Chapter 3

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Theoretical Framework
This thesis will use two theories – consociational theory and plural society theory – to interpret post-colonial Malaysian social and political landscape. Since Independence in 1957, Malaysian political landscape has evolved from the equal power sharing in the Alliance to the domination of UMNO within the BN government. Pro-Malay policies have been implemented more aggressively since the NEP was launched in 1970. Even though there was a departure from the exclusivist pro-Malay to more inclusive policies since 1990s, Malay supremacy within Malaysia is still very real.
Some Malaysian observers argued that Malaysia has moved beyond ethnic politics, especially after the 1998 reformasi era. This thesis will argue otherwise. In fact, there was an increase in ethnic assertion in the form of religious exclusivism. Increasingly, the Malays in Malaysia are redefining their ethnic boundary from Islamic aspects.
This chapter will begin by looking at some basic concepts commonly mentioned throughout this thesis. Then it will look at two theories in detail.
The last part in this chapter it will point out that the notion of news objectivity is a myth, and essentially, news can be manipulated to reflect the editorial opinion of a particular newspaper.

3.2 Definition of Concepts
3.2.1 Race and ethnicity
In Malaysia, it has been proposed that the primary cause for such tension since the 1980s is economic factors. (Hua 1983, Jesudason 1989). Hwang In-Won (2003, p. 9) in his Personalized Politics: The Malaysian State Under Mahathir observed that Malaysia is generally described as a prime example of a society severely divided along ethnic lines and ethnic conflict is still one of the most distinctive sources of political conflicts.

Race or racial group
The earliest use of the term ‘race’ was in the 16th and 17th century European to mean the descendents of a common ancestor, emphasizing kinship and linkage. It was only in the late 18th century that the term ‘race’ came to mean a distinct category of human being with physical characteristics transmitted by descent (Feagin 1989, p. 5).
According to Feagin (1985), Francis Berneir was one of the first European to sort out human beings with physical characteristics into basic and distinctive categories, with European on top and Negro or Black Africans on the bottom, primarily because they were then best known to European as slaves.
By the late 19th century, numerous European and American writers were systematically downgrading all peoples not of northern European origin as inferior “races”, particularly southern and eastern European people (Rose 1968, Gossett 1965).
It was in this context of downgrading that ideological “racism” emerged. Von den Berghe (1967, p. 11) defined ideological racism as “an ideology that considers a group’s unchangeable physical characteristics to be linked in a direct, casual way to psychological or intellectual characteristics, and on this basis distinguishes between superior and inferior racial groups”.
Apart from the ideological racism, another school of thought tried to introduce the “scientific racism”. European writers like Count de Gobineau in mid 19th century used this concept to morally justify the imperialism of northern European state in Asian, Africa, and the Americas (Feagin 1989).
Some actually believed that the size of a person’s brain had causal influence on a person’s intelligence. In 1935 an influential professor from University of Virginia wrote that “the size of the brain of the Black Race is below the medium both of the Whites and the Yellow-Browns, frequently with relatively more simple convolutions” (Robert Bennett Bean, as quoted in Carlson and Colburn 1972, p. 106).
In the last few decades, a major concern among social scientists has been with the social definition of race and racial groups. In 1948, Cox (1948, p. 402) was one of the first to underscore this perspective by defining a race as “any people who are distinguished, or consider themselves distinguished, in social relations with other peoples, by their physical characteristics”.
Von den Berghe (1967, p. 9) also defined racial groups as “human group that defines itself and/or is defined by other groups as different from other groups by virtue of [presumed] innate and immutable physical characteristics”.
A person’s race is most typically determined by and important to certain outsiders, although a group’s self-definition can also be important. Feagin (1989, p. 6-7) defined a racial group as “not something naturally generated as part of the self-evident over the universe, but is a social group that persons inside or outside the group have decided is important to single out as inferior or superior, typically on the basis of real or alleged physical characteristics subjectively selected”. Feagin noted that the physical characteristic usually associated with race is skin colour.
Banton (1967, p. 57-8) argued that “skin colours are easily observed and ordered in the mind”. Feagin (1989, p. 7) argued that, “more important than ease of observation is the way which economic or political exploitation often leads to the need to identify the exploited group in a certain way”.

Ethnic group
The word ‘ethnic’ comes from Greek ‘ethnos’, originally meaning ‘nation’ (Feagin 1989). Feagin (1989, p. 9) noted that these social definitions of ethnic group move us away from a “biological determinism that sees groups as self-evident and genetically fixed with unchanging physical or mental characteristics”.
