Chapter 3

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Theoretical Framework
This thesis will use two theories – consociational theory and plural society theory – to interpret post-colonial Malaysian social and political landscape. Since Independence in 1957, Malaysian political landscape has evolved from the equal power sharing in the Alliance to the domination of UMNO within the BN government. Pro-Malay policies have been implemented more aggressively since the NEP was launched in 1970. Even though there was a departure from the exclusivist pro-Malay to more inclusive policies since 1990s, Malay supremacy within Malaysia is still very real.
Some Malaysian observers argued that Malaysia has moved beyond ethnic politics, especially after the 1998 reformasi era. This thesis will argue otherwise. In fact, there was an increase in ethnic assertion in the form of religious exclusivism. Increasingly, the Malays in Malaysia are redefining their ethnic boundary from Islamic aspects.
This chapter will begin by looking at some basic concepts commonly mentioned throughout this thesis. Then it will look at two theories in detail.
The last part in this chapter it will point out that the notion of news objectivity is a myth, and essentially, news can be manipulated to reflect the editorial opinion of a particular newspaper.

3.2 Definition of Concepts
3.2.1 Race and ethnicity
In Malaysia, it has been proposed that the primary cause for such tension since the 1980s is economic factors. (Hua 1983, Jesudason 1989). Hwang In-Won (2003, p. 9) in his Personalized Politics: The Malaysian State Under Mahathir observed that Malaysia is generally described as a prime example of a society severely divided along ethnic lines and ethnic conflict is still one of the most distinctive sources of political conflicts.

Race or racial group
The earliest use of the term ‘race’ was in the 16th and 17th century European to mean the descendents of a common ancestor, emphasizing kinship and linkage. It was only in the late 18th century that the term ‘race’ came to mean a distinct category of human being with physical characteristics transmitted by descent (Feagin 1989, p. 5).
According to Feagin (1985), Francis Berneir was one of the first European to sort out human beings with physical characteristics into basic and distinctive categories, with European on top and Negro or Black Africans on the bottom, primarily because they were then best known to European as slaves.
By the late 19th century, numerous European and American writers were systematically downgrading all peoples not of northern European origin as inferior “races”, particularly southern and eastern European people (Rose 1968, Gossett 1965).
It was in this context of downgrading that ideological “racism” emerged. Von den Berghe (1967, p. 11) defined ideological racism as “an ideology that considers a group’s unchangeable physical characteristics to be linked in a direct, casual way to psychological or intellectual characteristics, and on this basis distinguishes between superior and inferior racial groups”.
Apart from the ideological racism, another school of thought tried to introduce the “scientific racism”. European writers like Count de Gobineau in mid 19th century used this concept to morally justify the imperialism of northern European state in Asian, Africa, and the Americas (Feagin 1989).
Some actually believed that the size of a person’s brain had causal influence on a person’s intelligence. In 1935 an influential professor from University of Virginia wrote that “the size of the brain of the Black Race is below the medium both of the Whites and the Yellow-Browns, frequently with relatively more simple convolutions” (Robert Bennett Bean, as quoted in Carlson and Colburn 1972, p. 106).
In the last few decades, a major concern among social scientists has been with the social definition of race and racial groups. In 1948, Cox (1948, p. 402) was one of the first to underscore this perspective by defining a race as “any people who are distinguished, or consider themselves distinguished, in social relations with other peoples, by their physical characteristics”.
Von den Berghe (1967, p. 9) also defined racial groups as “human group that defines itself and/or is defined by other groups as different from other groups by virtue of [presumed] innate and immutable physical characteristics”.
A person’s race is most typically determined by and important to certain outsiders, although a group’s self-definition can also be important. Feagin (1989, p. 6-7) defined a racial group as “not something naturally generated as part of the self-evident over the universe, but is a social group that persons inside or outside the group have decided is important to single out as inferior or superior, typically on the basis of real or alleged physical characteristics subjectively selected”. Feagin noted that the physical characteristic usually associated with race is skin colour.
Banton (1967, p. 57-8) argued that “skin colours are easily observed and ordered in the mind”. Feagin (1989, p. 7) argued that, “more important than ease of observation is the way which economic or political exploitation often leads to the need to identify the exploited group in a certain way”.

Ethnic group
The word ‘ethnic’ comes from Greek ‘ethnos’, originally meaning ‘nation’ (Feagin 1989). Feagin (1989, p. 9) noted that these social definitions of ethnic group move us away from a “biological determinism that sees groups as self-evident and genetically fixed with unchanging physical or mental characteristics”.
Race is usually a category based on physical features, while ethnicity is a social constructs. Lai (2004, p. 2) quoted Frederick Barth’s definition of ethnicity as “a mode of identification and organisation by one group vis-à-vis other, in which, in the process of interactions, ethnic groups draw from their cultures each with their own elements of affinity and identity, to mark out differences and to fix the relationship to each other”.
Joanna and Darini (1999) pointed out that numerical majorities and minorities are constructed and manipulated, just as ethnicity is, in group struggles for power and hegemony. For example, the inclusion of non-Malay indigenous people of Sarawak and Sabah in 1963 to form the larger group of Bumiputra, rather than classifying them separately from Malays is a strategy to increase the percentage of Bumiputra in Malaysia. In practice, Bumiputra usually refers to the Malays in Malaysia.
Joanna and Darini (1999, p. 13) also noted that nation-building often meant “centralization and a single group dominating the symbolic framework of national”. This domination will encourage minority groups felt marginalised by the process “to (re)invent new collective identities” (Joanna & Darini 1999, p. 13). This process will cause mass mobilisation of groups along ethnic lines. This is the paradox of nation building as a process of creating a common national identity, which will stimulate resistance from the minorities.
Joanna and Darini (1999) suggest that there are two reasons why people prefer to stick to their own kind. From the culture side, people place special trust in members of their own kind. The political arrangement of patron-client also requires political elites to promote and award their own people to political positions as an acknowledgement of their loyalty.
Brown (1994, p. xii) stated that “ethnicity constitute one of several forms of association through which individuals pursue their interests relating to economic and political advantage” and noted that “individuals seem to need to distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’ communities”.
The debate on ethnicity generally takes two approaches; primordialism and situationalism. Brown (1994, p. xiii) noted that the first approach asserts that “people are naturally ethnocentric, exhibiting trust and preference for those of their own cultural group while feeling more distant from, and distrustful of, those of other cultural groups”. The main proponents for this perspective include J. S. Furnivall and M. G. Smith.
Brown (1994, p. xiv) noted that “any attempts at responsive, democratic, or alliance-based government will tend to degenerate into political instability and disintegration”. In the early days of independence, observers predicted that the alliance formed to govern Malaysia would not last because of the nature of instability of such political arrangement. However, Brown (1994, p. xiv) noted that “political instability can be avoided only by some form of authoritarian state”. The BN government’s responses to the May 13 riot mirrored some of this approach.
For the situationalist approach, individuals are seen as members of social and cultural groups without necessary recognizing them as having ideological and political significance. Brown (1994, p. xvi) noted that “ethnic attachment has frequently been explained as a response to situational threats from dominating others, so that individuals react by forming appropriate defensive groups”. These groups will vary depending upon the source of the perceived situational threat.
Brown (1994, p. xvii) noted that this approach guided the works of Judith Nagata, Charles Keyes, William Liddle, and Robert Taylor. Situationalist approach explains ethnicity as one resource among many which individuals may employ in their efforts to respond to the environment.
Brown (1994, p. xviii) concluded, “the primordialist and situationalist approaches can thus both be seen to offer valuable insights as to the nature of ethnicity and its role in politics, but the adoption of either approach on its own seems to be misleading”.
Brown (1994) pointed out that there is a close relationship between ethnic consciousness and the activities of the state. State, according to Brown (1994, p. 1-2), played a major role in influencing the distribution of power, status and wealth, thus, not only influencing the socioeconomic disparities, but the “advantages which accrue to those possessing a particular language, religio-culture or racial identity”. For example, the Indian Muslim community in Malaysia demands the Bumiputra special privileges despite their Indian background (Muda Mohd Noor 2004).
The British era in Malaysia had generated a distinctive type of relationship between class and ethnicity. In order to sustain British demands for raw materials, different racial groups were recruited into a particular occupational category. For example, the Indians were largely involved in plantations, while the Chinese were largely involved in mining industry.
Brown (1994, p. 213) noted that this “coinciding of race with class fraction fostered the perception by the exploited classes that it was their racial attributes which determined their class position”. The Malays in Malaysia certainly argued for their special privileges based on the perceived discrimination by the British that resulted, according to the Malay elites in the Malays being left behind in the economic progress of Malaysia.
Another feature of British rule was the close co-operation between the commercial sector and the state bureaucratic sector, in order to maintain the social order of which these two sectors were the major beneficiaries. One of the main strategies employed by the bourgeois (British) class was to exploit ethnic sentiments.
According to Brown (1994, p. 214) this strategy was possible in Malaysia because of three factors. These interrelated factors are:

a. The colonial state was able to make use of the prevalent ethno-class consciousness which had been generated by the racial division of labour under colonialism, inhibiting the emergence of an incipient class consciousness which transcended racial lines and which posed a potential threat to orderly decolonialisation.
b. The institutional form of the alliance between the commercial and bureaucratic bourgeoisie was that of the ethnically consociational state, in which political alliance were formed between racial groups.
c. The compartmentalisation of each racial class began to erode and contact between different racial classes started to increase. Unequal competition for jobs and resources breed rivalry between racial classes, which gave credibility to the ethnic ideology propagated by the state elites.

Frank Furedi (as quoted in Brown 1994, p. 214) noted that these factors were used to promote ethnic ideology, in which “overtly class-based political movements were suppressed by the colonial and post-colonial state, and were redesignated as ethnic communal movements so as to be politically neutralised”. The British were actively structuring the Malaya community along racial-occupational lines, so that there are only limited interactions between the various communities. This occupational compartmentalisation was made worse by British policy in education. The Indian and Chinese were left alone to take care of their educational needs, and the British only provided Malay and English schools. Fuston (1980, p. 31) noted that the majority of Malays were provided with only elementary vernacular education, “practically oriented so as to stress the educational value of manual labour and not give rise to any dissatisfaction with the peasants’ humble lot”.

