an official language as well,[16] and be accorded the same status as the Malay language in the national education system.

Within the framework of the Alliance, MCA too tried to pressure its partner, UMNO in endorsing Chinese language as an additional official language. After Dr Lim Chong Eu was elected the president in 1958, the United Chinese School Teachers’ Association, and the Chinese Guilds and Associations began to pressure Dr Lim.

It is difficult to tell why an English-educated politician would take up this cause. Certainly by taking up this cause, Dr Lim hoped to draw these Chinese organisations into the national decision making process.

However, this decision was not being received kindly by UMNO, especially after Dr Lim wrote letter to Tunku Abdul Rahman, outlining demands concerning language and the increase of seats allocation in the upcoming elections. MCA threatened to quit the Alliance unless these demands were met. The Alliance National Council, which Tunku was the chairman, announced that MCA must withdrawn these demands. Soon after that, Dr Lim resigned as the president of MCA and was replaced by Tan Siew Sin, the son of MCA founder.

This episode demonstrated that the role of MCA within the ruling coalition is to explain and persuade the Chinese community to support government’s policies, not as a vehicle to pressure the government. This episode is a clear lesson for the Chinese organisations that it is usually fruitless to pressure the government through political channel.

Lucien Pye (1985) also pointed out that Confucian culture do not provide any guidelines for Chinese leaders to function in a non-Confucian context. Worse still, the idea of Chinese being the subordinates of a foreign power is “unthinkable”. Pye (1985: 251) added that “any Chinese who acts as a leader must be an imposter, if he is subservient to the Malay majority leadership”.

This observation might explain the low status of MCA leaders in the Chinese community. The Chinese had long dismissed MCA leaders as selling out Chinese rights when they agreed to the deals brokered with UMNO. As Pye pointed out, the “MCA leaders who supported the pro-UMNO constitutional deal were characterized as self-serving towkays (merchants) … and who were willing to serve as UMNO lackeys in order to reap the spoils of the political office”. It certainly did not help the MCA that their early leaders were mostly merchants. Chinese cultural and language leaders, that have extensive networks with the masses were largely aligned to the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), the party that British choose to ignore despite MCP’s contribution to the fall of the Japanese Occupation in Malaya.

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2.5 THE MYTH OF NEWS OBJECTIVITY


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2.6 Consociational Theory

Consociational theory was first associated with the integration process of the European Union. According to Barry (1975), the term ‘consociation’ derives from the Latin consociatio which means “the action or fact of associating together” or “union in fellowship” (Barry, 1975:478, quoted in Chryssochoou 2001:3). The Netherlands were the first countries to be identified as consociational (Lijphart 1975:231). Malaysia was a consociational country from 1955 to 1969 and since 1971, with the increased concentration of power to the ruling elites. (Von Vorys 1976). As a political theory, it is a good way to explain the political arrangement among the political elites in Malaysia, and as a way to understand the working nature of a diverse political coalition in Malaysia that was in power since Independence.

Holden, however, pointed out that consociationalism is often “a theory about how much decision making remains possible in the face of grave difficulties” (1993:112).

It is important to note that in times of crisis, negotiations between subunits within the system are often carried out behind closed door. Chryssochoou pointed out that, because of these practices, “members of the elite cartel successfully exclude themselves from extensive public scrutiny” (2001:6). Decisions reached within the coalition are usually treated as a collective decision. Therefore, no particular subunit within the system could be picked out to be responsible for the decision reached.

From this, we could assume that components within this particular political system come together and co-operate on an equal ground, towards a common goal. This, in essence, very much characterised the early stage of the Alliance, the predecessor to the Barisan Nasional (BN) government which rules Malaysia since her Independence in 1957.

The term ‘consociational democracy’ was first use by Apter who defined it as the “joining together of constituent units which do not lose their identity when merging in some form of union” (Apter 1961:24). This is very much the case of the 13 political parties forming the ruling coalition in Malaysia, with the three major political parties clearly maintaining their ethnic identity.