Race is usually a category based on physical features, while ethnicity is a social constructs. Lai (2004, p. 2) quoted Frederick Barth’s definition of ethnicity as “a mode of identification and organisation by one group vis-à-vis other, in which, in the process of interactions, ethnic groups draw from their cultures each with their own elements of affinity and identity, to mark out differences and to fix the relationship to each other”.
Joanna and Darini (1999) pointed out that numerical majorities and minorities are constructed and manipulated, just as ethnicity is, in group struggles for power and hegemony. For example, the inclusion of non-Malay indigenous people of Sarawak and Sabah in 1963 to form the larger group of Bumiputra, rather than classifying them separately from Malays is a strategy to increase the percentage of Bumiputra in Malaysia. In practice, Bumiputra usually refers to the Malays in Malaysia.
Joanna and Darini (1999, p. 13) also noted that nation-building often meant “centralization and a single group dominating the symbolic framework of national”. This domination will encourage minority groups felt marginalised by the process “to (re)invent new collective identities” (Joanna & Darini 1999, p. 13). This process will cause mass mobilisation of groups along ethnic lines. This is the paradox of nation building as a process of creating a common national identity, which will stimulate resistance from the minorities.
Joanna and Darini (1999) suggest that there are two reasons why people prefer to stick to their own kind. From the culture side, people place special trust in members of their own kind. The political arrangement of patron-client also requires political elites to promote and award their own people to political positions as an acknowledgement of their loyalty.
Brown (1994, p. xii) stated that “ethnicity constitute one of several forms of association through which individuals pursue their interests relating to economic and political advantage” and noted that “individuals seem to need to distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’ communities”.
The debate on ethnicity generally takes two approaches; primordialism and situationalism. Brown (1994, p. xiii) noted that the first approach asserts that “people are naturally ethnocentric, exhibiting trust and preference for those of their own cultural group while feeling more distant from, and distrustful of, those of other cultural groups”. The main proponents for this perspective include J. S. Furnivall and M. G. Smith.
Brown (1994, p. xiv) noted that “any attempts at responsive, democratic, or alliance-based government will tend to degenerate into political instability and disintegration”. In the early days of independence, observers predicted that the alliance formed to govern Malaysia would not last because of the nature of instability of such political arrangement. However, Brown (1994, p. xiv) noted that “political instability can be avoided only by some form of authoritarian state”. The BN government’s responses to the May 13 riot mirrored some of this approach.
For the situationalist approach, individuals are seen as members of social and cultural groups without necessary recognizing them as having ideological and political significance. Brown (1994, p. xvi) noted that “ethnic attachment has frequently been explained as a response to situational threats from dominating others, so that individuals react by forming appropriate defensive groups”. These groups will vary depending upon the source of the perceived situational threat.
Brown (1994, p. xvii) noted that this approach guided the works of Judith Nagata, Charles Keyes, William Liddle, and Robert Taylor. Situationalist approach explains ethnicity as one resource among many which individuals may employ in their efforts to respond to the environment.
Brown (1994, p. xviii) concluded, “the primordialist and situationalist approaches can thus both be seen to offer valuable insights as to the nature of ethnicity and its role in politics, but the adoption of either approach on its own seems to be misleading”.
Brown (1994) pointed out that there is a close relationship between ethnic consciousness and the activities of the state. State, according to Brown (1994, p. 1-2), played a major role in influencing the distribution of power, status and wealth, thus, not only influencing the socioeconomic disparities, but the “advantages which accrue to those possessing a particular language, religio-culture or racial identity”. For example, the Indian Muslim community in Malaysia demands the Bumiputra special privileges despite their Indian background (Muda Mohd Noor 2004).
The British era in Malaysia had generated a distinctive type of relationship between class and ethnicity. In order to sustain British demands for raw materials, different racial groups were recruited into a particular occupational category. For example, the Indians were largely involved in plantations, while the Chinese were largely involved in mining industry.
Brown (1994, p. 213) noted that this “coinciding of race with class fraction fostered the perception by the exploited classes that it was their racial attributes which determined their class position”. The Malays in Malaysia certainly argued for their special privileges based on the perceived discrimination by the British that resulted, according to the Malay elites in the Malays being left behind in the economic progress of Malaysia.
