Chapter 2

CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL AND MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF MALAYSIA

2.1 Political Landscape
Hwang (2003) divided independent Malaysia politics into four phases. The first phase, according to him was after Independence in 1957 until the May 13 riots in 1969. During this phase, Malay dominance formed the foundations of Malaysian political landscape, but with strong recognition of the non-Malay political role.
The implementation of New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970 marked the second phase of Malaysian politics, with shift in the UMNO leaders’ attitude for moderate consociational bargaining to one of more hegemonic control.
Political challenge to Dr Mahathir leadership in 1987 shifted the state power from UMNO to Mahathir. This phase marked the consolidation of Dr Mahathir’s authoritarian rule, and courting the non-Malays neglected under NEP.
The fourth phase of Malaysian politics starts with the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim from his Cabinet post in 2 Sept 1998. Anwar reformasi movement marked the emergence of a multi-ethnic consciousness in Malaysian civil society.
Malaysia has been described as an authoritarian (Gomez & Jomo 1999), semi-authoritarian (Crouch 1992), semi-democratic (Case 1993) and quasi-democratic (Zakaria 1989) state since its independence in 1957.
In order to better understand the origins of ethnic politics in Malaysia, we need to trace back the early stage of nationhood of Malaysia, starting from the period prior to the British rule in Malaya, the impact of British rule in Malaya, the Japanese Occupation, the early stage of independence negotiations, and the vague but yet influential ‘social contracts’.

2.1.1 Melaka and Malay Dominance
Melaka before it was invaded by the Portuguese in 1511 A.D. was a major entreport in Asia. Today, it is only a reminder of the once great Malay Muslim Empire that is still a source of pride among the Malays in Malaysia.
It was in the 15th century when trade was among the major income to the Melaka sultanate particularly and to the people of Southeast Asia generally. The Southeast Asia region was also often referred to as the Nusantara Archipelago. Natives in this archipelago shared the same cultural roots.
It was believed that the Malays migrated from the southern part of China and settled in this region before the Chinese and Indian immigrants. Hence, it is important to note that the Malays were immigrant themselves. However, the Malays in Malaysia claimed special positions and the status of being natives to the land. This shall be the source of contention for many years after the special privileges were formally enshrined into the 1957 Merdeka Constitution, the supreme law in Malaysia.
The Melaka sultanate is often looked upon within the Malay community with a sense of pride and shame. Pride because it reminds them those glory days when Melaka was the centre of trade in Asia and what Malays community was capable of. Shame because it reminds them of the catastrophe for being complacent about their achievements and how they were tricked into discriminating treaties and agreements by foreign powers that finally resulted them being left behind by other immigrant races like the Chinese and the Indians. As pointed out by Von Vorys (1976, p. 36), “traditional Malay society was especially vulnerable to external predatory initiatives”.
The Malays were subjected to the rule of foreign western powers until the World War II (WWII) that saw the participation of the Japanese army in the Pacific arena. For over 400 years, the Malays only managed to see in awe what the western powers were capable of, especially in exploiting their beloved lands.
The Malays were also constantly being made to believe that they would never be capable to run the country. The term ‘lazy natives’ were always being used to describe the Malays. This ‘lazy native’s myth’ was also the justification used by the British to pursued aggressive immigration policies in bringing in foreign labour from China and India.
Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 10) noted that “despite the formation of a plural society in Malaysia with the mass migration of Chinese and Indians into the country, there was very little integration and only limited interaction among the ethnic communities”.
The British argue that these influxes of foreign communities were crucial to support the labour demands for the economy of Malaya then. Hilley (2001, p. 23) observed that the “British and other commercial interests have sought to restructure [Malaya] domestic economy, turning it from subsistence agriculture into key producer of primary products and raw materials for the British and European markets”.
If this past account gave the impression that the British actively sidelined the entire Malay community, it is only half of the story. During the British colonial time, they had actively engaged the elites in the Malay community, and to protect their interests by promoting their positions in the community.
According to Haque (2003, p. 247), the British had “arranged English education and training for the sons of aristocratic Malays to join certain positions in the Malayan Civil Service (MCS). Haque also noted that the Malay Administrative Service (MAS) were created for these privileged Malays, but actively leave out the ordinary Malays (Means 1986, p. 97 as cited in Haque 2003).
Thus, we can only speculate the reason for the Malaysian ruling elites in arguing for the preferential treatments for the Malays. According to Haque, the proportion of Malays and non-Malays entering the MCS was required to be 4:1, to “ensure that they were not marginalised by non-Malays” (2003, p. 247).
Andaya and Andaya (2001, p. 174) noted that the “co-operation of the Malay ruling class, initially the most hostile towards the British … was essential for the success of indirect rule”. Andaya and Andaya (2001, p. 174) pointed out that “a primary mean of gaining the desired co-operation was to compensate the ruling class for income they had lost through the abolition of slavery and the introduction of a central treasury”.
In other words, it was their own social and economic well-being that concerned them most, not the welfare of the masses. And yet, the present Malay political elites have elevated their status, including the sultans, to that of Malay special privileges guardian.
Such relationship with the British resulted in the Malay sultans and elites losing most of their former powers, but the British support gave them security from potential challengers. Hilley (2001, p. 27) noted that “the British had employed a form of indirect rule, by adhering to pro-Malay policies and recognizing the Malay Sultans as ‘natural rulers’, thus avoiding unnecessary conflict”.

2.1.2 The Japanese Invasion
As discussed previously, for over 400 hundred years, the Malays were made to believe that they were not capable of running the country and the western races were invincible. The swift success of the Japanese army invasion over the large part of Asia generally, and especially their two weeks campaign in Peninsula Malaysia demolished this myth once and for all. Previously, even the lower administration clerks job were sourced directly by the British from India.
When the Japanese defeated the British in Peninsula Malaysia, they established the Japanese Emperor administration to replace it. As a strategy to influence the Malays to support the Japanese invasion, some administration posts were passed to the Malays. This is to minimise local insurgence by the Malays community. Malays were also recruited into the police force.
The Japanese used this strategy to pit the Malays against the Chinese in Malaya. Overseas Chinese donated large sum of money to support China during the Japanese campaign back in 1938. As revenge, the Japanese targeted the Chinese in their ‘purifying’ campaign of the Malaya. Thus, the Malay police force was used to hunt down the Chinese. This strategy leaves a sore point between the Chinese and the Malays in the post-WW2 period in Malaysia. As noted by Vidhu (2002, p. 28), the Japanese “fanned anti-Chinese feelings by deploying military units of Malays to fight Chinese resistance groups”. The Japanese Occupation gave the Malays a new confidence.