This is only possible because the three major ethnic groups in Malaysia – namely, Malays, Chinese and Indians – trust their political elites to bargain on behalf of them. As pointed out by Stevenson (1982), “in such countries the population is segmented in subgroups, each represented by political elites who are trusted to bargain with other elites on behalf of the group interests” (1982:37). In fact, those political elites often project their parties as such. Three major parties in the BN coalition were formed specifically for that proposes – to champion the rights of their ethnic groups.

United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) was formed at the height of the Malays’ protest against the formation of Malayan Union by the British in 1948. Malayan Union was seen as challenging the sovereignty of the Malay rulers. This was seen as a direct challenge to the very existence of the Malays in their own land.

Lijphart argue that there could be “stable democracy in plural, vertically segmented or communally divided societies if there was overarching co-operation among the segment elites, based on a set of unwritten rules of the games” (Lustick 1979). Lijphart was the author of the 1968 article Typologies of democratic systems which launched the term consociational democracy.

In the case of Malaysia, the “unwritten rules of the games” are, of course, “the informality yet seriousness of the discussions, the atmosphere of hard bargaining, but a willingness to compromise” (Von Vorys 1976:104). This method of negotiation basically sets the tone of future inter-ethnic negotiations within the BN coalition.

Lijphart also pointed out that the consociational democracy comprised of four characteristics: grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality and mutual veto (Lijphart 1977:25). However in the later stage of the BN coalition, we see that the coalition was dominated by UMNO especially after the late 1980s. Naturally, UMNO being the largest subunit within this grand coalition will also have the majority to bulldozer their way through any negotiations. When the ‘old’ UMNO was deregistered in 1988, Dr Mahathir, the UMNO president then, registered the ‘new’ UMNO and this is the beginning of greater UMNO domination over the ruling coalition. Critics have accused Dr Mahathir of engineering the deregistration of the old UMNO as a step to purged the party of his rival fraction, then led by Tengku Razaleigh.

Basically the domination of UMNO in the ruling coalition was the result of the consolidation of power under Dr Mahathir and the need to show to the Malays community – which was split after the 1988 UMNO deregistration – that UMNO are still able to defend the interests of the Malays and that UMNO is still very much in control of the ruling coalition.

Andeweg (2000) pointed out that the later evolution of the consociational theory, the element of elite cooperation had evolved into this: “political elites do not compete”. As for the Malaysia case, political elites do not compete mainly because the political elites from the other political parties are dominated by UMNO.

In the Lower House (Dewan Rakyat ), the ruling coalition control 147 out of 193 seats in the house (Election Commission of Malaysia). However the figures in the Election Commission website only shown the seats won by BN coalition as a whole, not the breakdown of the seats won by individual political parties within the coalition. This is another cosmetic ways to show the unity within the ruling coalition. However, this is not surprising because a coalition need to show that decisions are arrived collectively.

Andeweg (2000:511) pointed out that the main feature in consociational democracy is that “the elite eschew decision by the majority.” This means that UMNO would not want to be seen as dominating the decision making process because of its majority number within the ruling coalition. Any decisions made are best projected as a collective decision, and not a decision by the majority.

UMNO total popular votes during the 1999 general election dropped but they still managed to control 48 percent of seats of the Lower House (Maznah 1999).

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2.7 Plural Society Theory

The pioneers of the theory of plural societies were J. S. Furnivall and M. G. Smith (Rex & Gurharpal 2003:107). Furnivall was writing about Indonesia and Smith was writing primarily about the British West Indies. Plural societies, in Furnivall famous words, are societies that “mix but do not combine” Furnivall also noted that in the plural societies, “different sections of the community living side by side but in the same political unit”.

In the economic sphere, Furnivall noted, “there is a division of labour on racial lines (1956:304). This division of labour or the identification of labour along racial lines will be the major source of contention on the post-colonial Malaysia and will become one of the strongest reasons for the massive social reengineering programmes by the Malaysian government.

These affirmative action-oriented programmes, according to Bacchi (1996), did not start after the 1969 racial riot as widely believed by many observers of Malaysian affairs. It was perhaps pursued more aggressively by the Malaysian government after the racial riots, as there was then a more pressing reason to do so. It was also a physical proof of what economic imbalance among the different races living together could do to a newly independent multiracial country like Malaysia.