Another feature of British rule was the close co-operation between the commercial sector and the state bureaucratic sector, in order to maintain the social order of which these two sectors were the major beneficiaries. One of the main strategies employed by the bourgeois (British) class was to exploit ethnic sentiments.
According to Brown (1994, p. 214) this strategy was possible in Malaysia because of three factors. These interrelated factors are:

a. The colonial state was able to make use of the prevalent ethno-class consciousness which had been generated by the racial division of labour under colonialism, inhibiting the emergence of an incipient class consciousness which transcended racial lines and which posed a potential threat to orderly decolonialisation.
b. The institutional form of the alliance between the commercial and bureaucratic bourgeoisie was that of the ethnically consociational state, in which political alliance were formed between racial groups.
c. The compartmentalisation of each racial class began to erode and contact between different racial classes started to increase. Unequal competition for jobs and resources breed rivalry between racial classes, which gave credibility to the ethnic ideology propagated by the state elites.

Frank Furedi (as quoted in Brown 1994, p. 214) noted that these factors were used to promote ethnic ideology, in which “overtly class-based political movements were suppressed by the colonial and post-colonial state, and were redesignated as ethnic communal movements so as to be politically neutralised”. The British were actively structuring the Malaya community along racial-occupational lines, so that there are only limited interactions between the various communities. This occupational compartmentalisation was made worse by British policy in education. The Indian and Chinese were left alone to take care of their educational needs, and the British only provided Malay and English schools. Fuston (1980, p. 31) noted that the majority of Malays were provided with only elementary vernacular education, “practically oriented so as to stress the educational value of manual labour and not give rise to any dissatisfaction with the peasants’ humble lot”.

3.2.2 Malay supremacy
The first colonial definition of a ‘Malay’ was made in the Malay Reservations Act 1913, classifying as a Malay ‘any person belonging to the Malayan race’ who habitually spoke Malay or ‘any other Malayan language’ and who professed Islam as a religion (Andaya & Andaya 2001).
According to Heng (1998, p. 51), there are three core ethnic identifiers of “Malayness” – bahasa, agama, raja (language, religion, and royalty) – that was constantly used by the Malay leaders to reflect the hegemonic status of the Malay in Malaysian polity. Shamsul (1996) said these ethnic identifiers concurred with the three key attributes identified by the Malay nationalist movement in the 1900s. These Malay nationalists also felt that Malay should be the sole official and national language in an independent Malaya. The Malay nationalists which consisted of three factions – the “administocrats”, the Malay Left, and the Islamic leaders – differed in regards of the role of the royalty and Islam.
In the early stage of independence, the British choose to back the Malay ‘administocrats’, which the British saw as being in the best position to maintain British interests in an independent Malaya. Thus, royalty and Islam were thrust to the forefront – together with the Malay language – as the main ethnic identifiers of the Malays in Malaysia.
Heng (1998) pointed out that the main priority of the Malay nationalists after WWII was to ensure their political hegemony in the independent Malaya. In other words, the Malay put politics before economy. Malay political hegemony in Malaysia was largely attributed to the British’s ‘blessing’, unlike the official narrative put forward by the ruling elites in Malaysia today. According the Heng (1998), the British acknowledged the Malay political and cultural dominance in the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948 and later entrenched it in the 1957 Constitution.
Besides having the blessing from the British, UMNO also had it easy with its Alliance partner. Heng (1998) noted that MCA, in negotiating the independence Constitution with UMNO, conceded to the Malay special positions, Malay language as the sole national language, and the lack of official status for Mandarin. This means MCA had recognised the Malay hegemonic position in politics right from the birth of Malaysia. Heng (1998) pointed out that MCA had little choice because the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948 had already discriminated against Chinese interests. In addition to that, the British were supporting UMNO in their position in Malay political leadership.
The British did not encourage the Chinese to seek equal citizenship. As a response to the MCA-negotiated deal with UMNO, the Council of Registered Chinese Guilds and Association led by Chinese-educated merchant Lau Pak Khuan, was formed to push for equal citizenship and official-language status for Mandarin. This movement was rebuffed by the British, thus leaving the Chinese with the MCA-brokered deal.
Heng (1998, p. 59) also pointed out that the independence in 1957 actually brought less freedom for the Chinese as “it ends the autonomy they had enjoyed in running their community affairs”. The independence actually put the Chinese under the direct rule of the Malay political elites, as the Chinese were unable to secure favourable deals with their Malay political partner.