3.2.2 Malay supremacy
The first colonial definition of a ‘Malay’ was made in the Malay Reservations Act 1913, classifying as a Malay ‘any person belonging to the Malayan race’ who habitually spoke Malay or ‘any other Malayan language’ and who professed Islam as a religion (Andaya & Andaya 2001).
According to Heng (1998, p. 51), there are three core ethnic identifiers of “Malayness” – bahasa, agama, raja (language, religion, and royalty) – that was constantly used by the Malay leaders to reflect the hegemonic status of the Malay in Malaysian polity. Shamsul (1996) said these ethnic identifiers concurred with the three key attributes identified by the Malay nationalist movement in the 1900s. These Malay nationalists also felt that Malay should be the sole official and national language in an independent Malaya. The Malay nationalists which consisted of three factions – the “administocrats”, the Malay Left, and the Islamic leaders – differed in regards of the role of the royalty and Islam.
In the early stage of independence, the British choose to back the Malay ‘administocrats’, which the British saw as being in the best position to maintain British interests in an independent Malaya. Thus, royalty and Islam were thrust to the forefront – together with the Malay language – as the main ethnic identifiers of the Malays in Malaysia.
Heng (1998) pointed out that the main priority of the Malay nationalists after WWII was to ensure their political hegemony in the independent Malaya. In other words, the Malay put politics before economy. Malay political hegemony in Malaysia was largely attributed to the British’s ‘blessing’, unlike the official narrative put forward by the ruling elites in Malaysia today. According the Heng (1998), the British acknowledged the Malay political and cultural dominance in the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948 and later entrenched it in the 1957 Constitution.
Besides having the blessing from the British, UMNO also had it easy with its Alliance partner. Heng (1998) noted that MCA, in negotiating the independence Constitution with UMNO, conceded to the Malay special positions, Malay language as the sole national language, and the lack of official status for Mandarin. This means MCA had recognised the Malay hegemonic position in politics right from the birth of Malaysia. Heng (1998) pointed out that MCA had little choice because the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948 had already discriminated against Chinese interests. In addition to that, the British were supporting UMNO in their position in Malay political leadership.
The British did not encourage the Chinese to seek equal citizenship. As a response to the MCA-negotiated deal with UMNO, the Council of Registered Chinese Guilds and Association led by Chinese-educated merchant Lau Pak Khuan, was formed to push for equal citizenship and official-language status for Mandarin. This movement was rebuffed by the British, thus leaving the Chinese with the MCA-brokered deal.
Heng (1998, p. 59) also pointed out that the independence in 1957 actually brought less freedom for the Chinese as “it ends the autonomy they had enjoyed in running their community affairs”. The independence actually put the Chinese under the direct rule of the Malay political elites, as the Chinese were unable to secure favourable deals with their Malay political partner.
Khoo (2003, p. 199) noted that “several turning points of Malaysian politics were set by mass Malay intrusions upon the political stage: witness 1946 and the Malayan Union; 1969 and May 13; and 1998 and reformasi”. Lee and Heng (2000) noted that once Malay power was consolidated in the period after 1969, with the inclusion of PAS, Chinese influence in the ruling coalition, along with their political expectations, became markedly reduced. Mauzy (1983, p. 140) noted that “although UMNO was the dominant party in the Alliance, it is even more hegemonic in the BN … After 1969 it was clear to everyone that the Malays led by UMNO were in charge”.
Jomo, Khoo and Chang (1995, p. 15) noted that the “Alliance regime and what it stood for were things of the past, a reality capped by Tunku’s retirement in September 1970”. Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 22) observed that the “hegemonic position of the new, more Malay-oriented leadership in the BN was enhanced through amendments to the Constitution”. Mauzy (1993, p. 110-11) noted that all the power sharing arrangement was in effect “accommodation in essentially Malay terms”. Milne and Mauzy (1999, p. 90) observed that the Chinese, especially those in the MCA “have suffered from delusions about power”. Even though MCA could claim to be the third largest Chinese-based political party in the world, in reality, it is just a junior political partner to UMNO in the BN.
Milne and Mauzy (1999) noted that MCA was weakened because of the ‘Merdeka bargain’ and by the inclusion of other Chinese-dominated political parties like Gerakan into the BN. The seats allocation for MCA in the Malaysian Cabinet has steadily decline over the past decades. In addition to that, ‘strategic’ portfolios like Finance and Trade and Industry were taken away from MCA in period after the start of NEP. Milne and Mauzy (1999, p. 91) noted that “Finance Ministry, the last bastion of Chinese strength in the Cabinet, was lost in 1974”. Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 23) noted that “in subsequent years, UMNO leaders would openly assert that the party could rule alone, but preferred to ‘share’ power in the interest of national unity”.

3.3 Consociational Theory
Consociational theory was first associated with the integration process of the European Union. According to Barry, the term ‘consociation’ derives from the Latin consociatio which means “the action or fact of associating together” or “union in fellowship” (Barry, 1975, p. 478, quoted in Chryssochoou 2001, p. 3). The Netherlands was the first country to be identified as consociational (Lijphart 1975). Malaysia was a consociational country from 1955 to 1969 and since 1971, with the increased concentration of power to the ruling elites (Von Vorys 1976). As a political theory, it is a good way to explain the political arrangement among the political elites in Malaysia, and as a means to understand the working nature of a diverse political coalition in Malaysia that has been in power since Independence.
Holden (1993, p. 112) however, pointed out that consociationalism is often “a theory about how much decision making remains possible in the face of grave difficulties”. Even so, Brown (1994, p. 228) pointed out that proponents of the concept of consociationalism argued that it represents the only effective way of organizing democracy in an ethnically plural society. It is important to note that in times of crisis, negotiations between subunits within the system are often carried out behind closed doors. Chryssochoou (2001, p. 6) pointed out that, because of these practices, “members of the elite cartel successfully exclude themselves from extensive public scrutiny”. Decisions reached within the coalition are usually treated as a collective decision. Therefore, no particular subunit within the system can be picked out to be responsible for the decision reached.
Tindigarukayo (1989, p. 43) proposed five favourable factors for consociationalism. These include segmental isolation; traditions of elite accommodation and overarching cleavages; popular legitimacy of the ruling elites; respect for institutional rules and procedures; and generous amount of compromise, trust and goodwill among political leaders. Mair (1994) pointed out that segmentation in a plural society is usually drawn on linguistic and religious lines.
Lijphart (1968, p. 5) also proposed that there are four “prerequisites” for consociational democracy to work in a plural society. These include society’s ability to recognise the dangers inherent in a fragmented system; committed to [political] system maintenance; ability to transcend sub-cultural cleavages at the elite level; and the ability to forge appropriate solutions for the demands of the sub-cultures. From this, we can assume that components within this particular political system come together and co-operate on an equal ground, towards a common goal. This, in essence, very much characterised the early stage of the Alliance, the predecessor to the Barisan Nasional (BN) government which has rule Malaysia since her Independence in 1957.
The term ‘consociational democracy’ was first use by Apter (1966, p. 24) who defined it as the “joining together of constituent units which do not lose their identity when merging in some form of union”. This is very much the case of the 13 political parties forming the ruling coalition in Malaysia, with the three major political parties clearly maintaining their ethnic identity. This is only possible because the three major ethnic groups in Malaysia – namely, Malays, Chinese and Indians – trust their political elites to bargain on behalf of them. As pointed out by Stevenson (1982, p. 37), “in such countries the population is segmented in subgroups, each represented by political elites who are trusted to bargain with other elites on behalf of the group interests”.
In fact, those political elites often project their parties as such. The three major parties in the BN coalition were formed specifically for that propose – to champion the rights of their ethnic groups. Brown (1994, p. 229) criticised these inter-communal Alliance as the “institutional form for the maintenance of bourgeois class domination, which allowed the bourgeois class fractions to disguise the defence of their own class interests as the protection of communal interests”.
UMNO was formed at the height of the Malays’ protest against the formation of Malayan Union by the British in 1948. Malayan Union was seen as challenging the sovereignty of the Malay rulers. This was seen as a direct challenge to the very existence of the Malays in their own land.
Lijphart (1968) argue that there could be stable democracy in plural, vertically segmented or communally divided societies if there was overarching co-operation among the segment elites, based on a set of unwritten rules of the games. Lijphart was the author of the 1968 article Typologies of democratic systems which launched the term consociational democracy. In the case of Malaysia, the “unwritten rules of the games” are, of course, “the informality yet seriousness of the discussions, the atmosphere of hard bargaining, but a willingness to compromise” (Von Vorys 1976, p. 104). This method of negotiation basically sets the tone of future inter-ethnic negotiations within the BN coalition.
Lijphart also pointed out that the consociational democracy comprised of four characteristics: grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality and mutual veto (Lijphart 1977, p. 25). However in the later stage of the BN coalition, we see that the coalition was dominated by UMNO especially after the late 1980s. Naturally, UMNO being the largest subunit within this grand coalition will also have the majority support to bulldozer their way through any negotiations.
When the ‘old’ UMNO was deregistered in 1988, Dr Mahathir, the UMNO president then, registered the ‘new’ UMNO and this was the beginning of greater UMNO domination over the ruling coalition. Critics have accused Dr Mahathir of engineering the deregistration of the old UMNO as a step to purged the party of his rival fraction, then led by Tengku Razaleigh. Basically the domination of UMNO in the ruling coalition was the result of the consolidation of power under Dr Mahathir and the need to show to the Malays community – which was split after the 1988 UMNO deregistration – that UMNO was still able to defend the interests of the Malays and that UMNO was still very much in control of the ruling coalition.
Hwang (2003, p. 9) concurred that the “consociational model is only evident in the period between 1957 and 1969, and since the 1970s, there was increasing political and economic discrimination in favour of the Malays. Andeweg (2000) pointed out that the later evolution of the consociational theory, the element of elite cooperation had evolved into this: political elites do not compete. As for the Malaysian case, political elites do not compete mainly because the political elites from the other political parties are dominated by UMNO.
In the Lower House (Dewan Rakyat ), the ruling coalition controls 147 out of 193 seats in the House. However, the figure in the Election Commission website only show the seats won by BN coalition as a whole, not the breakdown of the seats won by individual political parties within the coalition. This is another cosmetic way to show the unity within the ruling coalition. However, this is not surprising because a coalition is needed to show that decisions are arrived at collectively.
Andeweg (2000, p. 511) pointed out that the main feature in consociational democracy is that “the elite eschew decision by the majority.” This means that UMNO would not want to be seen as dominating the decision making process because of its majority number within the ruling coalition. Any decisions made are best projected as a collective decision and not a decision by the majority. UMNO’s total popular votes during the 1999 general election dropped but they still managed to control 48 percent of seats of the Lower House (Maznah 1999).