During the colonial time in Malaya, the basic relations among the communities and the colonial powers were essentially economic. In the 19th century, the British encouraged aggressive immigration by the Chinese and Indians. This is to meet the demands of labours in plantation and mining sectors – two major sources of income to the colonial power. As noted by Rex & Gurharpal (2003), “most colonial societies involved groups of different origin performing different functions”. This is also the case for the immigrant communities in Malaya.

The Chinese were mainly involved in mining sector and trade in urban area. The Indians were confined to the plantation estates. The British were very specific in their labour policy, confining one ethnic group into one industry.

Abraham (2004) pointed out that “the division of labour along ethnic lines further reinforced sociocultural differences because of lack of social interaction between the different ethnic groups”.

This separation of immigrants’ communities with the local communities resulted minimum contact between them. Each community will have different ways of life and since “these different groups came from different geographical origins meant that in part the distinction between them was an ethnic one” (Rex & Gurharpal 2003:111). This form of divide and rules resulted “social-class antagonisms, ethnocentrism and racial polarisation (Abraham 2004:xvii).

During the colonial times, each community had to look after their own welfare. Thus, this “reinforced a consciousness of kind as the basis for groups to organise themselves to survive (Abraham 2004: xviii).

This form of political arrangement resulted the respective groups to turn to their own elites for supports. Abraham (2004) noted that despite knowing that these elites will use their position as the power base for their own benefits, the communities had little choice but to turn to them. This is still the situation in Malaysia where each community elites will claimed that they will fight on behalf of them with the condition that the community must give these elites undying political supports.

Perhaps, that is the paradox of Malaysia, while we strive to achieve Bangsa Malaysia; our political parties are still formed along racial lines.

When the British withdrawn from Malaya, power was passed to the local lead by the Alliance. Within this transition period, there are at least two groups of Malayan vying for power – the secular Alliance that consist of the three major races in Malaya and the mainly Chinese Malayan Communist Party (MCP).

In Malaya, powers were divided between two ethnic groups – the Chinese controls the economic while the Malays by defaults of their majority in Malaya control the politics.

As noted by Rex & Gurharpal (2003), “in Malaysia, Malays controlled the government, economic entrepreneurship was in the hands of the Chinese and agricultural labours in the hands of Indians”. For the agricultural sectors, large foreign plantation companies like Sime Darby and Guthrie continues to operate. These companies had since being taken over by Malaysians.

In plural societies, those who are vying for power usually claimed to represent everyone in the countries and usually stand on nationalistic platform when negotiating for power. However, as noted by Rex & Gurharpal (2003), these “nationalist leaders commonly represent a particular class or ethnic group”.

Tunku Abdul Rahman, the leader in the Alliance knew this very well. British would not grant Malaya independence if the three races in Malaya could not cooperate and live together as a nation. The British were also aware that they are limited in choice and time.

After WW2, there was a massive drawback of the British forces in their overseas colonies. The other promising group in Malaya then was the Malayan Communist Party. MCP led Malayan People Anti-Japanese Liberation Army (MPAJA) were credited for supplying the British with intelligence during the Japanese Occupation that eventually resulted the defeat of the Japanese in WW2. However, global ideology struggle among the superpowers then clearly strike this out as an alternative.

As a post-colonial country, Malaysia constantly has to deal with question of multiculturalism. Von Vorys (1976) also pointed out that generally in newly independent countries, the “social system is far from stable”.

In addition to that, contemporary Malaysian also has to deal with the question of class. This appeared more apparent in the Malay community and is one of the reasons for the split of the Malays community in the recent years. The aggressive affirmative actions programmes only reach certain groups of Malays, creating new Malay middle class playing a dominant role.

Abraham also argues, “colonialism superimposed class distinctions on racial groups and this created racial antagonism between the Malays, Chinese and Indian (2004:xxii).