2.1.3 The Malayan Union
The Malayan Union proposed by the returning British after the WWII was perhaps the best chance for the immigrant communities especially the Chinese and Indians to fight for equal citizenship. However, the political consciousness of these two communities was largely aligned to their home countries – China and India.
Hilley (2001, p. 27) noted that the Malayan Union was an “attempt to move towards a more uniform [political] structure in 1946” and to “bring the nine Malay states …, plus two Straits Settlements … under the ambit of stable central governing body for the first time”. For Vidhu Verma, it was an attempt “to reinforce their (British) authority after the war” (2002, p. 28).
The period after WWII was a period of uncertainty, with the status of Malaya as a country unclear. Hence, the Chinese saw it fit to keep their Chinese citizenship than to give it up and fight for Malayan citizenship which was uncertain of happening in the first place.
Therefore, when the Malayan Union proposed equal citizenship to everyone in Malaya, the Malays, through their vernacular newspapers were strongly opposed to the idea while the Chinese only gave it a cold response. Chinese papers gave scant coverage to this aspect of the Malayan Union. As pointed out by Fujio (2003) the majority of the Chinese still felt that their homeland was China and Malaya was only a temporary place.
The rally by the Utusan, an influential Malay paper saw the rise of Malay political consciousness, led by a Malay leader, Onn Jaafar from the southern state of Johor. The Malays saw the need to come together to defend their rights in Malaya and thus, UMNO was formed in 1948 with this purpose in mind.
The scheme was replaced in 1948 by the Federation of Malaya Agreement, drawn up by British and Malay leaders, where the non-Malays did not get the full citizenship rights. As noted by Comber (1983, p. 33), “in essence, the Federal Agreement was an Anglo-Malay compromise, as the Chinese were excluded from the Working Committee”.
Hilley (2001, p. 28) observed that this 1948 Agreement gave rise to the “communally located political parties”. The Agreement itself had set a trend in distinguished Malaya citizens into two categories. This gave the political parties a “communal agenda … for political mobilization of the subordinate classes”. Hilley (2001, p. 27) said this enabled UMNO, Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) to emerge as the “class patrons for each ethnic grouping”.
The founder of UMNO, Onn bin Jaafar wanted to open UMNO to all Malayans, but his idea was strongly opposed by UMNO members and he later left UMNO and set up the non-communal Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) in 1951. It did not attract much support from anyone.
At that time, when the idea to replace Malayan Union solidified, the non-communal All Malay Council of Joint Action (AMCJA) came to being and called for a political structure that recognised universal citizenship. However, the British choose to support and negotiate with the Alliance for the independence of Malaya.
Another potent force at that time was the Malaya Communist Party (MCP). Hilley (2001, p. 28) observed that the British “portray the MCP as an avowedly Chinese nationalist body, rather than a broad-based, anti-colonial class movement, the British hope to stifle Malay support for any form of class politics or radical nationalism”. Khoo (1997) noted that despite its mainly Chinese base, MCP managed to garner commendable amount of Malay and Indian support by 1948.
Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 11) noted that as tension mounted between the British and the MCP – despite MCP crucial role in helping the British defeating the Japanese – “the need for an alternative Chinese party that was conservative yet pliant to British interests became imperative”.
The British turned to a leading Chinese businessman Tan Cheng Lock for such purpose and the MCA was formed in February 1949.
Overall, Hilley (2001, p. 29) concluded that the British legacy was significant to Malay from three aspects:
“First, it helped drawn the Malayan economy into the world capitalist system, thus setting the basic metropole-domestic class relations. Second, as a central feature of this process, it created an ethnic division of labour in which racial attributes became synonymous with class position. And, third, it provided the nucleus of a pragmatic alliance between the Malay aristocracy/state bureaucracy, the main Chinese commercial bourgeoisie and Indian petite bourgeoisie, setting the framework of class accommodations, consociational politics and ethnic ideology to follow”.

2.1.4 The Alliance and the Merdeka social contract
It can be said that the first generation of the leaders forming the core of the Alliance shared some of the similar characteristics. Tunku Abdul Rahman of UMNO, Tan Cheng Lock of MCA and Sambathan of MIC all were convinced that the “single most critical fact with which a viable political system would have to come to grips was the dominance of profound communal cleavages” (Von Vorys 1976, p. 13). This communal cleavage is one single factor that “radically distinguished it from its Western counterparts”.
The Alliance leaders recognised the grip of communal cleavages in human personality that they are convinced that “the only reasonable course to follow was to recognise communal groups as essential, legitimate components of the political system” (Von Vorys 1976, p. 14). Hence, the Alliance was formed with individual political parties intact to represent their respective communities.
The early Alliance leaders also were able to mobilise popular support because they were themselves primarily communal leaders.
Von Vorys (1976) also pointed out that these leaders shared certain beliefs like: a preference for democratic politics in resolving political conflicts and in providing legitimacy for the political system, and seeing the use of violence as a bad form and poor judgment, and coercion as only the last resort of public policy. They were also educated in English school.
Due to this sociopolitical background, “Malaysian (Malayan) leaders set out to establish a viable, democratic system not based on a national community, but on the cooperation of discrete communal groups” (Von Vorys 1976, p. 14).
Von Vorys listed out the four features of this political arrangement:
The relationship of citizens within the same group would continue to be managed through a semi-autonomous communal hierarchy;
The relationship of citizens across communal boundaries or to the government would be regulated through terms agreed to by an inter-communal Directorate at the highest level;
The terms of inter-communal relations would be promulgated in a constitutional contract, and then implemented and when necessary augmented by policies secretly negotiated;
The members of the Directorate would have to possess dual qualification. They would have to be the leaders of the political organisation of their community most capable of mobilizing mass support behind the government in democratically conducted elections.
They would also have to be men who would maintain the confidence of their colleagues by keeping negotiations within the Directorate secret and by refraining from ever mobilising their external communal mass-support to bring pressure on the secret negotiations (Von Vorys 1976, p. 14-15).
Under the 1957 Merdeka Constitution, the Malays were given ‘special positions’ status, not the ‘special rights’ as often heard these days. These ‘special privileges’ were enshrined in Article 153 of the Constitution as an exchange to the extension of citizenship to the non-Malays then.
This bargaining is commonly known as the ‘social contract’ between the Malays and the non-Malays in Malaysia. It is considered the cornerstone to the formation of Malaysia and the very concept where modern Malaysian society is built upon. Hence, as noted by Hilley (2001, p. 1), Malaysia had reached “a settlement structured around ethnic parties and communal politics”. The members of the Alliance also pledged in their 1955 Manifesto for Federal Elections to establish a type of national school that will be acceptable to the people of Malaya.
In the Report of the Education Committee 1956, better known as the Razak Report, the direction of this ‘national school’ was envisioned to share common syllabuses for all school throughout the country and for the Malay and English to be made compulsory subjects in all primary and secondary schools.
Roff (1967, p. 318) noted that the exclusion of Chinese or Tamil language as a compulsory subject do not received strong objections from the leaders of the MCA and the response from the Chinese press were restrained and hopeful.
The Chinese and Indian leaders were probably overcome by the euphoria of the prospect of gaining independence for Malaya.
However, the Malays intellectuals were not satisfied with the Razak Report. Outside the UMNO, various Malay Teachers’ Associations, the Malay Language Society of the University, and the national writers association united under the leadership of the National Language Action Front (NLAF) to voice their dissatisfaction. This protest simply means that UMNO was losing grip of the Malay intellectuals. The loudest criticism was voiced when NLAF accused Tunku Abdul Rahman of betraying the Malays.
For the Chinese community, the political party representing them – the MCA – only played marginal roles on most Chinese daily lives. Chinese community also treats their chambers of commerce and their clan associations with great respect and importance.
Thus, when the Alliance and later the BN coalition government, managed to co-opt the largely Malay and Indians communities into the mainstream political ideology, the Chinese had different channels to vent their dissatisfactions and to seek help. This is one of the reasons for a large number of Chinese to have their own psyche and hence do not share the national sentiments.