3.4 Plural Society Theory
The pioneers of the theory of plural societies were J. S. Furnivall and M. G. Smith (Rex & Gurharpal 2003, p. 107). Furnivall was writing about Indonesia and Smith was writing primarily about the British West Indies. Plural societies, in Furnivall (1956, p. 304) famous words, are societies that “mix but do not combine” Furnivall also noted that in the plural societies, “different sections of the community living side by side but in the same political unit”. In the economic sphere, Furnivall (1956, p. 304) noted, “there is a division of labour on racial lines”. Hilley (2001, p. 23) noted that “the British encouraged a policy of ethnic immigration and stratified labour relations as part of an export-led strategy”. Hilley (2001, p. 24) noted that it was also during that time that “colonial [mis]representations of racial attributes began to find popular resonance”.
This division of labour or the identification of labour along racial lines would be the major source of contention in the post-colonial Malaysia and would become one of the strongest reasons for the massive social reengineering programmes by the Malaysian government. These affirmative action-oriented programmes, according to Bacchi (1996), did not start until after the 1969 racial riots as widely believed by many observers of Malaysian affairs. It was perhaps pursued more aggressively by the Malaysian government after the racial riots, as there was then a more pressing reason to do so. It was also physical proof of what economic imbalance among the different races living together could do to a newly independent multiracial country like Malaysia.
During the colonial time in Malaya, the basic relations among the communities and the colonial powers were essentially economic. In the 19th century, the British encouraged aggressive immigration by the Chinese and Indians. This was to meet the demands of labour in plantation and mining sectors – two major sources of income to the colonial power. As noted by Rex & Gurharpal (2003), most colonial societies involved groups of different origin performing different functions. This was also the case for the immigrant communities in Malaya.
The Chinese were mainly involved in mining sector and trade in urban area. The Indians were confined to the plantation estates. The British were very specific in their labour policy, confining one ethnic group into one industry.
Abraham (2004, p. 5) pointed out that “the division of labour along ethnic lines further reinforced sociocultural differences because of lack of social interaction between the different ethnic groups”. This separation of immigrants’ communities with the local communities resulted minimum contact between them. Each community will have different ways of life and since “these different groups came from different geographical origins meant that in part the distinction between them was an ethnic one” (Rex & Gurharpal 2003, p. 111). This form of divide-and-rule resulted “social-class antagonisms, ethnocentrism and racial polarisation (Abraham 2004, p. xvii).
During the colonial times, each community had to look after their own welfare. Thus, this “reinforced a consciousness of kind as the basis for groups to organise themselves to survive (Abraham 2004, p. xviii). This form of political arrangement resulted the respective groups turning to their own elites for support. Abraham (2004) noted that despite knowing that these elites will use their position as the power base for their own benefits, the communities have little choice but to turn to them. This is still the situation in Malaysia where each community elites will claimed that they will fight on behalf of them with the condition that the community must give these elites undying political supports.
Perhaps, that is the paradox of Malaysia, while striving to achieve Bangsa Malaysia; its political parties are still formed along racial lines. When the British withdrew from Malaya, power was passed to the local lead by the Alliance. Within this transition period, there were at least two groups of Malayans vying for power – the secular Alliance that consisted of the three major races in Malaya and the mainly Chinese-based MCP.
In Malaya, powers were divided between two ethnic groups – the Chinese controlled the economic sector while the Malays by default of their majority number in Malaya controlled the political arena. As noted by Rex & Gurharpal (2003, p. 112), “in Malaysia, Malays controlled the government, economic entrepreneurship was in the hands of the Chinese and agricultural labours in the hands of Indians”. For the agricultural sectors, large foreign plantation companies like Sime Darby and Guthrie continued to operate. These companies had since being taken over by Malaysians.
In plural societies, those who are vying for power usually claim to represent everyone in the country and usually stand on a nationalistic platform when negotiating for power. However, as noted by Rex & Gurharpal (2003), these “nationalist leaders commonly represent a particular class or ethnic group”.
Tunku Abdul Rahman, the leader in the Alliance knew this very well. British would not grant Malaya independence if the three races in Malaya could not cooperate and live together as a nation. The British were also aware that they are limited in choice and time. After WWII, there was a massive drawback of the British forces in their overseas colonies. The other promising group in Malaya then was the Malayan Communist Party. MCP led Malayan People Anti-Japanese Liberation Army (MPAJA) were credited for supplying the British with intelligence during the Japanese Occupation that eventually resulted the defeat of the Japanese in WWII. However, global ideology struggle among the superpowers then clearly struck this out as an alternative.
As a post-colonial country, Malaysia constantly has to deal with question of multiculturalism. Von Vorys (1976) also pointed out that generally in newly independent countries, the “social system is far from stable”. In addition to that, contemporary Malaysia also has to deal with the question of class. This is more apparent in the Malay community and is one of the reasons for the split of the Malays community in the recent years. The aggressive affirmative action programmes only reached certain groups of Malays, creating a new Malay middle class playing a dominant role. Abraham (2004, p. xxii) also argues, “colonialism superimposed class distinctions on racial groups and this created racial antagonism between the Malays, Chinese and Indian”.
Even in 2003, Malaysian press still portrayed the Chinese as the rich community and the Malays still needs government subsidies (NST 13 Oct 2003). It was reported that Dr Mahathir said that if the Chinese in Malaysia were given the same subsidies and concessions as given to the Malays, the Chinese would have been “way ahead by now”. These constant portrayals by the press create the impression that the Chinese are largely of the middle class.
Perhaps the most controversial point made by Abraham was about the social impact of colonisation. Abraham (2004, p. 1) argues “colonial rules had a negative impact on this harmony and consequently manifested itself in racial perceptions, tension and potential social conflict”. In another words, colonisation split the Malayan community.
Jomo, Khoo and Chang (1995, p. 6) observed that:
“Malaysian social and political life appears to be overwhelmingly organised around this plural society and its trends of fluctuating interethnic competition, compromise and conflict. Political parties are mainly ethnically based, all kinds of issues are readily ‘communalised’, and political coalitions represent attempts at interethnic compromise”.


3.5 The Myth of News Objectivity
Students taking introduction class in journalism course will be told that objectivity is the cornerstone of news. Why is there such an emphasis on news objectivity? Tuchman (1972, p. 297) suggested that “the term ‘objectivity’ stands as a bulwark between themselves and critics” and was often invoked to defend themselves against any attacks on their news articles.
The most basic way to be objective is to identify ‘objectivity’ with ‘facts’ which may be verified. Tuchman (1972, p. 299) suggested four strategic procedures for journalists to follow so that they can claim to be objective. These procedures are:

A. Presentation of conflicting possibilities
B. Presentation of supporting evidence
C. The judicious use of quotation marks
D. Structuring information in an appropriate sequence

It is important for journalists to present both sides of the story so that they may claim to be ‘objective’ and allow the readers to decide on a particular issue. However, even this is open to criticism.
A charge placed at the beginning of a story might receive more attention from readers than the denial placed toward the bottom of the story. In the Suqiu episode, Suqiu press statements of denial or clarification usually end up at the bottom of the story.
Quotations are usually used in news because it is viewed as a form of supporting evidence. Tuchman (1972, p. 301) noted that “the reporter may remove his opinions from the story by getting others to say what he himself thinks”.
Newspaper also have the tendency to include public opinions that reflects the newspaper’s stand on a particular issue and reject those that contradict or critical of them.
In structuring information in an appropriate sequence, journalist has to decide what is ‘important’ and ‘interesting’ for the readers. This process in itself cannot be objective because it will involve journalist’s judgment based on their values and experience.
Tuchman (1972, p. 302) noted that “newspapers differ in their choice of material ‘facts’, their news policies, but all claim to be ‘objective’”. Tuchman (1972, p. 304) asserted that these ‘news procedures’ are actually “strategies through which [journalists] protect themselves from critics and lay professional claim to objectivity”. Tuchman (1972, p. 305) asserted that “an attempts to obtain objectivity […] cannot be said to provide objectivity”.
Cohen (1963, p. 13) noted that the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about”.
Bob Kohn in his Journalistic Fraud: How The New York Times Distorts the News and Why It Can No Longer Be Trusted had demonstrated that it is possible to disguise editorial opinion as objective news “for the purpose of influencing public opinion” (2003, p. 4).
Kohn (2003, p. 24) noted that it is important to slip editorial opinion into straight news because that “lends a level of credibility to the opinion that is normally reserved for objective news” and this will be a “much more effective means of influencing the public than the mere expression of opinion on editorials and op-ed pieces”. Kohn (2003, p. 29) noted that, unlike the past, today “newspapers are in the business of identifying solutions to society’s problems and influencing public opinion to agree with those solutions”.
Bob Kohn through his book Journalistic Fraud: How The New York Times Distorts the News and Why It Can No Longer Be Trusted shows explicitly how “misinformation” was carried out by slanting the presentations of the facts in leads, headlines and placement of the news item in the paper. As demonstrated by Kohn, there are nine ways a journalist could distort a news reports: (1) distorting the lead; (2) distorting the headline; (3) distorting the facts; (4) distorting with opinion; (5) distorting with labels; (6) distorting with loaded language; (7) distorting with crusades; (8) distorting with polls; and (9) distorting with placement.
In brief, no journalist could fully claim to be objective and it is possible to slip editorial opinion into ‘objective’ news in order to influence public opinion.

Chapter 2

CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL AND MEDIA LANDSCAPE OF MALAYSIA

2.1 Political Landscape
Hwang (2003) divided independent Malaysia politics into four phases. The first phase, according to him was after Independence in 1957 until the May 13 riots in 1969. During this phase, Malay dominance formed the foundations of Malaysian political landscape, but with strong recognition of the non-Malay political role.
The implementation of New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970 marked the second phase of Malaysian politics, with shift in the UMNO leaders’ attitude for moderate consociational bargaining to one of more hegemonic control.
Political challenge to Dr Mahathir leadership in 1987 shifted the state power from UMNO to Mahathir. This phase marked the consolidation of Dr Mahathir’s authoritarian rule, and courting the non-Malays neglected under NEP.
The fourth phase of Malaysian politics starts with the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim from his Cabinet post in 2 Sept 1998. Anwar reformasi movement marked the emergence of a multi-ethnic consciousness in Malaysian civil society.
Malaysia has been described as an authoritarian (Gomez & Jomo 1999), semi-authoritarian (Crouch 1992), semi-democratic (Case 1993) and quasi-democratic (Zakaria 1989) state since its independence in 1957.
In order to better understand the origins of ethnic politics in Malaysia, we need to trace back the early stage of nationhood of Malaysia, starting from the period prior to the British rule in Malaya, the impact of British rule in Malaya, the Japanese Occupation, the early stage of independence negotiations, and the vague but yet influential ‘social contracts’.

2.1.1 Melaka and Malay Dominance
Melaka before it was invaded by the Portuguese in 1511 A.D. was a major entreport in Asia. Today, it is only a reminder of the once great Malay Muslim Empire that is still a source of pride among the Malays in Malaysia.
It was in the 15th century when trade was among the major income to the Melaka sultanate particularly and to the people of Southeast Asia generally. The Southeast Asia region was also often referred to as the Nusantara Archipelago. Natives in this archipelago shared the same cultural roots.
It was believed that the Malays migrated from the southern part of China and settled in this region before the Chinese and Indian immigrants. Hence, it is important to note that the Malays were immigrant themselves. However, the Malays in Malaysia claimed special positions and the status of being natives to the land. This shall be the source of contention for many years after the special privileges were formally enshrined into the 1957 Merdeka Constitution, the supreme law in Malaysia.
The Melaka sultanate is often looked upon within the Malay community with a sense of pride and shame. Pride because it reminds them those glory days when Melaka was the centre of trade in Asia and what Malays community was capable of. Shame because it reminds them of the catastrophe for being complacent about their achievements and how they were tricked into discriminating treaties and agreements by foreign powers that finally resulted them being left behind by other immigrant races like the Chinese and the Indians. As pointed out by Von Vorys (1976, p. 36), “traditional Malay society was especially vulnerable to external predatory initiatives”.
The Malays were subjected to the rule of foreign western powers until the World War II (WWII) that saw the participation of the Japanese army in the Pacific arena. For over 400 years, the Malays only managed to see in awe what the western powers were capable of, especially in exploiting their beloved lands.
The Malays were also constantly being made to believe that they would never be capable to run the country. The term ‘lazy natives’ were always being used to describe the Malays. This ‘lazy native’s myth’ was also the justification used by the British to pursued aggressive immigration policies in bringing in foreign labour from China and India.
Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 10) noted that “despite the formation of a plural society in Malaysia with the mass migration of Chinese and Indians into the country, there was very little integration and only limited interaction among the ethnic communities”.
The British argue that these influxes of foreign communities were crucial to support the labour demands for the economy of Malaya then. Hilley (2001, p. 23) observed that the “British and other commercial interests have sought to restructure [Malaya] domestic economy, turning it from subsistence agriculture into key producer of primary products and raw materials for the British and European markets”.
If this past account gave the impression that the British actively sidelined the entire Malay community, it is only half of the story. During the British colonial time, they had actively engaged the elites in the Malay community, and to protect their interests by promoting their positions in the community.
According to Haque (2003, p. 247), the British had “arranged English education and training for the sons of aristocratic Malays to join certain positions in the Malayan Civil Service (MCS). Haque also noted that the Malay Administrative Service (MAS) were created for these privileged Malays, but actively leave out the ordinary Malays (Means 1986, p. 97 as cited in Haque 2003).
Thus, we can only speculate the reason for the Malaysian ruling elites in arguing for the preferential treatments for the Malays. According to Haque, the proportion of Malays and non-Malays entering the MCS was required to be 4:1, to “ensure that they were not marginalised by non-Malays” (2003, p. 247).
Andaya and Andaya (2001, p. 174) noted that the “co-operation of the Malay ruling class, initially the most hostile towards the British … was essential for the success of indirect rule”. Andaya and Andaya (2001, p. 174) pointed out that “a primary mean of gaining the desired co-operation was to compensate the ruling class for income they had lost through the abolition of slavery and the introduction of a central treasury”.
In other words, it was their own social and economic well-being that concerned them most, not the welfare of the masses. And yet, the present Malay political elites have elevated their status, including the sultans, to that of Malay special privileges guardian.
Such relationship with the British resulted in the Malay sultans and elites losing most of their former powers, but the British support gave them security from potential challengers. Hilley (2001, p. 27) noted that “the British had employed a form of indirect rule, by adhering to pro-Malay policies and recognizing the Malay Sultans as ‘natural rulers’, thus avoiding unnecessary conflict”.