Even in 2003, Malaysian press still portrayed the Chinese as the rich community and the Malays still needs government subsidies.[17] It was reported that Dr Mahathir said that if the Chinese in Malaysia were given the same subsidies and concessions as given to the Malays, the Chinese would have been “way ahead by now”. These constant portrayals by the press create the impression that the Chinese are largely of the middle class.

Perhaps the most controversial point made by Abraham was about the social impact of colonisation. Abraham argues “colonial rules had a negative impact on this harmony and consequently manifested itself in racial perceptions, tension and potential social conflict (2004:1). In another words, colonisation split the Malayan community.


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Reference

Abraham, C. 2004. The Naked Social Order: The Roots of Racial Polarisation in Malaysia. Subang Jaya: Pelanduk Publications.

Andeweg, R. B. 2000. Consociational Democracy. Annual Review Political Science 2000, 3:509-36.

Apter, D. 1966. The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Bacchi, C. L. 1996. The Politics of Affirmative Action. London:Sage.

Bernama (2003), Royal Commission On Police Duties To Be Set Up, Says Abdullah, 29 December 2003. Retrieved on 12 Jan 2004. Available at http://www.bernama.com.my/bernama/v3/news.php?id=37258

Chryssochoou, D. N. 2001. Integration Theory and Treaty Reform: A Consociationalist Approach. Presented in EURESCO conference in “Social Capital” in Exeter, England from 15-20 Sept 2001.

Fujio H. (2003), Malayan Chinese & China: Conversion in Identity Consciousness 1945-1957, Singapore University Press: Singapore.

Furnivall, J. S. (1956) Colonial Policy and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Haque, M. S. 2003. The Role of the State in Managing Ethnic Tensions in Malaysia. American Behavioral Scientist, Vol 47 No. 3, November 2003, p. 240-266.

Holden, B. (1993) Understanding Liberal Democracy, 2nd ed., London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Lijphart, A. (1975), The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, 2nd ed., Berkeley: University California Press.

Lijphart, A. (1977), Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lustik, I. (1979), Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control, World Politics, April, p325-44.

Maznah M. 1999. UMNO and its Partners in the New Malaysia, Aliran Dec 1999. Available at http://www.malaysia.net/aliran/high9912.html

Milne, R. S. 1970. “National Ideology” and Nation-Building in Malaysia. Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 7 (Jul 1970), 563-573.

Rex, J. & Gurharpal S. (2003), Pluralism and Multiculturalism in Colonial and Post-Colonial Society – Thematic Introduction. International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS), Vol. 5, No. 2, 2003: 107-119.

Stevenson, G. 1982. Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity, revised edn., Toronto: Gage.

Suqiu 2002. Suqiu Documents, Kuala Lumpur: Suqiu Committee.

Von Vorys, K. 1976. Democracy without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur and Singapore: Oxford University Press.
[1] Heng 1998:51
[2] Shamsul A. B. (1996), “The Malay New Rich: A Comment on the Origin and Formation of a Social Class,” Paper presented at the Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo, March 13, 1996.
[3] Heng 1998:52
[4] Heng 1998:58
[5] Alliance Manifesto for the Federal Elections, June 1955.
[6] Roff 1967:318
[7] R. S. Milne, “National Ideology” and Nation-Building in Malaysia. Asian Survey, Vol. 10, No. 7 (Jul 1970), 563-573.
[8] Andaya & Andaya 2001:302.
[9] Heng 1998:55
[10] Abdul Aziz Ishak had confiscated all the licenses of Chinese rice millers in northern Perak and Province Wellesley (Seberang Perai, Penang) with which to win Malay’s supports.
[11] The Third Malaysia Plan (1876-80) acknowledges the poverty of non-Malay groups, and their need for improved access to education, healthcare and amenities.
[12] New Straits Times, 19 June 1999, p6, 18 as cited in Andaya & Andaya 2001:327.
[13] Weiss 2000:421
[14] Margaret Roff 1967. The Politics of Language in Malaya. Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 5 (May 1967), 316-328.
[15] Weiss 2000:425
[16] Roff 1967:318
[17] NST 13 Oct 2003