2.1.5 The May 13 racial riot and the NEP
Among the darkest history of Malaysia is the May 13 racial riots in 1969. The official explanation of the cause of the riot was the economic imbalance among the different races in Malaysia. After the riot, Malaysia was declared under the state of Emergency. Operation of the country was transferred from the Cabinet to the newly formed National Operation Council (NOC).
As Milne (1970) noted that the riot demonstrated that consensus was low and that primordial loyalties were high. Hilley (2001, p. 29) observed that “in contrast to the Malay elite, the economic position of ordinary Malays had not been substantially improved by decolonization”. The Malays feared that their political position and constitutional rights would be threatened by the outcome of the 1969 general elections (Hilley 2001). Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 21) also noted that “despite steady growth, diversification and low inflation, unemployment had been growing and ethnic tensions grew as inequalities were increasingly perceived in ethnic terms and attributes to the ‘ethnic other’ ”.
Brown (1994) however, explained the May 13 riot from the class struggle perspective. Brown (1994, p. 233) noted that “by the end of the 1960s, it was becoming increasingly evident that the net result of government economic policies was the redistribution of wealth, within each racial community, from the poor to the rich”. Anand (1983, p. 96) noted that by 1970, “nearly 90 per cent of overall income inequality was due to differences within racial groups, rather than to differences between them”. These income inequalities, according to Brown (1994, p. 234) “prompt significant sections of the subordinate classes in each racial group to withdraw their support for the Alliance parties and to seek alternatives channels for articulating their interests”.
The 1969 riot in Malaysia is often seen as a landmark event that shaped the future of Malaysia. If the Article 153 in the Constitution institutionalised communalism, then the NEP put forward by the NOC certainly operationalised it. Almost every single policy implemented in Malaysia after that was somehow influenced by the NEP.
Economically, the skewed distribution of wealth among different ethnic groups “forced the Malaysian government to fundamentally rethink its economic policy” (Andaya & Andaya 2001, p. 302). In 1970, 75 per cent of households living under poverty lines were Malays.
However, it would be inaccurate to assume that the Chinese controlled all the wealth in Malaysia. Chinese economic role might be bigger that the Malays, but it was still less compared to foreign capital. According to Heng (1998, p. 55), “the diverse and widespread economic role of the Chinese might gave the impression that they controlled the economy of Malaysia at that period”.
Politically, after the poor showing of UMNO in the 1969 general elections, UMNO had to heed the pressure from the Malay community in order to stay relevant. The Tunku, at that time, was unwilling to advance Malay welfare at the expense of holding back Chinese business interests. There was general perception that the prime minister who was also the president of UMNO was too compromising to the non-Malays. Some of UMNO leader like the Minister of Agriculture, Abdul Aziz Ishak had called for the advancement of Malay economic interests, even at the expense of the Chinese.[1]
The Constitution was suspended, and NOC was formed to run the country. NOC was headed by the then deputy prime minister Abdul Razak. Tunku Abdul Rahman stepped down soon after that and Abdul Razak took leadership after that.
NOC finally launched the NEP in 1971 with the purpose to correct the economic imbalance among the different races in Malaysia. The main objectives of the NEP were: (a) to reduce and eradicate poverty by increasing employment opportunities to every Malaysian regardless of ethnic background, and (b) to restructure the society and to eventually eradicate the identification of ethnic groups according their occupation.
Implicitly, the NEP aimed to reduce poverty among the Malays. In order to achieve this objective, government pursued aggressive positive affirmative actions aimed at the Malays. Malays were given subsidies, preferential treatment in granting licenses and franchises, quotas in government jobs and university places. For example, 64 percent of local universities places were reserved for the Malays. This number was in recent years reduced slowly.
In pursuing these two objectives, the implementation seems to focus on the eradication of poverty along communal lines. History will be twisted to provide justification to this one-sided policy. The official narrative will point to the colonial policies which put the Bumiputra at a disadvantage position. Even though there is an official recognition[2] that poverty exist in all communities, the focus is usually on the Bumiputra because of Malay special rights and that they were discriminated during the colonial era.
At the same time, the Alliance was expanded to include opposition political parties like Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), and was later, known as BN. PAS left the BN coalition in 1979. Tun Razak’s key objective was to implement UMNO’s long overdue objective of redressing the problem of Malay economic weakness through the implementation of the NEP.
In achieving the second objective, government introduced the Industrial Co-ordination Act 1975 which “required the private sectors to employ 30 per cent Malays at every level or risk revocation of their licenses” (Andaya & Andaya 2001, p. 314).
The NEP officially ended in 1990 with the introduction of National Development Policy (NDP). Despite the aggressive interventionist steps taken by the government, “ethnic and economic disparities were still very much part of Malaysian life” (Andaya & Andaya 2001, p. 318). This gave the Malay nationalists reason to call for the maintenance of the Malay special rights and created an atmosphere of fear and siege that helped to define the political roles for UMNO.
Often, the NEP was abused for political mileage. Malays were constantly reminded to support the existing government in order for them to continually enjoy the special privileges. The NEP also created a new class of Malays that benefited from the government-sponsored overseas tertiary education and government contracts. The main beneficiaries of NEP were the Malay bureaucrats and politicians.
Brown (1994, p. 246) noted that the main impact of the NEP was that it “further increases the income and occupational disparities within the Malay community”.
This eventually split the Malays into groups that support the present government because they benefit from it and those who prefer reforms because they see the special privileges as a political blackmail.
The anticipated protests by the Chinese bourgeois did not materialised even though from the surface, the NEP pro-Malay development and wealth redistribution programs would jeopardise Chinese economic interests. In fact, MCA continued to co-operate with UMNO even though the NEP did not argue well for MCA political status. Brown (1994, p. 247) suggested that the obvious explanation for this is that the NEP “has been implemented so as to minimize its adverse impact upon the Chinese commercial and business sectors and indeed to ensure their continued prosperity”.
In the 1999 general elections, the Malays were clearly divided into the urban middle class UMNO supporters on one side and the largely rural lower class PAS supporters. Of course, the division was not that clear cut. There are also urban Malay middle class, who themselves benefited from the NEP, who join their rural brethrens to push for reforms.
In 1991, the NEP was replaced by the NDP. NEP failed to achieve some of the objectives outlined. The ownership of share capital in limited companies by the Bumiputeras (read: Malays) did not hit 30 percent as targeted by NEP.
Andaya and Andaya (2001) noted that the NEP would have been difficult to implement had it not been for UMNO’s power in the governing coalition. After the Parliament resumed in February 1971, amendments were passed in Dewan Rakyat which enabled the government to implement these policies. Steps were also taken to remove the public discussion of ‘sensitive issues’ like the power and status of the Malay rulers, Malay special privileges, Malay as national language and the status of Islam as the official religion.
This reality is in stark contrast to the official rhetoric of equal partnership and power-sharing of the governing coalition. Up to 1969, UMNO still treated its two weaker partners with respect. However, with UMNO losing its credibility after the elections, it had no choice but to maintain its own relevance to the Malay community. The poor elections result of its Chinese partner, MCA also greatly weakened its bargaining power with UMNO (Andaya & Andaya 2001, p. 325).
The massive social restructuring of the NEP also saw the restructuring of the politics in Malaysia. The Alliance was expanded to include the PAS and was known as BN from then on.
Since then, the BN has been able to win more than two-third of the seats in Parliament due to the clever combinations of persuasive and coercive tactics. This enable the BN to amend the Constitution “at will to suit its purpose” (Andaya & Andaya 2001, p. 327).
UMNO is also never shy in letting the coalition partners to know who the actual boss is and who has the final say. Dr Mahathir, well-known for his tactics in consolidating powers to the executive, stated that “UMNO is the backbone, the very bulwark of the Barisan Nasional” (Andaya & Andaya 2001, p. 327). The position of UMNO within the ruling coalition and the government is so strong that threats to the party are usually internal power struggles rather than external threats.
In recent history, two particular events shaped the position of UMNO within the society and resulted in UMNO reasserting its position as the defender of Malay special rights. In these two occasions, it is the non-Malays who suffered as they are used as a bogeyman in UMNO communal rhetoric.
The first is Operasi Lalang in 1987. This was the response of UMNO to the perceived threats to the party internally and externally. The challenge to UMNO leadership of Dr Mahathir by Tengku Razaleigh, together with the dissatisfaction of the Chinese community caused by the appointment of non-Chinese educated Chinese to head Chinese schools gave UMNO the opportunity to clamp down on its enemies, both internal and external. In this episode, language and education were the main cause of the Chinese dissatisfaction.
The second was the 1998 episode was the accumulation of political crisis as a result of Asian economic crisis ravaging through Asia in 1997. The ambitious then deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim, inspired by the reformasi movement in Indonesia attempted to challenge Dr Mahathir to the premiership. The initial differences in handling the economic crisis later spilled to the political arena and climaxed with the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim from his government post and deputy president of UMNO. He was later charged in court for sodomy and corruption. This episode caused a massive swing of Malay support to the Opposition, especially with the forming of Parti Keadilan Nasional by Anwar’s wife.
UMNO had to reassert its position as the defender of the Malay special rights. The clever dissemination of message by the mainstream papers enabled UMNO to paint a different picture to the Malays and the non-Malays. To the Malays, Anwar was painted as the cause of disunity in the community. This, UMNO argued, would result in the Malay community being weak and unable to defend its interests. On the other hand, PAS was portrayed as an extremist Islamic party to the non-Malay, especially the Chinese. The political collaboration of Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) in Barisan Alternatif (BA) caused the former to lose their traditional – mainly Chinese – supporters.
Some Malaysian observers argued that the 1998 episode was the start to more principle-based politics, departing from the usual communal politics. This thesis argues that, even under such conducive environment, clever framing and dissemination of messages by political players and their control over the mass media enables them to ethnicised even universal issues. The Suqiu episode is one clear example.
Communal issues will always remain relevant in Malaysia as long as the present political structure is maintained, and this writer believes that political elites in Malaysia will strive hard to maintain such structure.
At the end of NEP, official figures showed it had succeeded in achieving its major goals. Although official figures show that the Malay share of corporate equity did not achieve the targeted figure of 30 per cent, some non-official reports showed that the figure in fact has been achieved (Malaysian Chinese Association 1988, p. 32).
The NDP was formulated to replace NEP with the same social and economic objective of achieving national unity. However, NDP avoid emphasizing numerical targets and emphasis on income-raising policies rather than income redistribution.
NDP is welcomed by the Chinese because it is less ethnically divisive than NEP. Together with this, Dr Mahathir introduced his ‘Wawasan 2020’ or Vision 2020 for the nation in the first meeting of the Malaysian Business Council (MBC) in early 1991. Dr Mahathir wanted Malaysia to be “a nation at peace with itself, territorially, and ethnically integrated, living in harmony and in full and fair partnership made of one Bangsa Malaysia” (NST, March 2, 1991).
Vision 2020 captured the imagination of Malaysians, particularly the non-Malays because this was a clear shift from the exclusivist “bangsa Melayu” (Malay race) to the all-embracing Bangsa Malaysia. Hilley (2001, p. 4) observed that Dr Mahathir attempted to “galvanise the public imagination through ideas of a shared vision of prosperity”. Thus, Vision 2020 is “more than an industrial plan for advanced economic development. It is an attempt to stimulate a new social context for the emergence of an alternative social order” (Hilley 2001, p. 19).
Hilley (2001, p. 20) termed this Vision as a “post-ethnic nationalism” and marked the “gathering shift away from the NEP ideology, ethnic balancing and the old ‘politics of consociationalism’ – class constructions and state forms variously designed to reproduce the ideas and interests of the dominant class fractions across ethnic lines”.
The NEP success in achieving its goals without alienating the non-Malays was mainly attributed to the robust growth of the economy that ensured that the economic pie was large enough to be shared by all.