Khoo (2003, p. 199) noted that “several turning points of Malaysian politics were set by mass Malay intrusions upon the political stage: witness 1946 and the Malayan Union; 1969 and May 13; and 1998 and reformasi”. Lee and Heng (2000) noted that once Malay power was consolidated in the period after 1969, with the inclusion of PAS, Chinese influence in the ruling coalition, along with their political expectations, became markedly reduced. Mauzy (1983, p. 140) noted that “although UMNO was the dominant party in the Alliance, it is even more hegemonic in the BN … After 1969 it was clear to everyone that the Malays led by UMNO were in charge”.
Jomo, Khoo and Chang (1995, p. 15) noted that the “Alliance regime and what it stood for were things of the past, a reality capped by Tunku’s retirement in September 1970”. Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 22) observed that the “hegemonic position of the new, more Malay-oriented leadership in the BN was enhanced through amendments to the Constitution”. Mauzy (1993, p. 110-11) noted that all the power sharing arrangement was in effect “accommodation in essentially Malay terms”. Milne and Mauzy (1999, p. 90) observed that the Chinese, especially those in the MCA “have suffered from delusions about power”. Even though MCA could claim to be the third largest Chinese-based political party in the world, in reality, it is just a junior political partner to UMNO in the BN.
Milne and Mauzy (1999) noted that MCA was weakened because of the ‘Merdeka bargain’ and by the inclusion of other Chinese-dominated political parties like Gerakan into the BN. The seats allocation for MCA in the Malaysian Cabinet has steadily decline over the past decades. In addition to that, ‘strategic’ portfolios like Finance and Trade and Industry were taken away from MCA in period after the start of NEP. Milne and Mauzy (1999, p. 91) noted that “Finance Ministry, the last bastion of Chinese strength in the Cabinet, was lost in 1974”. Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 23) noted that “in subsequent years, UMNO leaders would openly assert that the party could rule alone, but preferred to ‘share’ power in the interest of national unity”.

3.3 Consociational Theory
Consociational theory was first associated with the integration process of the European Union. According to Barry, the term ‘consociation’ derives from the Latin consociatio which means “the action or fact of associating together” or “union in fellowship” (Barry, 1975, p. 478, quoted in Chryssochoou 2001, p. 3). The Netherlands was the first country to be identified as consociational (Lijphart 1975). Malaysia was a consociational country from 1955 to 1969 and since 1971, with the increased concentration of power to the ruling elites (Von Vorys 1976). As a political theory, it is a good way to explain the political arrangement among the political elites in Malaysia, and as a means to understand the working nature of a diverse political coalition in Malaysia that has been in power since Independence.
Holden (1993, p. 112) however, pointed out that consociationalism is often “a theory about how much decision making remains possible in the face of grave difficulties”. Even so, Brown (1994, p. 228) pointed out that proponents of the concept of consociationalism argued that it represents the only effective way of organizing democracy in an ethnically plural society. It is important to note that in times of crisis, negotiations between subunits within the system are often carried out behind closed doors. Chryssochoou (2001, p. 6) pointed out that, because of these practices, “members of the elite cartel successfully exclude themselves from extensive public scrutiny”. Decisions reached within the coalition are usually treated as a collective decision. Therefore, no particular subunit within the system can be picked out to be responsible for the decision reached.
Tindigarukayo (1989, p. 43) proposed five favourable factors for consociationalism. These include segmental isolation; traditions of elite accommodation and overarching cleavages; popular legitimacy of the ruling elites; respect for institutional rules and procedures; and generous amount of compromise, trust and goodwill among political leaders. Mair (1994) pointed out that segmentation in a plural society is usually drawn on linguistic and religious lines.
Lijphart (1968, p. 5) also proposed that there are four “prerequisites” for consociational democracy to work in a plural society. These include society’s ability to recognise the dangers inherent in a fragmented system; committed to [political] system maintenance; ability to transcend sub-cultural cleavages at the elite level; and the ability to forge appropriate solutions for the demands of the sub-cultures. From this, we can assume that components within this particular political system come together and co-operate on an equal ground, towards a common goal. This, in essence, very much characterised the early stage of the Alliance, the predecessor to the Barisan Nasional (BN) government which has rule Malaysia since her Independence in 1957.