2.1.2 The Japanese Invasion
As discussed previously, for over 400 hundred years, the Malays were made to believe that they were not capable of running the country and the western races were invincible. The swift success of the Japanese army invasion over the large part of Asia generally, and especially their two weeks campaign in Peninsula Malaysia demolished this myth once and for all. Previously, even the lower administration clerks job were sourced directly by the British from India.
When the Japanese defeated the British in Peninsula Malaysia, they established the Japanese Emperor administration to replace it. As a strategy to influence the Malays to support the Japanese invasion, some administration posts were passed to the Malays. This is to minimise local insurgence by the Malays community. Malays were also recruited into the police force.
The Japanese used this strategy to pit the Malays against the Chinese in Malaya. Overseas Chinese donated large sum of money to support China during the Japanese campaign back in 1938. As revenge, the Japanese targeted the Chinese in their ‘purifying’ campaign of the Malaya. Thus, the Malay police force was used to hunt down the Chinese. This strategy leaves a sore point between the Chinese and the Malays in the post-WW2 period in Malaysia. As noted by Vidhu (2002, p. 28), the Japanese “fanned anti-Chinese feelings by deploying military units of Malays to fight Chinese resistance groups”. The Japanese Occupation gave the Malays a new confidence.

2.1.3 The Malayan Union
The Malayan Union proposed by the returning British after the WWII was perhaps the best chance for the immigrant communities especially the Chinese and Indians to fight for equal citizenship. However, the political consciousness of these two communities was largely aligned to their home countries – China and India.
Hilley (2001, p. 27) noted that the Malayan Union was an “attempt to move towards a more uniform [political] structure in 1946” and to “bring the nine Malay states …, plus two Straits Settlements … under the ambit of stable central governing body for the first time”. For Vidhu Verma, it was an attempt “to reinforce their (British) authority after the war” (2002, p. 28).
The period after WWII was a period of uncertainty, with the status of Malaya as a country unclear. Hence, the Chinese saw it fit to keep their Chinese citizenship than to give it up and fight for Malayan citizenship which was uncertain of happening in the first place.
Therefore, when the Malayan Union proposed equal citizenship to everyone in Malaya, the Malays, through their vernacular newspapers were strongly opposed to the idea while the Chinese only gave it a cold response. Chinese papers gave scant coverage to this aspect of the Malayan Union. As pointed out by Fujio (2003) the majority of the Chinese still felt that their homeland was China and Malaya was only a temporary place.
The rally by the Utusan, an influential Malay paper saw the rise of Malay political consciousness, led by a Malay leader, Onn Jaafar from the southern state of Johor. The Malays saw the need to come together to defend their rights in Malaya and thus, UMNO was formed in 1948 with this purpose in mind.
The scheme was replaced in 1948 by the Federation of Malaya Agreement, drawn up by British and Malay leaders, where the non-Malays did not get the full citizenship rights. As noted by Comber (1983, p. 33), “in essence, the Federal Agreement was an Anglo-Malay compromise, as the Chinese were excluded from the Working Committee”.
Hilley (2001, p. 28) observed that this 1948 Agreement gave rise to the “communally located political parties”. The Agreement itself had set a trend in distinguished Malaya citizens into two categories. This gave the political parties a “communal agenda … for political mobilization of the subordinate classes”. Hilley (2001, p. 27) said this enabled UMNO, Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) to emerge as the “class patrons for each ethnic grouping”.
The founder of UMNO, Onn bin Jaafar wanted to open UMNO to all Malayans, but his idea was strongly opposed by UMNO members and he later left UMNO and set up the non-communal Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) in 1951. It did not attract much support from anyone.
At that time, when the idea to replace Malayan Union solidified, the non-communal All Malay Council of Joint Action (AMCJA) came to being and called for a political structure that recognised universal citizenship. However, the British choose to support and negotiate with the Alliance for the independence of Malaya.
Another potent force at that time was the Malaya Communist Party (MCP). Hilley (2001, p. 28) observed that the British “portray the MCP as an avowedly Chinese nationalist body, rather than a broad-based, anti-colonial class movement, the British hope to stifle Malay support for any form of class politics or radical nationalism”. Khoo (1997) noted that despite its mainly Chinese base, MCP managed to garner commendable amount of Malay and Indian support by 1948.
Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 11) noted that as tension mounted between the British and the MCP – despite MCP crucial role in helping the British defeating the Japanese – “the need for an alternative Chinese party that was conservative yet pliant to British interests became imperative”.
The British turned to a leading Chinese businessman Tan Cheng Lock for such purpose and the MCA was formed in February 1949.
Overall, Hilley (2001, p. 29) concluded that the British legacy was significant to Malay from three aspects:
“First, it helped drawn the Malayan economy into the world capitalist system, thus setting the basic metropole-domestic class relations. Second, as a central feature of this process, it created an ethnic division of labour in which racial attributes became synonymous with class position. And, third, it provided the nucleus of a pragmatic alliance between the Malay aristocracy/state bureaucracy, the main Chinese commercial bourgeoisie and Indian petite bourgeoisie, setting the framework of class accommodations, consociational politics and ethnic ideology to follow”.

2.1.4 The Alliance and the Merdeka social contract
It can be said that the first generation of the leaders forming the core of the Alliance shared some of the similar characteristics. Tunku Abdul Rahman of UMNO, Tan Cheng Lock of MCA and Sambathan of MIC all were convinced that the “single most critical fact with which a viable political system would have to come to grips was the dominance of profound communal cleavages” (Von Vorys 1976, p. 13). This communal cleavage is one single factor that “radically distinguished it from its Western counterparts”.
The Alliance leaders recognised the grip of communal cleavages in human personality that they are convinced that “the only reasonable course to follow was to recognise communal groups as essential, legitimate components of the political system” (Von Vorys 1976, p. 14). Hence, the Alliance was formed with individual political parties intact to represent their respective communities.
The early Alliance leaders also were able to mobilise popular support because they were themselves primarily communal leaders.
Von Vorys (1976) also pointed out that these leaders shared certain beliefs like: a preference for democratic politics in resolving political conflicts and in providing legitimacy for the political system, and seeing the use of violence as a bad form and poor judgment, and coercion as only the last resort of public policy. They were also educated in English school.
Due to this sociopolitical background, “Malaysian (Malayan) leaders set out to establish a viable, democratic system not based on a national community, but on the cooperation of discrete communal groups” (Von Vorys 1976, p. 14).
Von Vorys listed out the four features of this political arrangement:
The relationship of citizens within the same group would continue to be managed through a semi-autonomous communal hierarchy;
The relationship of citizens across communal boundaries or to the government would be regulated through terms agreed to by an inter-communal Directorate at the highest level;
The terms of inter-communal relations would be promulgated in a constitutional contract, and then implemented and when necessary augmented by policies secretly negotiated;
The members of the Directorate would have to possess dual qualification. They would have to be the leaders of the political organisation of their community most capable of mobilizing mass support behind the government in democratically conducted elections.
They would also have to be men who would maintain the confidence of their colleagues by keeping negotiations within the Directorate secret and by refraining from ever mobilising their external communal mass-support to bring pressure on the secret negotiations (Von Vorys 1976, p. 14-15).
Under the 1957 Merdeka Constitution, the Malays were given ‘special positions’ status, not the ‘special rights’ as often heard these days. These ‘special privileges’ were enshrined in Article 153 of the Constitution as an exchange to the extension of citizenship to the non-Malays then.
This bargaining is commonly known as the ‘social contract’ between the Malays and the non-Malays in Malaysia. It is considered the cornerstone to the formation of Malaysia and the very concept where modern Malaysian society is built upon. Hence, as noted by Hilley (2001, p. 1), Malaysia had reached “a settlement structured around ethnic parties and communal politics”. The members of the Alliance also pledged in their 1955 Manifesto for Federal Elections to establish a type of national school that will be acceptable to the people of Malaya.
In the Report of the Education Committee 1956, better known as the Razak Report, the direction of this ‘national school’ was envisioned to share common syllabuses for all school throughout the country and for the Malay and English to be made compulsory subjects in all primary and secondary schools.
Roff (1967, p. 318) noted that the exclusion of Chinese or Tamil language as a compulsory subject do not received strong objections from the leaders of the MCA and the response from the Chinese press were restrained and hopeful.
The Chinese and Indian leaders were probably overcome by the euphoria of the prospect of gaining independence for Malaya.
However, the Malays intellectuals were not satisfied with the Razak Report. Outside the UMNO, various Malay Teachers’ Associations, the Malay Language Society of the University, and the national writers association united under the leadership of the National Language Action Front (NLAF) to voice their dissatisfaction. This protest simply means that UMNO was losing grip of the Malay intellectuals. The loudest criticism was voiced when NLAF accused Tunku Abdul Rahman of betraying the Malays.
For the Chinese community, the political party representing them – the MCA – only played marginal roles on most Chinese daily lives. Chinese community also treats their chambers of commerce and their clan associations with great respect and importance.
Thus, when the Alliance and later the BN coalition government, managed to co-opt the largely Malay and Indians communities into the mainstream political ideology, the Chinese had different channels to vent their dissatisfactions and to seek help. This is one of the reasons for a large number of Chinese to have their own psyche and hence do not share the national sentiments.