2.1.6 1997 economic crisis and the 1998 political crisis
Anwar Ibrahim, the former deputy prime minister was sacked from his post on 2 Sept 1998. This was the clearest sign of differences between the top two men in the government, something which they both had publicly denied before that. With the sacking of Anwar, Lee (2002, p. 177) observed that “the economic fallout in Malaysia became intertwined with a political crisis.” Rustam A. Sani (2001. p. 89) also noted that “the economic crisis that struck Malaysia from the middle of 1997 has since then become a political or even regime crisis”.
After the 1988 UMNO political crisis, Dr Mahathir managed to purge his party from rival fractions by registering UMNO as a new party, excluding those he saw as his political rivals. Thus, throughout the 90s, he managed to consolidate power to himself and to put anyone up or down at his will. Anwar Ibrahim, a student leader back in the 70s was among a few who earned Dr Mahathir’s trust. Anwar meteoric rise to the top was the envy of a large number of UMNO members.
The baht devaluation in July 1997 sparked a massive economic crisis that hit most of the Asian countries. Dr Mahathir with his usual rhetoric snubbed the International Monetary Fund (IMF) advice for tighter fiscal policy.
The government announced that the Chinese would be allowed to take over companies owned by Malay to prevent the latter going bankrupt. However, they were not allowed to hold these assets in the long term, as spelt out by Daim Zainuddin, then the Minister of Special Functions: “I’d allow them [the Chinese] to rescue ailing companies. After they recover, they can talk about ownership” (FEER 19/2/9).
Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 196) observed that “this use of selected Chinese businessmen to help bail out some well-connected Malay businessmen reflects Chinese capital’s continued subordination and obligations to Malay political hegemony”.
On the other hand, Anwar Ibrahim was widely seen as favourable of the tighter fiscal policy. Dr Mahathir announced increase in government spending to facilitate economic growth. This goes against Anwar Ibrahim who was then the Finance Minister as well. These economic differences were downplayed by both men as the usual difference but with the similar goal in mind. Lee (2004, p. 88) pointed out that “some observers believed that each faction was anxious to protect the business interests of its supporters”.
Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 200) observed that at that time, “the Western media openly encouraged early Anwar succession to national leadership, portraying Dr Mahathir as out-moded, inadequate to the challenge and even ignorant, if not irrational”.
During the 1998 UMNO general assembly, Zahid Hamidi, a protégée of Anwar Ibrahim and then UMNO Youth chief, moved a motion during the debate of the presidential speech. Zahid brought up the issue of cronyism and corruption during his speech. This was seen as an indirect attack to Dr Mahathir. Cronyism and corruption were seen as the reason for the weak Asian economic fundamentals including Malaysia. It was also these two issues that brought down the former Indonesian president Suharto.
As a response, Dr Mahathir pulls another rabbit out his political hat by releasing list of names of Bumiputera that had benefited from the government’s share allocation schemes. These names includes Anwar Ibrahim’s father.
That was the clearest sign of Anwar’s challenging Dr Mahathir leadership. Many observers felt that the days of Anwar were numbered. However the swiftness of Anwar’s removal and the subsequent events caught everyone by surprise.
The sacking of Anwar Ibrahim on 2 Sept 1998 ends the dynamic partnership of Mahathir and Anwar in running the country and marked the beginning of the split within the Malays.
As expected, Anwar did not go quietly. He rallied his supporters for massive demonstrations in the capital city and held rallies around the country to gather support. Malays who were left out from the economic growth felt that it is time to push for reforms and PAS was fast in throwing support behind the man they once criticised as the traitor to the Islamic religion.
The political stakes during the 1999 general election were high. There was a general consensus that changes with the existing sociopolitical conditions were possible. It was also in the spirit of reforms that Chinese associations introduced the 17-point election appeals.