The term ‘consociational democracy’ was first use by Apter (1966, p. 24) who defined it as the “joining together of constituent units which do not lose their identity when merging in some form of union”. This is very much the case of the 13 political parties forming the ruling coalition in Malaysia, with the three major political parties clearly maintaining their ethnic identity. This is only possible because the three major ethnic groups in Malaysia – namely, Malays, Chinese and Indians – trust their political elites to bargain on behalf of them. As pointed out by Stevenson (1982, p. 37), “in such countries the population is segmented in subgroups, each represented by political elites who are trusted to bargain with other elites on behalf of the group interests”.
In fact, those political elites often project their parties as such. The three major parties in the BN coalition were formed specifically for that propose – to champion the rights of their ethnic groups. Brown (1994, p. 229) criticised these inter-communal Alliance as the “institutional form for the maintenance of bourgeois class domination, which allowed the bourgeois class fractions to disguise the defence of their own class interests as the protection of communal interests”.
UMNO was formed at the height of the Malays’ protest against the formation of Malayan Union by the British in 1948. Malayan Union was seen as challenging the sovereignty of the Malay rulers. This was seen as a direct challenge to the very existence of the Malays in their own land.
Lijphart (1968) argue that there could be stable democracy in plural, vertically segmented or communally divided societies if there was overarching co-operation among the segment elites, based on a set of unwritten rules of the games. Lijphart was the author of the 1968 article Typologies of democratic systems which launched the term consociational democracy. In the case of Malaysia, the “unwritten rules of the games” are, of course, “the informality yet seriousness of the discussions, the atmosphere of hard bargaining, but a willingness to compromise” (Von Vorys 1976, p. 104). This method of negotiation basically sets the tone of future inter-ethnic negotiations within the BN coalition.
Lijphart also pointed out that the consociational democracy comprised of four characteristics: grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality and mutual veto (Lijphart 1977, p. 25). However in the later stage of the BN coalition, we see that the coalition was dominated by UMNO especially after the late 1980s. Naturally, UMNO being the largest subunit within this grand coalition will also have the majority support to bulldozer their way through any negotiations.
When the ‘old’ UMNO was deregistered in 1988, Dr Mahathir, the UMNO president then, registered the ‘new’ UMNO and this was the beginning of greater UMNO domination over the ruling coalition. Critics have accused Dr Mahathir of engineering the deregistration of the old UMNO as a step to purged the party of his rival fraction, then led by Tengku Razaleigh. Basically the domination of UMNO in the ruling coalition was the result of the consolidation of power under Dr Mahathir and the need to show to the Malays community – which was split after the 1988 UMNO deregistration – that UMNO was still able to defend the interests of the Malays and that UMNO was still very much in control of the ruling coalition.
Hwang (2003, p. 9) concurred that the “consociational model is only evident in the period between 1957 and 1969, and since the 1970s, there was increasing political and economic discrimination in favour of the Malays. Andeweg (2000) pointed out that the later evolution of the consociational theory, the element of elite cooperation had evolved into this: political elites do not compete. As for the Malaysian case, political elites do not compete mainly because the political elites from the other political parties are dominated by UMNO.
In the Lower House (Dewan Rakyat ), the ruling coalition controls 147 out of 193 seats in the House. However, the figure in the Election Commission website only show the seats won by BN coalition as a whole, not the breakdown of the seats won by individual political parties within the coalition. This is another cosmetic way to show the unity within the ruling coalition. However, this is not surprising because a coalition is needed to show that decisions are arrived at collectively.
Andeweg (2000, p. 511) pointed out that the main feature in consociational democracy is that “the elite eschew decision by the majority.” This means that UMNO would not want to be seen as dominating the decision making process because of its majority number within the ruling coalition. Any decisions made are best projected as a collective decision and not a decision by the majority. UMNO’s total popular votes during the 1999 general election dropped but they still managed to control 48 percent of seats of the Lower House (Maznah 1999).

3.4 Plural Society Theory
The pioneers of the theory of plural societies were J. S. Furnivall and M. G. Smith (Rex & Gurharpal 2003, p. 107). Furnivall was writing about Indonesia and Smith was writing primarily about the British West Indies. Plural societies, in Furnivall (1956, p. 304) famous words, are societies that “mix but do not combine” Furnivall also noted that in the plural societies, “different sections of the community living side by side but in the same political unit”. In the economic sphere, Furnivall (1956, p. 304) noted, “there is a division of labour on racial lines”. Hilley (2001, p. 23) noted that “the British encouraged a policy of ethnic immigration and stratified labour relations as part of an export-led strategy”. Hilley (2001, p. 24) noted that it was also during that time that “colonial [mis]representations of racial attributes began to find popular resonance”.