2.1.5 The May 13 racial riot and the NEP
Among the darkest history of Malaysia is the May 13 racial riots in 1969. The official explanation of the cause of the riot was the economic imbalance among the different races in Malaysia. After the riot, Malaysia was declared under the state of Emergency. Operation of the country was transferred from the Cabinet to the newly formed National Operation Council (NOC).
As Milne (1970) noted that the riot demonstrated that consensus was low and that primordial loyalties were high. Hilley (2001, p. 29) observed that “in contrast to the Malay elite, the economic position of ordinary Malays had not been substantially improved by decolonization”. The Malays feared that their political position and constitutional rights would be threatened by the outcome of the 1969 general elections (Hilley 2001). Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 21) also noted that “despite steady growth, diversification and low inflation, unemployment had been growing and ethnic tensions grew as inequalities were increasingly perceived in ethnic terms and attributes to the ‘ethnic other’ ”.
Brown (1994) however, explained the May 13 riot from the class struggle perspective. Brown (1994, p. 233) noted that “by the end of the 1960s, it was becoming increasingly evident that the net result of government economic policies was the redistribution of wealth, within each racial community, from the poor to the rich”. Anand (1983, p. 96) noted that by 1970, “nearly 90 per cent of overall income inequality was due to differences within racial groups, rather than to differences between them”. These income inequalities, according to Brown (1994, p. 234) “prompt significant sections of the subordinate classes in each racial group to withdraw their support for the Alliance parties and to seek alternatives channels for articulating their interests”.
The 1969 riot in Malaysia is often seen as a landmark event that shaped the future of Malaysia. If the Article 153 in the Constitution institutionalised communalism, then the NEP put forward by the NOC certainly operationalised it. Almost every single policy implemented in Malaysia after that was somehow influenced by the NEP.
Economically, the skewed distribution of wealth among different ethnic groups “forced the Malaysian government to fundamentally rethink its economic policy” (Andaya & Andaya 2001, p. 302). In 1970, 75 per cent of households living under poverty lines were Malays.
However, it would be inaccurate to assume that the Chinese controlled all the wealth in Malaysia. Chinese economic role might be bigger that the Malays, but it was still less compared to foreign capital. According to Heng (1998, p. 55), “the diverse and widespread economic role of the Chinese might gave the impression that they controlled the economy of Malaysia at that period”.
Politically, after the poor showing of UMNO in the 1969 general elections, UMNO had to heed the pressure from the Malay community in order to stay relevant. The Tunku, at that time, was unwilling to advance Malay welfare at the expense of holding back Chinese business interests. There was general perception that the prime minister who was also the president of UMNO was too compromising to the non-Malays. Some of UMNO leader like the Minister of Agriculture, Abdul Aziz Ishak had called for the advancement of Malay economic interests, even at the expense of the Chinese.[1]
The Constitution was suspended, and NOC was formed to run the country. NOC was headed by the then deputy prime minister Abdul Razak. Tunku Abdul Rahman stepped down soon after that and Abdul Razak took leadership after that.
NOC finally launched the NEP in 1971 with the purpose to correct the economic imbalance among the different races in Malaysia. The main objectives of the NEP were: (a) to reduce and eradicate poverty by increasing employment opportunities to every Malaysian regardless of ethnic background, and (b) to restructure the society and to eventually eradicate the identification of ethnic groups according their occupation.
Implicitly, the NEP aimed to reduce poverty among the Malays. In order to achieve this objective, government pursued aggressive positive affirmative actions aimed at the Malays. Malays were given subsidies, preferential treatment in granting licenses and franchises, quotas in government jobs and university places. For example, 64 percent of local universities places were reserved for the Malays. This number was in recent years reduced slowly.
In pursuing these two objectives, the implementation seems to focus on the eradication of poverty along communal lines. History will be twisted to provide justification to this one-sided policy. The official narrative will point to the colonial policies which put the Bumiputra at a disadvantage position. Even though there is an official recognition[2] that poverty exist in all communities, the focus is usually on the Bumiputra because of Malay special rights and that they were discriminated during the colonial era.
At the same time, the Alliance was expanded to include opposition political parties like Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), and was later, known as BN. PAS left the BN coalition in 1979. Tun Razak’s key objective was to implement UMNO’s long overdue objective of redressing the problem of Malay economic weakness through the implementation of the NEP.
In achieving the second objective, government introduced the Industrial Co-ordination Act 1975 which “required the private sectors to employ 30 per cent Malays at every level or risk revocation of their licenses” (Andaya & Andaya 2001, p. 314).
The NEP officially ended in 1990 with the introduction of National Development Policy (NDP). Despite the aggressive interventionist steps taken by the government, “ethnic and economic disparities were still very much part of Malaysian life” (Andaya & Andaya 2001, p. 318). This gave the Malay nationalists reason to call for the maintenance of the Malay special rights and created an atmosphere of fear and siege that helped to define the political roles for UMNO.
Often, the NEP was abused for political mileage. Malays were constantly reminded to support the existing government in order for them to continually enjoy the special privileges. The NEP also created a new class of Malays that benefited from the government-sponsored overseas tertiary education and government contracts. The main beneficiaries of NEP were the Malay bureaucrats and politicians.
Brown (1994, p. 246) noted that the main impact of the NEP was that it “further increases the income and occupational disparities within the Malay community”.
This eventually split the Malays into groups that support the present government because they benefit from it and those who prefer reforms because they see the special privileges as a political blackmail.
The anticipated protests by the Chinese bourgeois did not materialised even though from the surface, the NEP pro-Malay development and wealth redistribution programs would jeopardise Chinese economic interests. In fact, MCA continued to co-operate with UMNO even though the NEP did not argue well for MCA political status. Brown (1994, p. 247) suggested that the obvious explanation for this is that the NEP “has been implemented so as to minimize its adverse impact upon the Chinese commercial and business sectors and indeed to ensure their continued prosperity”.
In the 1999 general elections, the Malays were clearly divided into the urban middle class UMNO supporters on one side and the largely rural lower class PAS supporters. Of course, the division was not that clear cut. There are also urban Malay middle class, who themselves benefited from the NEP, who join their rural brethrens to push for reforms.
In 1991, the NEP was replaced by the NDP. NEP failed to achieve some of the objectives outlined. The ownership of share capital in limited companies by the Bumiputeras (read: Malays) did not hit 30 percent as targeted by NEP.
Andaya and Andaya (2001) noted that the NEP would have been difficult to implement had it not been for UMNO’s power in the governing coalition. After the Parliament resumed in February 1971, amendments were passed in Dewan Rakyat which enabled the government to implement these policies. Steps were also taken to remove the public discussion of ‘sensitive issues’ like the power and status of the Malay rulers, Malay special privileges, Malay as national language and the status of Islam as the official religion.
This reality is in stark contrast to the official rhetoric of equal partnership and power-sharing of the governing coalition. Up to 1969, UMNO still treated its two weaker partners with respect. However, with UMNO losing its credibility after the elections, it had no choice but to maintain its own relevance to the Malay community. The poor elections result of its Chinese partner, MCA also greatly weakened its bargaining power with UMNO (Andaya & Andaya 2001, p. 325).
The massive social restructuring of the NEP also saw the restructuring of the politics in Malaysia. The Alliance was expanded to include the PAS and was known as BN from then on.
Since then, the BN has been able to win more than two-third of the seats in Parliament due to the clever combinations of persuasive and coercive tactics. This enable the BN to amend the Constitution “at will to suit its purpose” (Andaya & Andaya 2001, p. 327).
UMNO is also never shy in letting the coalition partners to know who the actual boss is and who has the final say. Dr Mahathir, well-known for his tactics in consolidating powers to the executive, stated that “UMNO is the backbone, the very bulwark of the Barisan Nasional” (Andaya & Andaya 2001, p. 327). The position of UMNO within the ruling coalition and the government is so strong that threats to the party are usually internal power struggles rather than external threats.
In recent history, two particular events shaped the position of UMNO within the society and resulted in UMNO reasserting its position as the defender of Malay special rights. In these two occasions, it is the non-Malays who suffered as they are used as a bogeyman in UMNO communal rhetoric.
The first is Operasi Lalang in 1987. This was the response of UMNO to the perceived threats to the party internally and externally. The challenge to UMNO leadership of Dr Mahathir by Tengku Razaleigh, together with the dissatisfaction of the Chinese community caused by the appointment of non-Chinese educated Chinese to head Chinese schools gave UMNO the opportunity to clamp down on its enemies, both internal and external. In this episode, language and education were the main cause of the Chinese dissatisfaction.
The second was the 1998 episode was the accumulation of political crisis as a result of Asian economic crisis ravaging through Asia in 1997. The ambitious then deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim, inspired by the reformasi movement in Indonesia attempted to challenge Dr Mahathir to the premiership. The initial differences in handling the economic crisis later spilled to the political arena and climaxed with the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim from his government post and deputy president of UMNO. He was later charged in court for sodomy and corruption. This episode caused a massive swing of Malay support to the Opposition, especially with the forming of Parti Keadilan Nasional by Anwar’s wife.
UMNO had to reassert its position as the defender of the Malay special rights. The clever dissemination of message by the mainstream papers enabled UMNO to paint a different picture to the Malays and the non-Malays. To the Malays, Anwar was painted as the cause of disunity in the community. This, UMNO argued, would result in the Malay community being weak and unable to defend its interests. On the other hand, PAS was portrayed as an extremist Islamic party to the non-Malay, especially the Chinese. The political collaboration of Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) in Barisan Alternatif (BA) caused the former to lose their traditional – mainly Chinese – supporters.
Some Malaysian observers argued that the 1998 episode was the start to more principle-based politics, departing from the usual communal politics. This thesis argues that, even under such conducive environment, clever framing and dissemination of messages by political players and their control over the mass media enables them to ethnicised even universal issues. The Suqiu episode is one clear example.
Communal issues will always remain relevant in Malaysia as long as the present political structure is maintained, and this writer believes that political elites in Malaysia will strive hard to maintain such structure.
At the end of NEP, official figures showed it had succeeded in achieving its major goals. Although official figures show that the Malay share of corporate equity did not achieve the targeted figure of 30 per cent, some non-official reports showed that the figure in fact has been achieved (Malaysian Chinese Association 1988, p. 32).
The NDP was formulated to replace NEP with the same social and economic objective of achieving national unity. However, NDP avoid emphasizing numerical targets and emphasis on income-raising policies rather than income redistribution.
NDP is welcomed by the Chinese because it is less ethnically divisive than NEP. Together with this, Dr Mahathir introduced his ‘Wawasan 2020’ or Vision 2020 for the nation in the first meeting of the Malaysian Business Council (MBC) in early 1991. Dr Mahathir wanted Malaysia to be “a nation at peace with itself, territorially, and ethnically integrated, living in harmony and in full and fair partnership made of one Bangsa Malaysia” (NST, March 2, 1991).
Vision 2020 captured the imagination of Malaysians, particularly the non-Malays because this was a clear shift from the exclusivist “bangsa Melayu” (Malay race) to the all-embracing Bangsa Malaysia. Hilley (2001, p. 4) observed that Dr Mahathir attempted to “galvanise the public imagination through ideas of a shared vision of prosperity”. Thus, Vision 2020 is “more than an industrial plan for advanced economic development. It is an attempt to stimulate a new social context for the emergence of an alternative social order” (Hilley 2001, p. 19).
Hilley (2001, p. 20) termed this Vision as a “post-ethnic nationalism” and marked the “gathering shift away from the NEP ideology, ethnic balancing and the old ‘politics of consociationalism’ – class constructions and state forms variously designed to reproduce the ideas and interests of the dominant class fractions across ethnic lines”.
The NEP success in achieving its goals without alienating the non-Malays was mainly attributed to the robust growth of the economy that ensured that the economic pie was large enough to be shared by all.

2.1.6 1997 economic crisis and the 1998 political crisis
Anwar Ibrahim, the former deputy prime minister was sacked from his post on 2 Sept 1998. This was the clearest sign of differences between the top two men in the government, something which they both had publicly denied before that. With the sacking of Anwar, Lee (2002, p. 177) observed that “the economic fallout in Malaysia became intertwined with a political crisis.” Rustam A. Sani (2001. p. 89) also noted that “the economic crisis that struck Malaysia from the middle of 1997 has since then become a political or even regime crisis”.
After the 1988 UMNO political crisis, Dr Mahathir managed to purge his party from rival fractions by registering UMNO as a new party, excluding those he saw as his political rivals. Thus, throughout the 90s, he managed to consolidate power to himself and to put anyone up or down at his will. Anwar Ibrahim, a student leader back in the 70s was among a few who earned Dr Mahathir’s trust. Anwar meteoric rise to the top was the envy of a large number of UMNO members.
The baht devaluation in July 1997 sparked a massive economic crisis that hit most of the Asian countries. Dr Mahathir with his usual rhetoric snubbed the International Monetary Fund (IMF) advice for tighter fiscal policy.
The government announced that the Chinese would be allowed to take over companies owned by Malay to prevent the latter going bankrupt. However, they were not allowed to hold these assets in the long term, as spelt out by Daim Zainuddin, then the Minister of Special Functions: “I’d allow them [the Chinese] to rescue ailing companies. After they recover, they can talk about ownership” (FEER 19/2/9).
Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 196) observed that “this use of selected Chinese businessmen to help bail out some well-connected Malay businessmen reflects Chinese capital’s continued subordination and obligations to Malay political hegemony”.
On the other hand, Anwar Ibrahim was widely seen as favourable of the tighter fiscal policy. Dr Mahathir announced increase in government spending to facilitate economic growth. This goes against Anwar Ibrahim who was then the Finance Minister as well. These economic differences were downplayed by both men as the usual difference but with the similar goal in mind. Lee (2004, p. 88) pointed out that “some observers believed that each faction was anxious to protect the business interests of its supporters”.
Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 200) observed that at that time, “the Western media openly encouraged early Anwar succession to national leadership, portraying Dr Mahathir as out-moded, inadequate to the challenge and even ignorant, if not irrational”.
During the 1998 UMNO general assembly, Zahid Hamidi, a protégée of Anwar Ibrahim and then UMNO Youth chief, moved a motion during the debate of the presidential speech. Zahid brought up the issue of cronyism and corruption during his speech. This was seen as an indirect attack to Dr Mahathir. Cronyism and corruption were seen as the reason for the weak Asian economic fundamentals including Malaysia. It was also these two issues that brought down the former Indonesian president Suharto.
As a response, Dr Mahathir pulls another rabbit out his political hat by releasing list of names of Bumiputera that had benefited from the government’s share allocation schemes. These names includes Anwar Ibrahim’s father.
That was the clearest sign of Anwar’s challenging Dr Mahathir leadership. Many observers felt that the days of Anwar were numbered. However the swiftness of Anwar’s removal and the subsequent events caught everyone by surprise.
The sacking of Anwar Ibrahim on 2 Sept 1998 ends the dynamic partnership of Mahathir and Anwar in running the country and marked the beginning of the split within the Malays.
As expected, Anwar did not go quietly. He rallied his supporters for massive demonstrations in the capital city and held rallies around the country to gather support. Malays who were left out from the economic growth felt that it is time to push for reforms and PAS was fast in throwing support behind the man they once criticised as the traitor to the Islamic religion.
The political stakes during the 1999 general election were high. There was a general consensus that changes with the existing sociopolitical conditions were possible. It was also in the spirit of reforms that Chinese associations introduced the 17-point election appeals.