2.1.7 The split of the Malays and Chinese voters as kingmaker
The gentlemen’s agreement to discuss anything sensitive within the Alliance was tested several times throughout the history of Malaysia. The last one was during the 1999 general elections. It was a few months prior to the general elections that 11 Chinese association came together to form The Malaysian Chinese Organisations Election Appeals Committee, or in short Suqiu. The main component of the Suqiu committee were the United Chinese School Committees Association of Malaysia (Dong Zong), United Chinese School Teachers Association of Malaysia (Jiao Zong) – collectively known as Dong Jiao Zong – and nine other Chinese associations (refer to Appendix A for the full list).
Suqiu came out with a 17-point appeal and “call upon all political parties and candidates in the coming general elections to declare their support and endorsement” (Suqiu 2002, p. 11). This was seen by the BN as pressure by the Chinese community from outside the Alliance to bow to their demands and the failure of the MCA to co-opt and check on this dissident voices.
After the sacking of the former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim, the Malay community was split and thus, support from other communities were even more crucial to ensure that BN stayed in power. Thus, the BN government did not take this 17-point appeal kindly and saw it as blackmail by the Chinese community. As the Chinese consist of 26 percent of the population, any swing by the Chinese electorates would ensure victory to any candidates the Chinese choose to support. As noted by Heng (1999), “the Chinese vote will affect the outcome of this election more decisively than any other held since 1969”.
Khoo Boo Teik (2003, p. 128) in his book Beyond Mahathir: Malaysian Politics and its Discontents noted that “it has become one of UMNO’s stock political myths that ‘disunity’ was something the Malay community could not afford because it implied weakness that would be exploited by others”.
Ratnam and Milne (1970) in their paper published in the Pacific Affairs, noted that in the 1969 general election, UMNO were only commanding 47.7 per cent of the valid Malay votes as compared to Pan Malaya Islam Party (PMIP, the predecessor to PAS) 52.3 per cent.
Khoo (2003, p. 128) suggested that this ‘Malay disunity’ would be invoked to rally for support for UMNO. UMNO argued and persuaded PAS to join the enlarged BN in 1971 and pushed for aggressive implementation of NEP.
In 1987, prior to Operation Lalang, there was an internal power struggle in UMNO between Team A headed by Dr Mahathir and Team B spearheaded by Tengku Razaleigh.
In 1998, it was a challenge to Dr Mahathir leadership mounted from the reformasi movement. In order to rally for Malay supports, UMNO had to create a credible ‘non-Malay threat’. Thus, Suqiu was single out for that purpose.
Weiss (2000, p. 413) noted that the Malay vote was “clearly split between UMNO and PAS”. Lee (2002, p. 177) also concluded that the “deep split in the Malay community was obvious with the participants on the reformasi demonstrations launched by Anwar were largely Malays”. Lee (2004, p. 88) noted that “Dr Mahathir’s own reputation had suffered as a result both from the 1997-98 financial crises and from the handling of Anwar’s [reformasi] challenge”.
The Chinese were with the BN since the 1995 general elections. The BA coalition with PAS and Keadilan closely identify with the reformasi movement did not appeal to some Malays and especially the non-Malays. As noted by Weiss (2000, p. 421), some Malaysian voters “expressed dissatisfaction with or distrust Anwar, seeing him as just another opportunistic BN politician”.
Weiss (2000, p. 421) noted that for the non-Malays, Anwar was known for its “pro-Malay, pro-Islam policies of the 1980s and 1990s that have disgruntled non-Malays; hence, his multiracial rhetoric rang a bit hollow to some”.
Thus, in the elections, the choice was clear. It was between the BN’s politics of development and stability and BA’s politics of justice and good governance.
However, even when BA tried to move beyond ethnic politics, its own campaigns and conducts during the run up to the elections played into BN’s hand. Weiss (2000, p. 425) noted that since its formation, Keadilan “has grown more Islamic in image”.
BA tried hard to move beyond ethnic politics even though they know very well that ethnic issues still appeal to Malaysians. PAS government in Kelantan – in a move seen as trying to appeal to the Chinese voters – lifted the ban on pig farming.
Even though this move was commendable, Chinese voters never distinguish PAS Islamic politics with UMNO Malay nationalist politics. Lee (2004, p. 90) pointed out that “many Chinese rejected the link between the DAP and PAS”.
Even in the early years of Malaysia, during the debate of national language after the Razak Report was published in 1956, PAS was seen as “being critical of the government for what is felt to be the inexcusable gradualism in making Malay the sole official language, and foolish tolerance towards the persistence of other language” (Roff 1967, p. 319).
Weiss (2000) noted that the elections results for the Keadilan candidates could be interpreted as voters identifying Keadilan as a Malay-based party, as all its successful candidates were Muslim Malays. Lee (2004) also pointed out that the party that gained most in the 1999 elections was PAS.

2.2 The Political Economy of the Press In Malaysia
In Malaysia, the media, especially the press, was controlled through media ownership and also via coercive legislations. Zaharom (2002, p. 112) observed that “the early 1980s saw the emergence of new titles, signifying to many a liberalisation of media policies, a relaxation of control”. However, almost all national dailies in Malaysia are published by three groups that are owned or linked to individuals or political parties of the ruling coalitions.
New Straits Times Press (NSTP) publishes two English dailies – NST and Malay Mail – as well as two Malay dailies – Berita Harian (BH) and Harian Metro. Utusan Melayu (Malaysia) publishes the influential Utusan Malaysia. Both NSTP and Utusan are linked to UMNO. Star Publications (M) Sdn Bhd – which is owned by the MCA through Huaren Holding – publishes the leading English daily, The Star.
Thus, as observed by Zaharom (2002, p. 117), that the local press “while seemingly increasing in number, nonetheless are controlled by the same few actors … invariably aligned to political parties and leaders”. Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 2-3) also concurred that the press in Malaysia are largely owned by politicians or politically influential businessmen.
Hilley (2001, p. 12) noted that the main agenda-setting agency in Malaysia is the mass media, and they “represent a vital part of the UMNO network, helping to filter information, entertainment and civil values”. Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 3) noted that these BN-controlled media have been “used by the BN to promote and legitimise itself as well as to discredit political opposition and dissent more generally”.
Hilley (2001, p. 12) also observes that Malaysian media, since 1980s have been “encouraging a form of safe ‘role model’ media discourse based on lifestyle images and social concerns”. This strategy, observed Hilley (2001:13), has provided a context for “managed media debate, helping to keep dissent distanced from any meaningful critique of the power structure”. Anyone louder than the ‘tolerated noise’ will be shut out from the debate.