This division of labour or the identification of labour along racial lines would be the major source of contention in the post-colonial Malaysia and would become one of the strongest reasons for the massive social reengineering programmes by the Malaysian government. These affirmative action-oriented programmes, according to Bacchi (1996), did not start until after the 1969 racial riots as widely believed by many observers of Malaysian affairs. It was perhaps pursued more aggressively by the Malaysian government after the racial riots, as there was then a more pressing reason to do so. It was also physical proof of what economic imbalance among the different races living together could do to a newly independent multiracial country like Malaysia.
During the colonial time in Malaya, the basic relations among the communities and the colonial powers were essentially economic. In the 19th century, the British encouraged aggressive immigration by the Chinese and Indians. This was to meet the demands of labour in plantation and mining sectors – two major sources of income to the colonial power. As noted by Rex & Gurharpal (2003), most colonial societies involved groups of different origin performing different functions. This was also the case for the immigrant communities in Malaya.
The Chinese were mainly involved in mining sector and trade in urban area. The Indians were confined to the plantation estates. The British were very specific in their labour policy, confining one ethnic group into one industry.
Abraham (2004, p. 5) pointed out that “the division of labour along ethnic lines further reinforced sociocultural differences because of lack of social interaction between the different ethnic groups”. This separation of immigrants’ communities with the local communities resulted minimum contact between them. Each community will have different ways of life and since “these different groups came from different geographical origins meant that in part the distinction between them was an ethnic one” (Rex & Gurharpal 2003, p. 111). This form of divide-and-rule resulted “social-class antagonisms, ethnocentrism and racial polarisation (Abraham 2004, p. xvii).
During the colonial times, each community had to look after their own welfare. Thus, this “reinforced a consciousness of kind as the basis for groups to organise themselves to survive (Abraham 2004, p. xviii). This form of political arrangement resulted the respective groups turning to their own elites for support. Abraham (2004) noted that despite knowing that these elites will use their position as the power base for their own benefits, the communities have little choice but to turn to them. This is still the situation in Malaysia where each community elites will claimed that they will fight on behalf of them with the condition that the community must give these elites undying political supports.
Perhaps, that is the paradox of Malaysia, while striving to achieve Bangsa Malaysia; its political parties are still formed along racial lines. When the British withdrew from Malaya, power was passed to the local lead by the Alliance. Within this transition period, there were at least two groups of Malayans vying for power – the secular Alliance that consisted of the three major races in Malaya and the mainly Chinese-based MCP.
In Malaya, powers were divided between two ethnic groups – the Chinese controlled the economic sector while the Malays by default of their majority number in Malaya controlled the political arena. As noted by Rex & Gurharpal (2003, p. 112), “in Malaysia, Malays controlled the government, economic entrepreneurship was in the hands of the Chinese and agricultural labours in the hands of Indians”. For the agricultural sectors, large foreign plantation companies like Sime Darby and Guthrie continued to operate. These companies had since being taken over by Malaysians.
In plural societies, those who are vying for power usually claim to represent everyone in the country and usually stand on a nationalistic platform when negotiating for power. However, as noted by Rex & Gurharpal (2003), these “nationalist leaders commonly represent a particular class or ethnic group”.
Tunku Abdul Rahman, the leader in the Alliance knew this very well. British would not grant Malaya independence if the three races in Malaya could not cooperate and live together as a nation. The British were also aware that they are limited in choice and time. After WWII, there was a massive drawback of the British forces in their overseas colonies. The other promising group in Malaya then was the Malayan Communist Party. MCP led Malayan People Anti-Japanese Liberation Army (MPAJA) were credited for supplying the British with intelligence during the Japanese Occupation that eventually resulted the defeat of the Japanese in WWII. However, global ideology struggle among the superpowers then clearly struck this out as an alternative.
As a post-colonial country, Malaysia constantly has to deal with question of multiculturalism. Von Vorys (1976) also pointed out that generally in newly independent countries, the “social system is far from stable”. In addition to that, contemporary Malaysia also has to deal with the question of class. This is more apparent in the Malay community and is one of the reasons for the split of the Malays community in the recent years. The aggressive affirmative action programmes only reached certain groups of Malays, creating a new Malay middle class playing a dominant role. Abraham (2004, p. xxii) also argues, “colonialism superimposed class distinctions on racial groups and this created racial antagonism between the Malays, Chinese and Indian”.