2.1.7 The split of the Malays and Chinese voters as kingmaker
The gentlemen’s agreement to discuss anything sensitive within the Alliance was tested several times throughout the history of Malaysia. The last one was during the 1999 general elections. It was a few months prior to the general elections that 11 Chinese association came together to form The Malaysian Chinese Organisations Election Appeals Committee, or in short Suqiu. The main component of the Suqiu committee were the United Chinese School Committees Association of Malaysia (Dong Zong), United Chinese School Teachers Association of Malaysia (Jiao Zong) – collectively known as Dong Jiao Zong – and nine other Chinese associations (refer to Appendix A for the full list).
Suqiu came out with a 17-point appeal and “call upon all political parties and candidates in the coming general elections to declare their support and endorsement” (Suqiu 2002, p. 11). This was seen by the BN as pressure by the Chinese community from outside the Alliance to bow to their demands and the failure of the MCA to co-opt and check on this dissident voices.
After the sacking of the former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim, the Malay community was split and thus, support from other communities were even more crucial to ensure that BN stayed in power. Thus, the BN government did not take this 17-point appeal kindly and saw it as blackmail by the Chinese community. As the Chinese consist of 26 percent of the population, any swing by the Chinese electorates would ensure victory to any candidates the Chinese choose to support. As noted by Heng (1999), “the Chinese vote will affect the outcome of this election more decisively than any other held since 1969”.
Khoo Boo Teik (2003, p. 128) in his book Beyond Mahathir: Malaysian Politics and its Discontents noted that “it has become one of UMNO’s stock political myths that ‘disunity’ was something the Malay community could not afford because it implied weakness that would be exploited by others”.
Ratnam and Milne (1970) in their paper published in the Pacific Affairs, noted that in the 1969 general election, UMNO were only commanding 47.7 per cent of the valid Malay votes as compared to Pan Malaya Islam Party (PMIP, the predecessor to PAS) 52.3 per cent.
Khoo (2003, p. 128) suggested that this ‘Malay disunity’ would be invoked to rally for support for UMNO. UMNO argued and persuaded PAS to join the enlarged BN in 1971 and pushed for aggressive implementation of NEP.
In 1987, prior to Operation Lalang, there was an internal power struggle in UMNO between Team A headed by Dr Mahathir and Team B spearheaded by Tengku Razaleigh.
In 1998, it was a challenge to Dr Mahathir leadership mounted from the reformasi movement. In order to rally for Malay supports, UMNO had to create a credible ‘non-Malay threat’. Thus, Suqiu was single out for that purpose.
Weiss (2000, p. 413) noted that the Malay vote was “clearly split between UMNO and PAS”. Lee (2002, p. 177) also concluded that the “deep split in the Malay community was obvious with the participants on the reformasi demonstrations launched by Anwar were largely Malays”. Lee (2004, p. 88) noted that “Dr Mahathir’s own reputation had suffered as a result both from the 1997-98 financial crises and from the handling of Anwar’s [reformasi] challenge”.
The Chinese were with the BN since the 1995 general elections. The BA coalition with PAS and Keadilan closely identify with the reformasi movement did not appeal to some Malays and especially the non-Malays. As noted by Weiss (2000, p. 421), some Malaysian voters “expressed dissatisfaction with or distrust Anwar, seeing him as just another opportunistic BN politician”.
Weiss (2000, p. 421) noted that for the non-Malays, Anwar was known for its “pro-Malay, pro-Islam policies of the 1980s and 1990s that have disgruntled non-Malays; hence, his multiracial rhetoric rang a bit hollow to some”.
Thus, in the elections, the choice was clear. It was between the BN’s politics of development and stability and BA’s politics of justice and good governance.
However, even when BA tried to move beyond ethnic politics, its own campaigns and conducts during the run up to the elections played into BN’s hand. Weiss (2000, p. 425) noted that since its formation, Keadilan “has grown more Islamic in image”.
BA tried hard to move beyond ethnic politics even though they know very well that ethnic issues still appeal to Malaysians. PAS government in Kelantan – in a move seen as trying to appeal to the Chinese voters – lifted the ban on pig farming.
Even though this move was commendable, Chinese voters never distinguish PAS Islamic politics with UMNO Malay nationalist politics. Lee (2004, p. 90) pointed out that “many Chinese rejected the link between the DAP and PAS”.
Even in the early years of Malaysia, during the debate of national language after the Razak Report was published in 1956, PAS was seen as “being critical of the government for what is felt to be the inexcusable gradualism in making Malay the sole official language, and foolish tolerance towards the persistence of other language” (Roff 1967, p. 319).
Weiss (2000) noted that the elections results for the Keadilan candidates could be interpreted as voters identifying Keadilan as a Malay-based party, as all its successful candidates were Muslim Malays. Lee (2004) also pointed out that the party that gained most in the 1999 elections was PAS.

2.2 The Political Economy of the Press In Malaysia
In Malaysia, the media, especially the press, was controlled through media ownership and also via coercive legislations. Zaharom (2002, p. 112) observed that “the early 1980s saw the emergence of new titles, signifying to many a liberalisation of media policies, a relaxation of control”. However, almost all national dailies in Malaysia are published by three groups that are owned or linked to individuals or political parties of the ruling coalitions.
New Straits Times Press (NSTP) publishes two English dailies – NST and Malay Mail – as well as two Malay dailies – Berita Harian (BH) and Harian Metro. Utusan Melayu (Malaysia) publishes the influential Utusan Malaysia. Both NSTP and Utusan are linked to UMNO. Star Publications (M) Sdn Bhd – which is owned by the MCA through Huaren Holding – publishes the leading English daily, The Star.
Thus, as observed by Zaharom (2002, p. 117), that the local press “while seemingly increasing in number, nonetheless are controlled by the same few actors … invariably aligned to political parties and leaders”. Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 2-3) also concurred that the press in Malaysia are largely owned by politicians or politically influential businessmen.
Hilley (2001, p. 12) noted that the main agenda-setting agency in Malaysia is the mass media, and they “represent a vital part of the UMNO network, helping to filter information, entertainment and civil values”. Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 3) noted that these BN-controlled media have been “used by the BN to promote and legitimise itself as well as to discredit political opposition and dissent more generally”.
Hilley (2001, p. 12) also observes that Malaysian media, since 1980s have been “encouraging a form of safe ‘role model’ media discourse based on lifestyle images and social concerns”. This strategy, observed Hilley (2001:13), has provided a context for “managed media debate, helping to keep dissent distanced from any meaningful critique of the power structure”. Anyone louder than the ‘tolerated noise’ will be shut out from the debate.

2.2.1 History of Newspapers in Malaysia
The first newspaper published in Malaya was the English language Government Gazette, later called the Prince of Wales Island Gazette (PWIG) on 1 March 1806 (Mustafa 2002, p. 140; Mohd Safar 1996, p. 57). According to Mustafa (2002, p. 140), in the early 1800s, “there was no existing law in the Straits Settlements governing the issuance of newspaper licences”.
The first Chinese language newspapers, The Chinese Monthly Magazine, started its publication in August 1815, and it was produced not for local population but for audiences in China.
Only by 1876, the first Malay newspaper, Jawi Peranakan, was published in Singapore. The first Tamil newspaper, Singai Warthamani was started a year earlier.
During the Japanese rule, the press was designated as the main tool of Propaganda Department of the Japanese Military (Mohd Safar 1996). After the Japanese surrendered, Malay newspapers such as the Utusan Melayu, which was highly influential among the Malay, particularly rural Malays, took on a more “aggressive role in raising Malay consciousness pertaining to the hotly debated issue of Malayan Union” (Mohd Safar 1996, p. 213).
However, Utusan Melayu was involved in a takeover by UMNO in 1961. The newspaper worker called for editorial independence that was in line with the newspaper’s original philosophy of fighting for ‘the race, religion and homeland’, while UMNO insisted that the daily should consciously give full support to UMNO (Mustafa 2002, p. 145-46). The 93-day strike was finally over with UMNO gaining control over Utusan Melayu. As observed by Mustafa (2002, p. 146), this is “the first instance in Malaysian journalism since independence of a political party taking over a newspaper”.
Press freedom in Malaysia has close links to the political climate in Malaysia. Press freedom is usually tightened by the ruling coalition when there are threats to the power of the ruling coalition.
As observed by Mustafa (2002, p. 146), in the aftermath of May 13, press freedom in Malaysia was further restricted. Regulations were amended and ownership structure was changed in the early 1970s.
The government then felt that the locals should control the local media industry; hence the purchase of major stocks in Straits Times Press (STP) Group in 1972 by government-owned PERNAS, which was later transferred to UMNO investment company called Fleet Holdings. By 1984, the transfer was completed and STP was changed to NSTP.
The MCA also began to acquire various media interests starting with their purchase of 67.35 per cent of Star Publications (M) Sdn Bhd in 1979.

2.2.2 Media Legislation
The tightening of legislations governing the media in Malaysia usually follows as a result of the need for the ruling coalition to exercise greater control over the media. Mustafa (2002:149) observed that “traditionally, the threats of communism and communalism provided justification for these laws. However, the rationale for retaining and applying these laws has been widened and, in some cases, made vague enough to leave a catch-all effect”.

Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984
The main law governing the media has been amended 4 times, each time to tighten and gave the state more power over the media. The Printing Presses Ordinance of 1948 was revised in 1971 and 1974 as the Printing Presses Act. It was then revised in 1984 as the Printing Presses and Publications Act, and again in 1988 after Operasi Lalang in 1987.
Initially, this legislation was meant to exercise control over the ownership of printing presses and publications in the face of an increasing threat from communist in Malaya (Mohd Safar 1996).
The amendment in 1987 gave the Home Minister the power to grant printing permit to any newspapers circulating in Malaysia. The minister’s decision to grant the permit is final, and cannot be challenged in a court of law.

Internal Security Act (ISA) 1960
The ISA was also introduced by the government as a ‘safety net’ at the end of the communist threat in Malaysia. The Act empowers the home affairs minister to impose preventive detention without trial on anyone “acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia” (Means 1991, p. 142). Zaharom (2002, p. 124) noted that “over the years, the ISA has seen many people detained not necessarily because of communist connections or subversive activities”.

Official Secret Act (OSA) 1972
The political uncertainty after the May 13 riot provided some justification for the government to introduce the OSA. In theory, this Act prohibit a person from getting information that is deemed an ‘official secret’, but in practice, “it hampered the working journalists and dampened the development of investigative journalism” (Mustafa 2002, p. 151).