2.2.1 History of Newspapers in Malaysia
The first newspaper published in Malaya was the English language Government Gazette, later called the Prince of Wales Island Gazette (PWIG) on 1 March 1806 (Mustafa 2002, p. 140; Mohd Safar 1996, p. 57). According to Mustafa (2002, p. 140), in the early 1800s, “there was no existing law in the Straits Settlements governing the issuance of newspaper licences”.
The first Chinese language newspapers, The Chinese Monthly Magazine, started its publication in August 1815, and it was produced not for local population but for audiences in China.
Only by 1876, the first Malay newspaper, Jawi Peranakan, was published in Singapore. The first Tamil newspaper, Singai Warthamani was started a year earlier.
During the Japanese rule, the press was designated as the main tool of Propaganda Department of the Japanese Military (Mohd Safar 1996). After the Japanese surrendered, Malay newspapers such as the Utusan Melayu, which was highly influential among the Malay, particularly rural Malays, took on a more “aggressive role in raising Malay consciousness pertaining to the hotly debated issue of Malayan Union” (Mohd Safar 1996, p. 213).
However, Utusan Melayu was involved in a takeover by UMNO in 1961. The newspaper worker called for editorial independence that was in line with the newspaper’s original philosophy of fighting for ‘the race, religion and homeland’, while UMNO insisted that the daily should consciously give full support to UMNO (Mustafa 2002, p. 145-46). The 93-day strike was finally over with UMNO gaining control over Utusan Melayu. As observed by Mustafa (2002, p. 146), this is “the first instance in Malaysian journalism since independence of a political party taking over a newspaper”.
Press freedom in Malaysia has close links to the political climate in Malaysia. Press freedom is usually tightened by the ruling coalition when there are threats to the power of the ruling coalition.
As observed by Mustafa (2002, p. 146), in the aftermath of May 13, press freedom in Malaysia was further restricted. Regulations were amended and ownership structure was changed in the early 1970s.
The government then felt that the locals should control the local media industry; hence the purchase of major stocks in Straits Times Press (STP) Group in 1972 by government-owned PERNAS, which was later transferred to UMNO investment company called Fleet Holdings. By 1984, the transfer was completed and STP was changed to NSTP.
The MCA also began to acquire various media interests starting with their purchase of 67.35 per cent of Star Publications (M) Sdn Bhd in 1979.

2.2.2 Media Legislation
The tightening of legislations governing the media in Malaysia usually follows as a result of the need for the ruling coalition to exercise greater control over the media. Mustafa (2002:149) observed that “traditionally, the threats of communism and communalism provided justification for these laws. However, the rationale for retaining and applying these laws has been widened and, in some cases, made vague enough to leave a catch-all effect”.

Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984
The main law governing the media has been amended 4 times, each time to tighten and gave the state more power over the media. The Printing Presses Ordinance of 1948 was revised in 1971 and 1974 as the Printing Presses Act. It was then revised in 1984 as the Printing Presses and Publications Act, and again in 1988 after Operasi Lalang in 1987.
Initially, this legislation was meant to exercise control over the ownership of printing presses and publications in the face of an increasing threat from communist in Malaya (Mohd Safar 1996).
The amendment in 1987 gave the Home Minister the power to grant printing permit to any newspapers circulating in Malaysia. The minister’s decision to grant the permit is final, and cannot be challenged in a court of law.

Internal Security Act (ISA) 1960
The ISA was also introduced by the government as a ‘safety net’ at the end of the communist threat in Malaysia. The Act empowers the home affairs minister to impose preventive detention without trial on anyone “acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia” (Means 1991, p. 142). Zaharom (2002, p. 124) noted that “over the years, the ISA has seen many people detained not necessarily because of communist connections or subversive activities”.

Official Secret Act (OSA) 1972
The political uncertainty after the May 13 riot provided some justification for the government to introduce the OSA. In theory, this Act prohibit a person from getting information that is deemed an ‘official secret’, but in practice, “it hampered the working journalists and dampened the development of investigative journalism” (Mustafa 2002, p. 151).

2.2.3 The 90s in Malaysia
The improving standard of living of Malaysians, and the general atmosphere of liberalisation after the 1990 “provide the golden opportunity for the profit-driven mainstream newspapers to attract more readers and, by extension, more advertisers by publishing reports and analyses that were politically safe and sanitised” (Mustafa 2002, p. 152).
Mustafa (2002, p. 152) observed that during this period, papers in Malaysia “had undergone cosmetic changes in terms of format and the use of more colours as a way of making themselves visually more attractive”.
Loh and Mustafa (1996, p. 111) observed that “these changes made up for the newspapers’ weaknesses in the crucial area of investigative journalism, and incisive and illuminating commentaries”. Mustafa (2002, p. 152) noted that “these editorial developments constituted a form of social control as they helped newspapers to divert themselves – and the public’s attention – away from controversies, depoliticise issues, and displace people’s rights to political participation”.
The press was generally not critical of the ruling party, but would only give coverage to the opposition when there are opportunities to demonise them. Mustafa (2002, p. 155) observed that “the depiction of political parties in the opposition coalition as disparate and lacking both compatibility and direction, only reinforced the BN’s stereotype of the opposition as being unreliable and unfit to govern the country”.
The mainstream press as a whole was willing to cooperate with the state and placed its resources, expertise and influence at the disposal of the BN. Mustafa (2002, p. 162) observed that “the mainstream press under the tense circumstances of September 1998 was unmistakably partisan”. The negative coverage on Anwar after his sacking without him being given any change for rebuttal and the portrayal of street protests as the act that would threaten national security and political stability only goes to show what the press are ready to sacrifice in time of crisis.
The change of editorial of NST is closely linked to the power struggle within the UMNO leadership. Back in 1993, Anwar Ibrahim, then Malaysian Finance Minister, through his associates, bought into NSTP and TV3 in a steps widely seen as a preparatory to Anwar’s successful challenge later that year for UMNO’s deputy presidency.
Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 126) observed that “in the run-up to [UMNO] election, although TV3 and NSTP newspapers were not blatantly supportive of Anwar, they gave him prominent and favourable coverage, while ignoring Ghafar [Baba, then deputy prime minister and deputy president of UMNO] and his camp”.
In the lead-up to the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim in September 1998, Anwar’s associate, Johan Jaafar, editor-in-chief of Utusan Malaysia, and Nazri Abdullah, group editor of Berita Harian – the leading Malay language dailies – were removed. This removal was seen as an early step in getting ready the media for an all out assault on Anwar after his sacking.
Lee (2004, p. 100) suggested that the purchase of Nanyang Siang Pau and the China Press was an attempt by Dr Ling Liong Sik, then president of MCA, to deal with the continued challenge from Team B. While this might be an internal power struggle within the MCA, Chinese in general see this episode as an “attempt by the government through the MCA to further domesticate the Chinese press”.
Lee (2004, p. 100) noted that “editorial in the Chinese press are relatively more independent compared with the Malay and English language newspapers”.
During the proposed use of English in teaching Mathematics and Science controversy, several groups expressed strong reservations. They included Malay language supporters and Chinese educationists. Even Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (DBP) expressed their reservations. However, Malay language press choose only to highlight the Chinese protests, as if the Malays are united behind this UMNO’s initiative. One could only imagine the Malay press reactions if this idea was mooted by the MCA.
Lee (2004, p. 104) pointed out that the Malay press like Utusan labeled the Chinese educationists as “chauvinists and exclusionists”.
In the period leading up to the 1999 general elections, Utusan was careful not to bash DAP for its political association with PAS. The contest for Malay votes was fierce at that time between UMNO and PAS, and any attempts to discredit PAS would be detrimental to UMNO’s efforts in garnering Malay votes, as PAS generally commands substantial supports from the more conservative Malays.
Utusan, however, portrayed DAP as a party that did not respect rule of laws, and Utusan implied that this attitude contradicted DAP’s political struggles. In its 11 August 1999 report, Utusan urged Chinese to deny DAP their support because DAP did not respect the rule of laws, and not for DAP’s association with PAS.
Perhaps, with the increased sophistication of media consumers in Malaysia, there is hope in this controlled media environment. As observed by Zaharom (2002, p. 131-32), “stringent though the political and economic controls on the Malaysian media may be, raising vital questions about democratic practices, nonetheless it would be rather premature to assert that media audiences are simply duped into accepting at face value what is produced by the controlled media”.