Even in 2003, Malaysian press still portrayed the Chinese as the rich community and the Malays still needs government subsidies (NST 13 Oct 2003). It was reported that Dr Mahathir said that if the Chinese in Malaysia were given the same subsidies and concessions as given to the Malays, the Chinese would have been “way ahead by now”. These constant portrayals by the press create the impression that the Chinese are largely of the middle class.
Perhaps the most controversial point made by Abraham was about the social impact of colonisation. Abraham (2004, p. 1) argues “colonial rules had a negative impact on this harmony and consequently manifested itself in racial perceptions, tension and potential social conflict”. In another words, colonisation split the Malayan community.
Jomo, Khoo and Chang (1995, p. 6) observed that:
“Malaysian social and political life appears to be overwhelmingly organised around this plural society and its trends of fluctuating interethnic competition, compromise and conflict. Political parties are mainly ethnically based, all kinds of issues are readily ‘communalised’, and political coalitions represent attempts at interethnic compromise”.


3.5 The Myth of News Objectivity
Students taking introduction class in journalism course will be told that objectivity is the cornerstone of news. Why is there such an emphasis on news objectivity? Tuchman (1972, p. 297) suggested that “the term ‘objectivity’ stands as a bulwark between themselves and critics” and was often invoked to defend themselves against any attacks on their news articles.
The most basic way to be objective is to identify ‘objectivity’ with ‘facts’ which may be verified. Tuchman (1972, p. 299) suggested four strategic procedures for journalists to follow so that they can claim to be objective. These procedures are:

A. Presentation of conflicting possibilities
B. Presentation of supporting evidence
C. The judicious use of quotation marks
D. Structuring information in an appropriate sequence

It is important for journalists to present both sides of the story so that they may claim to be ‘objective’ and allow the readers to decide on a particular issue. However, even this is open to criticism.
A charge placed at the beginning of a story might receive more attention from readers than the denial placed toward the bottom of the story. In the Suqiu episode, Suqiu press statements of denial or clarification usually end up at the bottom of the story.
Quotations are usually used in news because it is viewed as a form of supporting evidence. Tuchman (1972, p. 301) noted that “the reporter may remove his opinions from the story by getting others to say what he himself thinks”.
Newspaper also have the tendency to include public opinions that reflects the newspaper’s stand on a particular issue and reject those that contradict or critical of them.
In structuring information in an appropriate sequence, journalist has to decide what is ‘important’ and ‘interesting’ for the readers. This process in itself cannot be objective because it will involve journalist’s judgment based on their values and experience.
Tuchman (1972, p. 302) noted that “newspapers differ in their choice of material ‘facts’, their news policies, but all claim to be ‘objective’”. Tuchman (1972, p. 304) asserted that these ‘news procedures’ are actually “strategies through which [journalists] protect themselves from critics and lay professional claim to objectivity”. Tuchman (1972, p. 305) asserted that “an attempts to obtain objectivity […] cannot be said to provide objectivity”.
Cohen (1963, p. 13) noted that the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about”.
Bob Kohn in his Journalistic Fraud: How The New York Times Distorts the News and Why It Can No Longer Be Trusted had demonstrated that it is possible to disguise editorial opinion as objective news “for the purpose of influencing public opinion” (2003, p. 4).
Kohn (2003, p. 24) noted that it is important to slip editorial opinion into straight news because that “lends a level of credibility to the opinion that is normally reserved for objective news” and this will be a “much more effective means of influencing the public than the mere expression of opinion on editorials and op-ed pieces”. Kohn (2003, p. 29) noted that, unlike the past, today “newspapers are in the business of identifying solutions to society’s problems and influencing public opinion to agree with those solutions”.
Bob Kohn through his book Journalistic Fraud: How The New York Times Distorts the News and Why It Can No Longer Be Trusted shows explicitly how “misinformation” was carried out by slanting the presentations of the facts in leads, headlines and placement of the news item in the paper. As demonstrated by Kohn, there are nine ways a journalist could distort a news reports: (1) distorting the lead; (2) distorting the headline; (3) distorting the facts; (4) distorting with opinion; (5) distorting with labels; (6) distorting with loaded language; (7) distorting with crusades; (8) distorting with polls; and (9) distorting with placement.
In brief, no journalist could fully claim to be objective and it is possible to slip editorial opinion into ‘objective’ news in order to influence public opinion.