2.2.3 The 90s in Malaysia
The improving standard of living of Malaysians, and the general atmosphere of liberalisation after the 1990 “provide the golden opportunity for the profit-driven mainstream newspapers to attract more readers and, by extension, more advertisers by publishing reports and analyses that were politically safe and sanitised” (Mustafa 2002, p. 152).
Mustafa (2002, p. 152) observed that during this period, papers in Malaysia “had undergone cosmetic changes in terms of format and the use of more colours as a way of making themselves visually more attractive”.
Loh and Mustafa (1996, p. 111) observed that “these changes made up for the newspapers’ weaknesses in the crucial area of investigative journalism, and incisive and illuminating commentaries”. Mustafa (2002, p. 152) noted that “these editorial developments constituted a form of social control as they helped newspapers to divert themselves – and the public’s attention – away from controversies, depoliticise issues, and displace people’s rights to political participation”.
The press was generally not critical of the ruling party, but would only give coverage to the opposition when there are opportunities to demonise them. Mustafa (2002, p. 155) observed that “the depiction of political parties in the opposition coalition as disparate and lacking both compatibility and direction, only reinforced the BN’s stereotype of the opposition as being unreliable and unfit to govern the country”.
The mainstream press as a whole was willing to cooperate with the state and placed its resources, expertise and influence at the disposal of the BN. Mustafa (2002, p. 162) observed that “the mainstream press under the tense circumstances of September 1998 was unmistakably partisan”. The negative coverage on Anwar after his sacking without him being given any change for rebuttal and the portrayal of street protests as the act that would threaten national security and political stability only goes to show what the press are ready to sacrifice in time of crisis.
The change of editorial of NST is closely linked to the power struggle within the UMNO leadership. Back in 1993, Anwar Ibrahim, then Malaysian Finance Minister, through his associates, bought into NSTP and TV3 in a steps widely seen as a preparatory to Anwar’s successful challenge later that year for UMNO’s deputy presidency.
Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 126) observed that “in the run-up to [UMNO] election, although TV3 and NSTP newspapers were not blatantly supportive of Anwar, they gave him prominent and favourable coverage, while ignoring Ghafar [Baba, then deputy prime minister and deputy president of UMNO] and his camp”.
In the lead-up to the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim in September 1998, Anwar’s associate, Johan Jaafar, editor-in-chief of Utusan Malaysia, and Nazri Abdullah, group editor of Berita Harian – the leading Malay language dailies – were removed. This removal was seen as an early step in getting ready the media for an all out assault on Anwar after his sacking.
Lee (2004, p. 100) suggested that the purchase of Nanyang Siang Pau and the China Press was an attempt by Dr Ling Liong Sik, then president of MCA, to deal with the continued challenge from Team B. While this might be an internal power struggle within the MCA, Chinese in general see this episode as an “attempt by the government through the MCA to further domesticate the Chinese press”.
Lee (2004, p. 100) noted that “editorial in the Chinese press are relatively more independent compared with the Malay and English language newspapers”.
During the proposed use of English in teaching Mathematics and Science controversy, several groups expressed strong reservations. They included Malay language supporters and Chinese educationists. Even Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (DBP) expressed their reservations. However, Malay language press choose only to highlight the Chinese protests, as if the Malays are united behind this UMNO’s initiative. One could only imagine the Malay press reactions if this idea was mooted by the MCA.
Lee (2004, p. 104) pointed out that the Malay press like Utusan labeled the Chinese educationists as “chauvinists and exclusionists”.
In the period leading up to the 1999 general elections, Utusan was careful not to bash DAP for its political association with PAS. The contest for Malay votes was fierce at that time between UMNO and PAS, and any attempts to discredit PAS would be detrimental to UMNO’s efforts in garnering Malay votes, as PAS generally commands substantial supports from the more conservative Malays.
Utusan, however, portrayed DAP as a party that did not respect rule of laws, and Utusan implied that this attitude contradicted DAP’s political struggles. In its 11 August 1999 report, Utusan urged Chinese to deny DAP their support because DAP did not respect the rule of laws, and not for DAP’s association with PAS.
Perhaps, with the increased sophistication of media consumers in Malaysia, there is hope in this controlled media environment. As observed by Zaharom (2002, p. 131-32), “stringent though the political and economic controls on the Malaysian media may be, raising vital questions about democratic practices, nonetheless it would be rather premature to assert that media audiences are simply duped into accepting at face value what is produced by the controlled media”.

2.3 Suqiu
Suqiu is the common name for The Malaysian Chinese Organisation Election Appeals Committee. According to Wong Chin Huat, writing in Suqiu Document, Suqiu is literally a “voters’ manifesto”. This 17-point appeals (the Appeals) was launched on 16 August 1999, and by the eve of the 1999 general elections, this document was later endorsed by 2095 organisations nationwide (Suqiu 2002, p.13).
These organisations were mainly Chinese organisations because it is a Chinese community’s initiative. However, Wong pointed out that its spirit and substances are definitely not Chinese but Malaysian oriented. Lee (2002, p. 184) also noted that the points raised by Suqiu could be divided into two types; the more universal goals similar to the ones promoted by civil society groups, and the one that reflects the usual Chinese concerns like equality in economic, education, and cultural rights (refer to Appendix A).
Plenty of the 17 points raised in the Appeals were universal in nature. For example, Point 14 urged the government to restore confidence in the police force. Suqiu reiterated their stand again on 17 October 2000 by issuing a press statement which urged the government to review the “salary scheme of Malaysian police, to build a clean and professional Police Force, and the regain public confidence” (Suqiu 2002, p. 114).
It is therefore not wrong to say that government did agree and shared the same sentiments as that of Suqiu. Some of the points of the Appeals were later implemented by the government. The 5th Prime Minister of Malaysia Abdullah Ahmad Badawi on 29 December 2003 announced that Malaysian government will set up a Royal Commission to “study and recommend steps to enhance the capability of the Royal Malaysia Police (PDRM) (Bernama 29 Dec 2003).
According the Bernama news report, Abdullah said the proposed commission would modernise all operational and work aspects of the police, taking into account policing techniques and human rights issues, including women's rights.
In fact, Lee (2002, p. 184) noted that the Cabinet “voted to support the Appeals in principle”. However, during the period leading to the general elections, the BN took the usual strategy to ethnicised legitimate universal appeals in order to whip up ethnic sentiments.
While UMNO’s strategy was to focus on the ethnic aspect of the Appeals, PAS and Keadilan avoided the ethnic appeals and focus on the universal ones.
Looking back, Suqiu is not something new from the Chinese community but a “continuation of its previous calls for an inclusive Malaya/Malaysia”. In the 80s, there were also two similar documents – Memorandum of National Culture (1983) and the Joint Declarations of Chinese Organisations (1986).
Back in June 1999, with elections expected to be held anytime, the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall (SCAH) took the initiative to organise dialogue between the Chinese community leaders and the representatives of both the ruling and oppositions political parties.
On 16 August 1999, the SCAH together with 10 other Chinese organisations launched the final version of the Appeals in Malay, English and Chinese.
One interesting episode within the Suqiu was the proposal by the Federation of Chinese Assembly Halls of Malaysia (FCAM) to include an ethnic Chinese second PM and an ethnic Chinese Finance Minister as part of the final draft. Even though Suqiu rejected outright this suggestion from FCAM, it was eventually accused by the mass media of playing up racial sentiments.
The main theme for the Appeals were promote national unity, advance democracy, uphold human rights and justice, curb corruption, fair and equitable economic policy, review the privatisation policy, enlightened, liberal and progressive education policy, let multiethnic cultures flourish, protect the Malaysian environment, develop and modernize new villages, housing for all, protect women’s rights, fair media, restore confidence in the police force, upgrade social services, respect the rights of workers, and provide for our indigenous people.

2.3.1 History of Chinese pressure
The three main concerns of the Malaysian Chinese can be summed up in three aspects – politics, economic, and culture.
Politically, the Malaysian Chinese had always felt that Malay special rights put the Chinese as second-class citizens. Milne and Mauzy (1999, p. 95) noted that the Chinese felt that they “should be hired in the public service, armed forces, etc., in accordance with their proportion in the population”.
Economically, Malaysian Chinese felt that the aggressive implementation of the NEP had compromised their opportunity in business.
Malaysian Chinese also takes the right for mother-tongue education seriously because language vital for the continuation of Chinese culture. Milne & Mauzy (1999, p. 90) noted that the “Chinese seemed to be especially vociferous on language and educational issues”.
Lee and Heng (2000, p. 194-5) argued that Chinese political parties on both sides of the national political divide “have always sought to represent the community bedrock interests: rights of full citizenship, opportunity for economic advancement, preservation of the Chinese language and Chinese schools, and outlets for public cultural expression”.
Politically, Malaysian Chinese had come to terms with the Malay special rights, and economically, Malaysian Chinese had been able to form symbiotic business partnership with Malay corporate elites.
The issue of Chinese education has remained a fundamental concern to the Chinese community, and currently remains the most contentious of all its concerns. Kua (1999, p. 1) noted that “the Chinese schools in Malaysia have indeed been steeped in politics from the start of their existence”. Tan Liok Ee (2000), in her writing on Chinese schools in Malaysia noted that Malaysia is the only country outside of China where there is a well-developed system of Chinese schools that is largely supported by the state. She argued that these Chinese schools are not only educationally significant but also culturally and politically important to the Chinese.
Tan (2000) argued that the Chinese schools in Malaysia are an unusual example of education institutions which began as schools serving a migrant community, but were able to evolve into a vibrant part of the education system of a multi-ethnic nation.
According to the Report of the MCA National Task Force (1988, p. 89) published in 1988, and Tan (2002, p. 157) close to 90 per cent of Chinese parents sent their children to Chinese primary national-type schools. This percentage drop a bit a few years later and Lee (2004, p. 105) pointed out that some 70 per cent of Chinese parents send their children to Chinese schools.
This 70 per cent also includes some 60,000 non-Chinese students enrolled in Chinese schools in 2000 (Tan 2002, p. 164). Thus, Chinese educationists maintain that the Chinese school stream is not exclusivist. According to Tan (2002, p. 155), there are today 1,284 national-type primary schools (NTPSs), and 60 independent Chinese secondary schools (ICSSs).
The ruling government also makes it a point to point out that the existence of ICSSs is not an issue and their existence are guaranteed under the Education Act 1996. This issue will surface every time an election is near. In the period leading up to the 1999 general elections, Malaysian government, perhaps anticipating that it will resurfaced again, reminded political parties not to exploit this issue [‘Chinese school here to stay’, The Star, 5 September 1999, p4].
Chinese schools could be found not only in towns but also small villages, wherever there was a group of children needing a school and some local leaders prepared to take the initiative to organise one. According to Tan (2002, p. 157), local leaders “had a social and moral obligation to keep the schools going and, together with Chinese schoolteachers, enjoyed both status and respect for their role in fulfilling a social and cultural need”.
The common complaints of Chinese educationists were that there was “no provision for new or additional NTPSs, less generous grants, and insufficient attention on training more teachers” (Tan 2002, p. 157).
In the past, Chinese schools grew according to local needs. Since independence, government has played a dominant role in education, seeking control over all schools, including the growth of Chinese schools.
Even in the days leading to the independence of Malaya, Chinese education groups were vocal in voicing their protests in what they saw as steps by the government to sidelined Chinese education and Chinese language values. Roff (1967, p. 318) noted that the “Chinese Guilds and Associations response to the release of the Razak Report in 1956 by demanding that Chinese language be accepted as an official language as well, and be accorded the same status as the Malay language in the national education system”.
Within the framework of the Alliance, MCA too tried to pressure its partner, UMNO in endorsing Chinese language as an additional official language. After Dr Lim Chong Eu was elected the president in 1958, the Jiao Zong, and the Chinese Guilds and Associations began to pressure Dr Lim.
It is difficult to tell why an English-educated politician would take up this cause. Certainly by taking up this cause, Dr Lim hoped to draw these Chinese organisations into the national decision making process.
However, this decision was not being received kindly by UMNO, especially after Dr Lim wrote letter to Tunku Abdul Rahman, outlining demands concerning language and the increase of seats allocation in the upcoming elections. MCA threatened to quit the Alliance unless these demands were met. The Alliance National Council, which Tunku was the chairman, announced that MCA must withdrawn these demands. Soon after that, Dr Lim resigned as the president of MCA and was replaced by Tan Siew Sin, the son of MCA founder.
This episode demonstrated that the role of MCA within the ruling coalition is to explain and persuade the Chinese community to support government’s policies, not as a vehicle to pressure the government. This episode is a clear lesson for the Chinese organisations that it is usually fruitless to pressure the government through political channel.
Pye (1985, p. 251) also pointed out that “Confucian culture do not provide any guidelines for Chinese leaders to function in a non-Confucian context”. Worse still, the idea of Chinese being the subordinates of a foreign power is “unthinkable”. Pye (1985, p. 251) added that “any Chinese who acts as a leader must be an imposter, if he is subservient to the Malay majority leadership”.
This observation might explain the low status of MCA leaders in the Chinese community. The Chinese had long dismissed MCA leaders as selling out Chinese rights when they agreed to the deals brokered with UMNO. Gomez and Jomo (1999, p. 12) observed that “in vein of the bourgeois nature of the MCA leadership and its subservient role to UMNO in the ruling coalition, the party has always have much difficulty in galvanising and sustaining the support of the working-class and middle-class Chinese”.
As Pye (2985) pointed out, the “MCA leaders who supported the pro-UMNO constitutional deal were characterized as self-serving towkays (merchants) … and who were willing to serve as UMNO lackeys in order to reap the spoils of the political office”.
It certainly did not help the MCA that their early leaders were mostly merchants. Chinese cultural and language leaders, that have extensive networks with the masses were largely aligned to the MCP, the party that British choose to ignore despite MCP’s contribution to the fall of the Japanese Occupation in Malaya.
Having said that, Lee and Heng (2000, p. 223) argued that the Chinese in Malaysia have developed “appropriate responses to successive groups of power wielders, and that Chinese co-operation in the Malaysian political system is central to the maintenance of political stability and inter-ethnic harmony”.