2.3 Suqiu
Suqiu is the common name for The Malaysian Chinese Organisation Election Appeals Committee. According to Wong Chin Huat, writing in Suqiu Document, Suqiu is literally a “voters’ manifesto”. This 17-point appeals (the Appeals) was launched on 16 August 1999, and by the eve of the 1999 general elections, this document was later endorsed by 2095 organisations nationwide (Suqiu 2002, p.13).
These organisations were mainly Chinese organisations because it is a Chinese community’s initiative. However, Wong pointed out that its spirit and substances are definitely not Chinese but Malaysian oriented. Lee (2002, p. 184) also noted that the points raised by Suqiu could be divided into two types; the more universal goals similar to the ones promoted by civil society groups, and the one that reflects the usual Chinese concerns like equality in economic, education, and cultural rights (refer to Appendix A).
Plenty of the 17 points raised in the Appeals were universal in nature. For example, Point 14 urged the government to restore confidence in the police force. Suqiu reiterated their stand again on 17 October 2000 by issuing a press statement which urged the government to review the “salary scheme of Malaysian police, to build a clean and professional Police Force, and the regain public confidence” (Suqiu 2002, p. 114).
It is therefore not wrong to say that government did agree and shared the same sentiments as that of Suqiu. Some of the points of the Appeals were later implemented by the government. The 5th Prime Minister of Malaysia Abdullah Ahmad Badawi on 29 December 2003 announced that Malaysian government will set up a Royal Commission to “study and recommend steps to enhance the capability of the Royal Malaysia Police (PDRM) (Bernama 29 Dec 2003).
According the Bernama news report, Abdullah said the proposed commission would modernise all operational and work aspects of the police, taking into account policing techniques and human rights issues, including women's rights.
In fact, Lee (2002, p. 184) noted that the Cabinet “voted to support the Appeals in principle”. However, during the period leading to the general elections, the BN took the usual strategy to ethnicised legitimate universal appeals in order to whip up ethnic sentiments.
While UMNO’s strategy was to focus on the ethnic aspect of the Appeals, PAS and Keadilan avoided the ethnic appeals and focus on the universal ones.
Looking back, Suqiu is not something new from the Chinese community but a “continuation of its previous calls for an inclusive Malaya/Malaysia”. In the 80s, there were also two similar documents – Memorandum of National Culture (1983) and the Joint Declarations of Chinese Organisations (1986).
Back in June 1999, with elections expected to be held anytime, the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall (SCAH) took the initiative to organise dialogue between the Chinese community leaders and the representatives of both the ruling and oppositions political parties.
On 16 August 1999, the SCAH together with 10 other Chinese organisations launched the final version of the Appeals in Malay, English and Chinese.
One interesting episode within the Suqiu was the proposal by the Federation of Chinese Assembly Halls of Malaysia (FCAM) to include an ethnic Chinese second PM and an ethnic Chinese Finance Minister as part of the final draft. Even though Suqiu rejected outright this suggestion from FCAM, it was eventually accused by the mass media of playing up racial sentiments.
The main theme for the Appeals were promote national unity, advance democracy, uphold human rights and justice, curb corruption, fair and equitable economic policy, review the privatisation policy, enlightened, liberal and progressive education policy, let multiethnic cultures flourish, protect the Malaysian environment, develop and modernize new villages, housing for all, protect women’s rights, fair media, restore confidence in the police force, upgrade social services, respect the rights of workers, and provide for our indigenous people.

2.3.1 History of Chinese pressure
The three main concerns of the Malaysian Chinese can be summed up in three aspects – politics, economic, and culture.
Politically, the Malaysian Chinese had always felt that Malay special rights put the Chinese as second-class citizens. Milne and Mauzy (1999, p. 95) noted that the Chinese felt that they “should be hired in the public service, armed forces, etc., in accordance with their proportion in the population”.
Economically, Malaysian Chinese felt that the aggressive implementation of the NEP had compromised their opportunity in business.
Malaysian Chinese also takes the right for mother-tongue education seriously because language vital for the continuation of Chinese culture. Milne & Mauzy (1999, p. 90) noted that the “Chinese seemed to be especially vociferous on language and educational issues”.
Lee and Heng (2000, p. 194-5) argued that Chinese political parties on both sides of the national political divide “have always sought to represent the community bedrock interests: rights of full citizenship, opportunity for economic advancement, preservation of the Chinese language and Chinese schools, and outlets for public cultural expression”.
Politically, Malaysian Chinese had come to terms with the Malay special rights, and economically, Malaysian Chinese had been able to form symbiotic business partnership with Malay corporate elites.
The issue of Chinese education has remained a fundamental concern to the Chinese community, and currently remains the most contentious of all its concerns. Kua (1999, p. 1) noted that “the Chinese schools in Malaysia have indeed been steeped in politics from the start of their existence”. Tan Liok Ee (2000), in her writing on Chinese schools in Malaysia noted that Malaysia is the only country outside of China where there is a well-developed system of Chinese schools that is largely supported by the state. She argued that these Chinese schools are not only educationally significant but also culturally and politically important to the Chinese.
Tan (2000) argued that the Chinese schools in Malaysia are an unusual example of education institutions which began as schools serving a migrant community, but were able to evolve into a vibrant part of the education system of a multi-ethnic nation.
According to the Report of the MCA National Task Force (1988, p. 89) published in 1988, and Tan (2002, p. 157) close to 90 per cent of Chinese parents sent their children to Chinese primary national-type schools. This percentage drop a bit a few years later and Lee (2004, p. 105) pointed out that some 70 per cent of Chinese parents send their children to Chinese schools.
This 70 per cent also includes some 60,000 non-Chinese students enrolled in Chinese schools in 2000 (Tan 2002, p. 164). Thus, Chinese educationists maintain that the Chinese school stream is not exclusivist. According to Tan (2002, p. 155), there are today 1,284 national-type primary schools (NTPSs), and 60 independent Chinese secondary schools (ICSSs).
The ruling government also makes it a point to point out that the existence of ICSSs is not an issue and their existence are guaranteed under the Education Act 1996. This issue will surface every time an election is near. In the period leading up to the 1999 general elections, Malaysian government, perhaps anticipating that it will resurfaced again, reminded political parties not to exploit this issue [‘Chinese school here to stay’, The Star, 5 September 1999, p4].
Chinese schools could be found not only in towns but also small villages, wherever there was a group of children needing a school and some local leaders prepared to take the initiative to organise one. According to Tan (2002, p. 157), local leaders “had a social and moral obligation to keep the schools going and, together with Chinese schoolteachers, enjoyed both status and respect for their role in fulfilling a social and cultural need”.
The common complaints of Chinese educationists were that there was “no provision for new or additional NTPSs, less generous grants, and insufficient attention on training more teachers” (Tan 2002, p. 157).
In the past, Chinese schools grew according to local needs. Since independence, government has played a dominant role in education, seeking control over all schools, including the growth of Chinese schools.
Even in the days leading to the independence of Malaya, Chinese education groups were vocal in voicing their protests in what they saw as steps by the government to sidelined Chinese education and Chinese language values. Roff (1967, p. 318) noted that the “Chinese Guilds and Associations response to the release of the Razak Report in 1956 by demanding that Chinese language be accepted as an official language as well, and be accorded the same status as the Malay language in the national education system”.
Within the framework of the Alliance, MCA too tried to pressure its partner, UMNO in endorsing Chinese language as an additional official language. After Dr Lim Chong Eu was elected the president in 1958, the Jiao Zong, and the Chinese Guilds and Associations began to pressure Dr Lim.
It is difficult to tell why an English-educated politician would take up this cause. Certainly by taking up this cause, Dr Lim hoped to draw these Chinese organisations into the national decision making process.
However, this decision was not being received kindly by UMNO, especially after Dr Lim wrote letter to Tunku Abdul Rahman, outlining demands concerning language and the increase of seats allocation in the upcoming elections. MCA threatened to quit the Alliance unless these demands were met. The Alliance National Council, which Tunku was the chairman, announced that MCA must withdrawn these demands. Soon after that, Dr Lim resigned as the president of MCA and was replaced by Tan Siew Sin, the son of MCA founder.
This episode demonstrated that the role of MCA within the ruling coalition is to explain and persuade the Chinese community to support government’s policies, not as a vehicle to pressure the government. This episode is a clear lesson for the Chinese organisations that it is usually fruitless to pressure the government through political channel.
Pye (1985, p. 251) also pointed out that “Confucian culture do not provide any guidelines for Chinese leaders to function in a non-Confucian context”. Worse still, the idea of Chinese being the subordinates of a foreign power is “unthinkable”. Pye (1985, p. 251) added that “any Chinese who acts as a leader must be an imposter, if he is subservient to the Malay majority leadership”.
This observation might explain the low status of MCA leaders in the Chinese community. The Chinese had long dismissed MCA leaders as selling out Chinese rights when they agreed to the deals brokered with UMNO. Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 12) observed that “in vein of the bourgeois nature of the MCA leadership and its subservient role to UMNO in the ruling coalition, the party has always have much difficulty in galvanising and sustaining the support of the working-class and middle-class Chinese”.
As Pye (2985) pointed out, the “MCA leaders who supported the pro-UMNO constitutional deal were characterized as self-serving towkays (merchants) … and who were willing to serve as UMNO lackeys in order to reap the spoils of the political office”.
It certainly did not help the MCA that their early leaders were mostly merchants. Chinese cultural and language leaders, that have extensive networks with the masses were largely aligned to the MCP, the party that British choose to ignore despite MCP’s contribution to the fall of the Japanese Occupation in Malaya.
Having said that, Lee and Heng (2000, p. 223) argued that the Chinese in Malaysia have developed “appropriate responses to successive groups of power wielders, and that Chinese co-operation in the Malaysian political system is central to the maintenance of political stability and inter-ethnic harmony”.

2.3.2 The chronology of the Suqiu episode
1999 June – The Civil Rights Committee (CRC) of Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall (SCAH) worked on to organise a dialogue between the Chinese community leader and the representatives of both the ruling and opposition parties.

1999 August 16 – Final version of the Appeals launched in Malay, English and Chinese and Suqiu started the endorsement drive.

1999 Sept 6 – DPM Abdullah said “Suqiu is not allowed to bargain with government”.

1999 Sept 20 – PM Dr Mahathir labeled Suqiu as “a mean to pressurise the government” and criticised it for “damaging racial harmony”.

1999 Sept 23 – 11 ministers, led by Dr Ling Liong Sik, Dr Lim Keng Yeik and Dr Lau Hieng Ding, met with Suqiu and accepted the Appeals in principle. NST quoted Dr Ling as saying that “Suqiu represented 99 per cent of Malaysian Chinese”.

1999 Oct 19 – Suqiu issued a press statement that to date, Suqiu has not received any invitation to sit on the NECC II. However, Suqiu resolved not to do so should the invitation arrive in the future. Reasons given are: Suqiu will promote the Appeals through public education; and since BN, in principle, have accepted the Appeals, it is up to the Cabinet, not NECC II, to realise those Appeals.

1999 Oct 19 – BA expressed their supports to a number of principles and concerns outlined in the Appeals.

2000 May – Suqiu permanent secretariat was set up in SCAH.

2000 August 8 – Judgment day for Anwar’s corruption charge.

2000 August 14 – Malay media tried to plying up businessman David Chua’s call for overview of Bumiputra privileges in an interview with FEER.

2000 August 16 – First anniversary celebration and launching of Suqiu website. The next day, Utusan headlined “Persatuan Cina Ulangi Tuntutan” [Chinese association repeat its demands].

2000 August 17 – 200 UMNO Youth members, lead by its deputy chief Abdul Aziz, demanded Suqiu to abandon its Appeals and to apologise to the Bumiputra society within a week, or, they will burn down the SCAH.

2000 August 31 – PM Dr Mahathir labeled Suqiu as ‘extremist’ and made equivalent to the communist and religious insurgent in his National Day speech.

2000 Sept 15 – 20 members of Suqiu committee meet up with PM to explain Suqiu aspirations. PM admit BN accept the Appeals before the general elections so that BN will not lose Chinese supports.

2000 Nov 29 – BA secured victory in Lunas by-election, a mix constituency which has been BN stronghold since Independence.

2000 Dec 11 – PM reiterated his equating of Suqiu with the communists when answering questions by Kota Melaka MP (DAP) Kerk Kim Hock in Parliament. PM admit the government was just forced to accept the Appeals in principle.

2000 Dec 13 – 500 members of GPMS held a demonstration. Its president Suhaimi Ibrahim demanded Suqiu to withdraw all its 83 sub-points within a month or Gabungan Pelajar Melayu Semenanjung (GPMS) will call for national demonstration and issue their own 100 demands.

2000 Dec 29 – Suqiu negotiated with UMNO Youth to set aside 7 sub-points.

2001 Jan 5 – Suqiu ‘put aside’ seven out of its 83 sub-point appeals in a joint statement with the UMNO Youth.

[1] Abdul Aziz Ishak had confiscated all the licenses of Chinese rice millers in northern Perak and Province Wellesley (Seberang Perai, Penang) with which to win Malay’s supports.
[2] The Third Malaysia Plan (1876-80) acknowledges the poverty of non-Malay groups, and their need for improved access to education, healthcare and amenities.