2.3.2 The chronology of the Suqiu episode
1999 June – The Civil Rights Committee (CRC) of Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall (SCAH) worked on to organise a dialogue between the Chinese community leader and the representatives of both the ruling and opposition parties.

1999 August 16 – Final version of the Appeals launched in Malay, English and Chinese and Suqiu started the endorsement drive.

1999 Sept 6 – DPM Abdullah said “Suqiu is not allowed to bargain with government”.

1999 Sept 20 – PM Dr Mahathir labeled Suqiu as “a mean to pressurise the government” and criticised it for “damaging racial harmony”.

1999 Sept 23 – 11 ministers, led by Dr Ling Liong Sik, Dr Lim Keng Yeik and Dr Lau Hieng Ding, met with Suqiu and accepted the Appeals in principle. NST quoted Dr Ling as saying that “Suqiu represented 99 per cent of Malaysian Chinese”.

1999 Oct 19 – Suqiu issued a press statement that to date, Suqiu has not received any invitation to sit on the NECC II. However, Suqiu resolved not to do so should the invitation arrive in the future. Reasons given are: Suqiu will promote the Appeals through public education; and since BN, in principle, have accepted the Appeals, it is up to the Cabinet, not NECC II, to realise those Appeals.

1999 Oct 19 – BA expressed their supports to a number of principles and concerns outlined in the Appeals.

2000 May – Suqiu permanent secretariat was set up in SCAH.

2000 August 8 – Judgment day for Anwar’s corruption charge.

2000 August 14 – Malay media tried to plying up businessman David Chua’s call for overview of Bumiputra privileges in an interview with FEER.

2000 August 16 – First anniversary celebration and launching of Suqiu website. The next day, Utusan headlined “Persatuan Cina Ulangi Tuntutan” [Chinese association repeat its demands].

2000 August 17 – 200 UMNO Youth members, lead by its deputy chief Abdul Aziz, demanded Suqiu to abandon its Appeals and to apologise to the Bumiputra society within a week, or, they will burn down the SCAH.

2000 August 31 – PM Dr Mahathir labeled Suqiu as ‘extremist’ and made equivalent to the communist and religious insurgent in his National Day speech.

2000 Sept 15 – 20 members of Suqiu committee meet up with PM to explain Suqiu aspirations. PM admit BN accept the Appeals before the general elections so that BN will not lose Chinese supports.

2000 Nov 29 – BA secured victory in Lunas by-election, a mix constituency which has been BN stronghold since Independence.

2000 Dec 11 – PM reiterated his equating of Suqiu with the communists when answering questions by Kota Melaka MP (DAP) Kerk Kim Hock in Parliament. PM admit the government was just forced to accept the Appeals in principle.

2000 Dec 13 – 500 members of GPMS held a demonstration. Its president Suhaimi Ibrahim demanded Suqiu to withdraw all its 83 sub-points within a month or Gabungan Pelajar Melayu Semenanjung (GPMS) will call for national demonstration and issue their own 100 demands.

2000 Dec 29 – Suqiu negotiated with UMNO Youth to set aside 7 sub-points.

2001 Jan 5 – Suqiu ‘put aside’ seven out of its 83 sub-point appeals in a joint statement with the UMNO Youth.

[1] Abdul Aziz Ishak had confiscated all the licenses of Chinese rice millers in northern Perak and Province Wellesley (Seberang Perai, Penang) with which to win Malay’s supports.
[2] The Third Malaysia Plan (1876-80) acknowledges the poverty of non-Malay groups, and their need for improved access to education, healthcare and amenities.

Chapter 1

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and Rationale
If the newspaper is the first draft of history, then whoever controls the papers will control the initial stage of history writing of a country. In research on social, political and economic issues of a country, newspapers are often the first reference point. Political players that control the paper could exercise their influence over the content of a particular paper, and indirectly influence the interpretation of events by future researchers. As pointed out by Farish A. Noor (2002, p. vii) in the introduction to his book, The Other Malaysia, “history and politics, are, and have always been, two of the most contested discursive terrains for the simple reason that to control the writing of history means having the power to determine the past, present and future of any nation”. Farish added that the “the awkward silence and blind spots in the national historical narrative were not there by accident” (p. vi).
In modern society, political players often have dominance over events in the country, and their interpretation of events is often accepted as the ‘right’ reality, more so when they exercise a strong grip over the media. With control over the media, the main players in Malaysia could then construct ‘reality’ and interpret events to their advantage.
In Malaysia, the Malays have dominated the political sphere since Independence in 1957, and through its political party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), have exercised political power over every facet of Malaysian society. As pointed out by Farish A. Noor (2002, p. vi), “a close reading of Malaysian official historiography will show that the Malaysian historical subject remains male, Malay/Bumiputra, middle-class and Muslim”.
Malaysia is often portrayed as the success story of post-colonial multiethnic society, where different ethnic groups lived together within a national political framework of equal power sharing. However, after the May 13 riots in 1969, the Malays, through legislative and government policies, increased their dominance in the Barisan Nasional (BN), the ruling coalition that governed Malaysia since Independence.
The interpretation of events is often skewed towards the legitimation of Malay dominance, and Malaysian papers, especially the Malay language papers, often reflect this.
During the period leading up the 1999 general elections in Malaysia, ethnic issues surfaced and were passionately debated by Malaysians through media like newspapers.
The first rationale of this thesis is to illustrate that ethnic politics is still very much alive despite claims by Malaysian political observers that ethnic politics has taken a backseat to a more principle-based politics. In the 1999 elections campaigns, the public discourse that was used to analyse and rationalise the elections results was made mainly from an ethnic perspective.
The second rationale of this thesis is to point out the inconsistencies of the interpretation and reporting of facts and issues by the mainstream newspapers which are largely controlled by the political parties in Malaysia. Since newspapers are one of the sources of research materials, these inconsistencies will probably seep into future literature. This situation has to be rectified in order to minimise the misinterpretation of history by future researchers. This thesis is a modest contribution towards that process.


1.2 Objectives of the Thesis
Against the backdrop of the historical role of the media in society, this thesis aims to understand the influence of ethnic politics in shaping media coverage of national issues using the Suqiu episode as a contemporary case study. It is commonly said that history is the winner’s version of the story.
This study does not intend to find out the quantity of news on Suqiu episode, or on the quantity of biased news – negative or positive – on this episode.
Rather, this study will take on a qualitative approach, examining the distortion of this episode by mainstream papers and how papers framed this episode based on ethnic politics.
It is important to properly understand the nature of the Suqiu episode and how this episode was distorted by the press.
Literature on Malaysian politics in 1999 largely focused on the split of the Malay community and the effect of the sacking of former Malaysian deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim to the electoral patterns and elections results.
This thesis aims to make up for the lack of proper documentation of this episode, as this writer feels that it is important to set the record straight for future researchers.

1.3 Research Question
In short, this study will attempt to understand what attributes of the Suqiu episode were emphasised by the press in the context of ethnic politics in Malaysia.
Specifically, this thesis attempts to understand how politicians and public figures initially framed this episode. Since the press has close relations with politicians, how did the press frame this episode and were there any difference between the framing of this episode by papers of different languages?
This thesis will discuss the findings of this episode within the context of ethnic politics.

1.4 Methodology
This thesis will use framing analysis as a method to study the influence of ethnic politics in the framing of national issues by the Malaysian press. While taking into consideration the nature of Malaysian politics, this thesis will attempt to identify frames used by these national political players as portrayed by the press in the Suqiu episode.

1.5 Scope of Thesis
This thesis will include data collected from Malaysian mainstream papers in 6 months before the 1999 general election which was held on 29 Nov, as well as data from the second phase of the episode in 2000. Papers include English language papers like New Straits Times (NST), The Star and The Sun; Malay language papers like Utusan Malaysia (Utusan) and Berita Harian (BH); and Chinese language papers like Sin Chew Daily (Sin Chew), Nanyang Siang Pau (Nanyang), China Press, and Guang Ming Daily News.
Other data are collected from news clippings of Suqiu episode compiled by Suqiu Committee, articles from other news organisations like malaysiakini, and The Straits Times of Singapore. The discussion on the second phase of this episode will mostly rely on data collected from these sources.
The 1999 general election was held in the atmosphere of intense competition after the sacking of Anwar Ibrahim. The potential for change was real, as the opposition leaders were united under Barisan Alternatif (BA) to defeat the Barisan Nasional (BN) government.
Suqiu episode was chosen as the main study subject because writers documenting that period largely ignored it, or only mentioned it briefly. Suqiu episode is a good example of universal political pressure groups being portrayed as a Chinese organisation extorting the BN government.

1.6 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 will provide the political and media background of Malaysia to enable readers to understand the events leading up to the 1999 general elections, and the subtle aspects of racial relations in Malaysia, especially between the economically-strong Chinese community and politically-dominant Malay community.
Chapter 3 will focus on the concepts and theoretical frameworks used in this thesis. Among the theories discussed in this chapter are consociational theory and the myth of news objectivity.
Chapter 4 will explain the methodology and research questions of this thesis.
Chapter 5 will discuss the findings from the data collected within the context of ethnic politics in Malaysia.
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis with discussion on the limitation of this research, and the future political trends in Malaysia.

Gerbang Tempur Politik Maya Kmu Dot Net - Anwar : Malaysiakini's letters

Sort of being quoted in the KMU

Gerbang Tempur Politik Maya Kmu Dot Net - Anwar : Malaysiakini's letters